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of my dumbfounded state when I first took Beckett on as the subject of my 
dissertation at Yale University. My aunt proceeded to check out all of Beck-
ett’s books from her local library. She made herself fluent in absurdity and 
then read my dissertation. My father and mother also encouraged my Beck-
ett thinking. They drove one night to a one-man Beckett monologue per-
formed at a small theater in Providence, Rhode Island, even though they 
had little interest in Beckett. The fact that my parents endured a Beckett 
performance on my behalf moves me to this day. Before the show they 
purchased a small tape recorder and secretly concealed it my dad’s breast 
pocket. My dad became the first man to officially bootleg Beckett. When 
I received the tapes in the mail two days later, I was astonished to find 
that all they had recorded was the noise of my dad’s restlessness during 
the performance, a brushing static sound made whenever he crossed his 
arms or nodded off. Beckett, who described art as a stain on silence, would 
have approved of the way his own words were scrubbed away, and how 
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the sound of an ocean.
This book is about Samuel Beckett’s destitute art. Though his body of work 
seems to offer audiences very little by way of lesson or entertainment, it 
nevertheless has an unusual performance history within settings of real-
world crisis. In landscapes of ruin, Waiting for Godot emerges unexpectedly 
and Beckett’s impoverished aesthetic begins to resonate. A focus on poverty 
is in keeping with the primary trajectory in Beckett’s career, eliminating 
all excess from his work and seeking what Beckett calls “ultimate penury” 
in art.1 Beckett offers us not a rich but a poor—and ever poorer—prose, 
and subject matter likewise stricken by poverty. Entwined with creation, 
poverty is for Beckett a dynamic condition, a “worsening” rather than an 
achieved state.2 In conversation with Lawrence Harvey, Beckett observes, 
“What complicates it all is the need to make. Like a child in mud but no 
mud. And no child. Only need.”3 Beckett’s work undertakes an endless sub-
tractive movement, removing first mud, then child, leaving only need and 
then perhaps something less than need. His texts explore an aesthetic of 
worsening suitable to the inherent dispossession of his itinerant subjects, 
figures in a perpetual state of emergency. This enterprise to deplete rep-
resentation places Beckett firmly in the camp of the avant-garde. Perform-
ances of Waiting for Godot in prisons, in Sarajevo during a civil war, and in 
post-Katrina New Orleans, however, reveal an alternative potential for his 
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work. Abstruse to many critics, Beckett’s postdramatic minimalism makes 
under these circumstances an immediate and unexpectedly emotive appeal, 
as the survivors of flood, siege, and carceral institutions become literate in 
Beckett through their predicament. This study explores the illuminating 
encounter between Beckett’s theater and these environments.
 The Work of Poverty is a discussion of “poor Beckett,” but it also aspires 
to add to existing discourses about poverty and worklessness. I isolate four 
key Beckettian tropes: need, exposure/abandonment, enough, and beg-
ging the question.4 Beckett uses the terms “exposure” and “abandonment” 
to describe the unsheltered condition of his evicted vagabond figure, for 
whom privation has supplanted privacy, similar to Walter Benjamin’s “new 
poverty.”5 Beckett’s term “enough,” his measure for the barely adequate, 
resonates with Giorgio Agamben’s concept of “bare” or “naked life,” the 
biopolitical status to which the individual is reduced in the modern state. 
The way Beckett’s work begs questioning provides us with the antithesis of 
Franz Kafka’s literature of petition. The Trial and stories such as “The Build-
ing of the Chinese Wall” honor petitio principii to the letter: they situate their 
narratives around the investigation of a missing premise, for example, the 
basis of Joseph K’s guilt and cause of his arrest.6 Whereas Kafka actively 
raises questions within the text, thereby encouraging a hermeneutical 
response from the reader, Beckett begs questions and invites an interroga-
tive relation to his work. Beckett’s defense of the remainder and his pursuit 
of the barely adequate are key to the recurrent but critically underappreci-
ated place of poverty in modern thought. Beckettian poverty differs sharply 
from depictions of the struggling poor in novels of Charles Dickens and 
Victor Hugo, which trade on “mere misery where destitute virtuous moth-
ers may steal bread for their starving brats.”7 The Work of Poverty explains 
why Hugo’s Les Misérables lands on Broadway while Beckett’s hobos turn 
up in Sarajevo. It shows how Beckett’s thematic discussion of poverty and 
his legendary theatrical, textual, and formal sparseness act together to pro-
pel the emergence of his theater on “stages of history,” landscapes mired in 
the aftermath of catastrophe.
 Although it has not yet achieved this status, Beckett’s destitute the-
ater ultimately deserves a place next to fellow modernist playwright Ber-
tolt Brecht’s aesthetic of didacticism, his Epic theater. Brecht approaches 
theater as a pedagogical instrument rigged to expose the contradictions 
of capital, showing the audience that theater is illusion. Brecht’s theater 
aspires to deny the viewer empathy by interrupting the theatrical illusion 
and drawing the spectator toward a state of critical awareness. The actors’ 
estrangement from their roles, the unexpected appearance of a stranger 
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in the doorway, the immobilization of a scene into a sudden tableau are 
devices that tear away the theatrical veil and remind the audience of the 
mechanism of its production. To this, Beckett’s Waiting for Godot provides 
a pointed antithesis. Not only does the play go uninterrupted, but its crux 
depends on a stranger who never shows up at all. The endless waiting for 
something to happen in Beckett’s plays inverts Brecht’s message that condi-
tions must be understood in order to be changed.8 On Beckett’s stage, noth-
ing changes and little is understood.
 If Brecht’s Epic theater seeks to educate and to make critics of his audi-
ence, what purpose are we to ascribe to Beckett’s theater of destitution? 
This purpose is glimpsed in what I call the crisis performances of Wait-
ing for Godot: productions in the impoverished contexts of Lüttringhausen 
Prison (1953), San Quentin State Prison (1957), and Raiford Prison (1974); 
McComb, Mississippi during the Civil Rights Movement (1964); Sarajevo 
in the midst of civil war and genocide (1993); post-Katrina New Orleans 
(2007); and in Zuccotti Park during Occupy Wall Street (2011). Beckett never 
stages crisis; rather, these crises stage Beckett. The reduction of the human 
subject in the prison, in the city under siege, and in the area devastated by 
flood meshes with the scant remains of persona and action witnessed on 
Beckett’s stage. Though Beckett rarely commented on Brecht’s work, Brecht 
was outspoken on what he took to be Beckett’s apolitical stance. In 1953 
Brecht made a stab at fashioning a Gegenentwurf (counterpoint drama) to 
Waiting for Godot, deleting some lines and adding others in order to make 
the play into a commentary on class. Estragon becomes ein Prolet (deroga-
tory slang for a proletarian), Vladimir an “intellectual,” Lucky a “donkey or 
policeman.” Pozzo becomes ein Gutsbesitzer (landowner) and a noble, “Von 
Pozzo.”9 Yet Brecht cannot refunction the dysfunctional figures on Beckett’s 
stage to his purpose and ultimately abandons the attempt to rewrite the 
play. Though it is the dramaturgical antithesis of Epic theater, Godot resists 
participation in dialogue with Brecht. The problem for Brecht is that Beck-
ett’s play advances very little. The play exposes a situation rather than 
posits a viewpoint. Because the play is the situation, Brecht has difficulty 
instrumentalizing it.10 What can Brecht offer Beckett’s outcasts? What coun-
terstance can Brecht strike against their abandonment, against their postso-
cial condition? Outside systems of exchange of labor and capital, Beckett’s 
vagabonds obstruct inscription into social context.
 In fact, Brecht does resolve this impasse, and The Work of Poverty takes 
a cue from his resolution. Brecht opts to leave the text and performance 
of Godot intact. Instead, he contextualizes the play by projecting cine-
matic footage of social revolutions in Asia, China, the Soviet Union, and 
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Africa behind the actors. In the words of Clas Zilliacus, the tramps are not 
“dragged into society. Instead, they are shown as voluntary outsiders hav-
ing chosen to part with a progressing world.” 11 Brecht realizes, in other 
words, that he must put his eraser and pencil down and approach Godot 
through the situation of performance. Brecht’s solution undoes the audi-
ence’s fascination with Godot’s absence as well as the religious and meta-
physical speculations it has sustained. The audience is asked to critically 
divide its attention between the stage and the cinematic space adjacent to it. 
Instead of invading the play, Brecht chooses a display of force, massing the 
troops of historical revolutions at the border of Beckett’s stage. The force 
exerted over Beckett’s play by Sarajevo, San Quentin, and New Orleans 
exceeds that of a cinematic backdrop. These crisis settings permeate every 
aspect of the play: not just performance but rehearsal, production, and 
audience. Whereas Brecht’s revolutionary filmstrips invite the spectator 
to dismiss Beckett’s stage through dialectical contrast, these environments 
align themselves with the subadequate conditions of Beckett’s stage. Cri-
sis encircles Beckett’s stage not to set it off (negate it) but to set off (like a 
bomb) the need and frailty of its images.
 Brecht understands something crucial in his effort to elicit meaning 
from Beckett: though too poor to instantiate a reality, Godot demands jux-
taposition to one. The condition of need on Beckett’s stage exerts a radiant 
effect over contiguous spaces. Waiting consumes all the spaces adjoining 
the stage, including the seating, the lobby, and even the space of move-
ment toward the theater. Drama theorist Elin Diamond remarks that Godot 
“paradoxically begs for meaningful context.”12 Brecht does not fabricate a 
context per se for Godot. His cinematic and archival images allow Beckett’s 
play its autonomy while indicting it as a willful abandonment of history 
and political action. Beckett does not seek alienation for effect, and there 
is no redemption, no charity, no call to action that would alleviate it. For 
Beckett, alienation is tied neither to man’s fate nor to labor. As we will see, 
need is not confined to the stage in San Quentin, Sarajevo, or New Orleans. 
Susan Sontag remarks that the separation of actor and role—the discipline 
demanded by both Brecht and Epic theater—is impossible in her Sarajevo 
production. The play calls for the character Pozzo to eat a piece of chicken 
and casually toss the bones aside in front of the hungry vagabonds. With no 
chicken available, Sontag resorts to a papier-mâché likeness. What need is 
there to expose the illusion, what opportunity is there for a lesson on class 
when the actor is himself hungry and where conspicuous consumption 
describes the actors’ bodies rather than Pozzo’s display of luxury on stage? 
In Sarajevo, chickens are for the pot, not the theater. Need is too urgent to 
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allow the bird to become a prop. The actor does not have the freedom to 
alienate himself from his hunger. Beckett’s work takes root in contexts that 
repudiate Brecht’s strategy of alienation. The destitution of Beckett’s char-
acters is registered, even exacerbated, in the very process of producing the 
play.
 Histories of Beckett performances tend to focus more on the directorial 
interpretation of his work than on an aesthetic of poverty. Critical emphasis 
on fidelity is partly a by-product of Beckett’s meticulous attention to detail 
as a director, and of the playwright’s absolute rejection of productions that 
“creatively” alter his text or stage directions.13 The language of paternity 
and proper inheritance pervades the backlash by critics dismayed by Son-
tag’s decision to cut Godot in half and turn Vladimir/Estragon into three 
distinct couples played by a total of six different actors. Everett Frost lines 
up with the Beckett estate when he makes a distinction between “Beckett’s” 
Godot and the “bastard twin” that he names “Godot-as-metaphor,” staged at 
the Youth Theater in Sarajevo.14 Frost’s emphasis on the purity of the tex-
tual Godot, which he calls the “full measure of the experience of the play 
written by Samuel Beckett,” is made clear by this comparison of Sontag’s 
production to a sibling abandoned at birth.15 Yet this abject status befits 
Sontag’s version of Beckett’s vagabond drama staged amidst a siege. The 
challenge is in recognizing this poor bastard performance without trying 
to restore it to the lineage of sanctioned productions. The goal here is not to 
issue a critical imprimatur but to learn how the adversities of war, prison, 
and flood impose their marks and fractures on these performances. These 
alterations to the face of Beckett’s play are not makeup added by the direc-
tor (willful infidelity) but the look of suffering it assumes in response to its 
surroundings.
 Literary critics who make no specific mention of these performances 
nevertheless evoke their possibility. In his 1967 essay “Beckett’s Purga-
tory of the Individual,” Darko Suvin writes that Beckett’s work finds rel-
evance in crisis: “The lack of a central and all-embracing relevance should 
not . . . make us forget what relevance can be found in Beckett’s work: for 
where and when it is relevant, it is supremely so. I suggested earlier that it 
was relevant in random and closed situations of human experience: in war, 
camps, prisons, sickness, old age, grim helplessness of all kinds.”16 Some 
of the settings Suvin hypothesizes as settings for Beckett have in fact mate-
rialized in the performances I discuss: war (Sarajevo), camps (the Lower 
Ninth Ward, with the FEMA trailer camps nearby), and prisons (Lüttring-
hausen, San Quentin).17 The other sites Suvin mentions provide us with 
food for thought, the possibility of Godot staged in retirement communities, 
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hospices, and hospital waiting rooms. Suvin remarks upon the “random 
and closed” quality of experience under these circumstances. Such impov-
erished sites sustain experience without horizon and within an economy 
of the ever-same. The closed systems of these environments find their echo 
in the hermetic structure of Beckett’s stage. In Godot, as in prison, “Noth-
ing happens, nobody comes, nobody goes, it’s awful!”18 Though Suvin 
describes the experiences of the prison, the camp, and war as “random,” we 
can observe that they are, in fact, just as structured and managed as the the-
ater itself. Godot is summoned not before natural disasters but before unnat-
ural ones: the wasteland by design of the carceral system, the combined 
engineering failure of the levee and inadequacy of governmental response 
following Katrina, the ethnic cleansing of Sarajevo.
 Relevance is more personal than meaning for a play. Suvin under-
scores the “where” and “when” of the relevance of Beckett’s work because 
it addresses people in particular situations—not just as theatergoers. Godot 
becomes relevant to audiences faced with “grim helplessness” through 
a mechanism other than representation (mimesis). In New York or Paris, 
Waiting for Godot is a highly mediated and avant-garde play. In the context 
of crisis, the play is self-evident, intuitive, even necessary. Vivian Mercier’s 
observation that Godot is a play in which “nothing happens, twice” becomes 
jarringly real for the displaced residents of the Lower Ninth Ward.19 Cap-
tive to forces deaf to their argument, prisoners understand the disjunc-
tion between the characters’ declaration (“let’s go”)20 and their subsequent 
immobility, but they see this predicament as familiar rather than absurd.
 Marked by mass uprootings, illegitimately detained subjects, and man-
made and natural disasters, our era finds its symptom in Beckett’s litera-
ture of dereliction. Crisis productions of Waiting for Godot are neither an 
aestheticization of the world nor a mirror held to it. Sontag’s production 
in Sarajevo and Paul Chan’s production in New Orleans both appear on 
the front page of the New York Times and in other major news media. While 
the headlines treat the confluence of crisis and theater as a sensational nov-
elty, I take it to be inherent in Beckett’s design. The response of the flood 
evacuee, the inmate, and the siege victim help us engage the play’s dras-
tic address. As I will show, these audiences’ reception illuminates waiting, 
structures of the waiting process, names for waiting, and the awaited. They 
help us read the play’s first line, “nothing to be done,” and the final stage 
direction, “they do not move.”21 Beckett’s theater exists, in a sense, after the 
world is over: an impoverished theater of aftermath.
 These audiences do not forget their situation in their encounter with the 
play. Martin Esslin remarks upon this as he introduces his classic study of 
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avant-garde theater, The Theatre of the Absurd, with the image of 1,400 spell-
bound convicts watching Vladimir and Estragon on the stage. Esslin asks, 
“Why did a play of the supposedly esoteric avant-garde make so immedi-
ate and deep an impact on an audience of convicts?”22 Prisoners, many of 
whom had never been to the theater before, were able to embrace a play 
that perplexed and angered theatergoers who were free to walk at intermis-
sion. In the early 1950s, Beckett’s only unqualified success was with crimi-
nals. Yet as we will see, the inmates’ responses are not entirely immediate, 
as if they were uneducated, nor do they construe Beckett’s work as nothing 
more than a circus act. Their reactions are mediated by their experience of 
the institution. They have been schooled there in a way that the critic will 
do his utmost to avoid: in living with the situation depicted on Beckett’s 
stage. After the performance in San Quentin, the convicts appropriate the 
names of Beckett’s characters to designate functions within the prison hier-
archy: “Lucky” is a man on death row, “Pozzo” is a guard.23 Godot in these 
contexts takes these audiences where they happen to be. Catastrophe turns 
the prisoners into readers of Beckett.
 Esslin overlooks the degree to which the setting is an active agent in 
this reception of Beckett’s play. A 1954 production of Waiting for Godot in 
Belgrade, Yugoslavia, stands as perhaps the purest rendering of Beckett’s 
absurd theater, as the play was performed for no audience at all. The per-
formance occurs in the context of the Eastern Bloc’s designation of modern 
theater as Western decadence. Prerag Dinulovic´, artistic director of the Bel-
grade Drama Theatre, agrees to begin rehearsals of Godot as a gesture of 
openness to Western culture. Concerned about the political repercussions 
of a Beckett performance, however, he eliminates the production in the 
announcement of the theater’s official repertoire, continuing all the while 
to rehearse the play.24 As the day of the premiere approaches, management 
grows increasingly wary of the plan to stage the play. Theater is important 
to Belgrade, and producing this play carries risks.25 What will be the conse-
quences of staging this most Western, most decadent piece? A compromise 
is found: the theater company will to go ahead with the production but 
allow no audience into the theater. Guards posted at the entrances allow 
only actors and stagehands to enter. The show goes on before an empty 
house, the spell interrupted only by a few intrepid theatergoers who man-
age to climb in unobserved through an open window and peek at the stage 
while crouched between the rows.
 This performance is unwittingly Beckettian, and I read Soviet bureau-
cracy as a crisis environment. By letting the performance happen but only 
under the condition of sealing it off from all witnesses, the administration 
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avoids the potential debate that shutting it down before opening night 
might have caused. Like a photo from which a suspect individual had to be 
erased, the Godot performance takes place, but without any aberrant sub-
jectivity marring the historical record. The performance literalizes Beckett’s 
idea of art as a “stain on the silence.”26 It also honors the suggestion Beck-
ett made at the time of the play’s first London production: “If they did it 
my way they would empty the theatre.”27 The evacuation of the audience 
does not represent an ironic “success” of the play but the fulfillment of its 
principle. When performed before an audience in a traditional theater set-
ting, the proscenium arch issues an official limit, a property deed, to the 
no-man’s-land on Beckett’s stage. Performed before an “empty house,” 
this emptiness does not end awkwardly with the front row. Likewise, the 
Belgrade production turns the prison performances of Godot inside out. At 
San Quentin, guards are stationed at the exits. In Belgrade, the guards are 
turned in the opposite direction. They are there to ensure that only theater 
workers enter. The guards do not interrupt the production, only the effects 
that the play might have produced. In Eastern Bloc absurdity, those effects 
are encountered by no one but the characters on stage, whose loneliness is 
actualized, whose abandonment is enforced by guards, and who really do 
just go through the motions as if opening night were indistinguishable from 
a rehearsal. Trees fall in theaters differently than in the proverbial woods. 
Beckett’s skimpy tree falls and is permitted to make a sound, but only in 
official documentation and not in anyone’s ear, not in anyone’s memory.
 Modern history provides more and more settings for Beckett’s stage, 
conditions under which Beckett is to be rediscovered. Suvin concludes his 
discussion about Beckett’s relevance by remarking, “As children of this cen-
tury . . . we have seen that it is often very difficult to tell the centre from 
the periphery. The threat of grim helplessness hangs continually over all 
of us collectively.”28 Textual analysis of Godot might observe that Beckett’s 
work precipitates the reversal of center and periphery by turning outcasts 
into dramatic personae. But Suvin here is looking off Beckett’s stage rather 
than on it. He approaches Beckett’s relevance by observing that the extreme 
conditions under which Beckett’s theater finds its address are losing their 
exceptional status.
 Situations beyond the stage, wherever there is shattering of the histori-
cal continuum, bring audiences into alignment with Beckett’s world. This 
alignment does not happen with the solar regularity of the moon’s rotation 
of the earth. It is episodic but frequent, the modern era’s tendency toward 
recurring and ongoing catastrophe. Beckett’s stage emerges in landscapes 
of dispossession, among people under threat. Beckett called this the “time-
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honored conception of humanity in ruins.”29 The crisis is not one of postmo-
dernity (the structural loss of center) but of poverty, foretold by Beckett’s 
impoverishing aesthetics, of an endlessly peripheral human subject. Beck-
ett’s aesthetics of poverty break the geometrical idea of periphery as a limit. 
His theater does not give us conceptual tools to think through our world. 
Instead, part of our world becomes visible in its déjà vu encounter with 
Beckett’s stage.
 Belgrade, New Orleans, San Quentin, and Sarajevo are not perform-
ances in extremis, spectacular and peripheral instances in which theater 
is called upon to resist the conditions that envelop it. In fact, the strange 
catharsis that prisoners and flood and siege survivors find in Beckett’s post-
dramatic theater is part of a growing awareness about how history is unfor-
tunately obliging Beckett’s microcosm. Finding Beckett’s relevance gives us 
an inkling of where we are headed as well as where we already are.
 Chapter 1 explores the performances of Waiting for Godot within carceral 
institutions. What qualities of Beckett’s play appeal to audiences “doing 
time”? How does the play read their situation? In the second half of the 
chapter, I reverse this question: how do the inmates illuminate Godot? What 
do they discover unacknowledged within Beckett criticism? Through the 
case studies of ex-convicts K. F. Lembke and Rick Cluchey, and inmates 
at Raiford Prison in the Florida State Penitentiary system, a different play 
emerges. The prisoners seize upon something only implicit within Beck-
ett’s impoverished theater. Former inmate Rick Cluchey, who later becomes 
friends with Beckett and Beckett’s preferred actor and interpreter of the 
roles of Hamm and Krapp, told me in 2011 that prior to Herbert Blau’s 1957 
production of Godot at San Quentin, he “had never been in a theater, not 
even to rob one.” Cluchey’s transfigurative encounter with the play illumi-
nates a possible response or outcome to Beckett’s hermetic stage. Following 
the Godot performance, Cluchey forms an actor’s workshop in San Quentin. 
He goes on to write plays (The Cage and The Wall Is Mama) that are critical 
rewritings of Waiting for Godot. Instead of breaching the “closed system” 
of Beckett’s play, Cluchey works more deeply within it, first as an under-
study reenacting Beckett’s figures, and then as an author of theatrical pris-
ons. Cluchey’s career repeats and expands the range of the closed system of 
Beckett’s work.
 Waiting for Godot has also been summoned before a city under siege and 
a postdiluvian no-man’s-land. Chapter 2 explores two performances that 
situate the play within disaster: Susan Sontag’s 1993 production of Godot 
in Sarajevo and the Paul Chan/Classical Theater of Harlem production 
of Godot in New Orleans in 2007. How do these performances enlist Wait-
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ing for Godot to the cause of humanitarian intervention or political protest? 
Sontag’s and Chan’s productions force reconsideration of the traditional 
understanding of performance context. Directors have always refashioned 
the stage to localize or update the setting of a play, as in productions that 
resituate Richard III between the two world wars. The productions I discuss 
submit Beckett’s play to conditions of need rather than just novel contexts. 
The play must meet these conditions like terms for a surrender: they affect 
the characters on stage as well as the actors and the production process.
 Chapter 3 examines the intrusion of reality into Beckett’s work at an 
interior and subjective level: the thought processes of his vagabond narra-
tors. Though critics have referred to Beckett’s characters as “learned” and 
even “philosophic,” the vagabonds seem to disperse, rather than dispense, 
knowledge. Drawing from Beckett’s prose works, I show how Enlighten-
ment protocols of reason that shore up the autonomy of the individual 
cannot sustain defenseless and impoverished subjects. We encounter the 
impoverished condition of Beckett’s narrators not mimetically but in the 
emergency state of thinking perforated by what the subject cannot pos-
sess. Beckett’s trilogy gives us monologic vagabond thought: thought in 
rags and without shelter (condition) but also thought in a constant state of 
displacement (movement). I isolate several distinct modalities of vagabond 
thought.
 In chapter 4, the role of the reader comes into view. What is an impov-
erished reading of Beckett? How can we maintain an unresentful disposi-
tion toward the indigence of Beckett’s work and respond to its needfulness 
without substituting something of value in its place? I show how Beck-
ett’s work ultimately abandons the figure of the derelict and begins inter-
rogating the worklike nature of the literary work per se. Decimated of 
both premise and possibility, late prose pieces such as Worstward Ho take 
begging to a new intrinsically literary level: they beg questioning. Our 
response to his literary work is structured primarily around the process 
of asking questions the work itself is unable to pose, as if his work were 
unable to afford question marks. Yet Beckett is not nihilistic. In Worstward 
Ho, a tract against nihilism, the work appears as its own writing manual 
in which the “less” and the “worse” are paradoxically “more” and “bet-
ter.” “Pox on void” is Beckett’s pithy slogan against the zero.30 It is counter-
balanced by his striving for the “meremost minimum.”31 Beckett calls this 
process “perjorism,” a worsening, in counterdistinction to “meliorism.”32 
Beckett’s destitute works culminate in the asymptotic nature of an escalat-
ing condition of need in which the figure for need, the hobo, is missing. I 
contrast Beckett’s defense of the remainder, his injunction toward the less 
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and the worse, with the more apocalyptic tone of his contemporaries, par-
ticularly Georges Bataille’s imperative, following the devastation of Hiro-
shima, “to lift, in the instant, a form of life to the level of the worst.”33 I 
situate the final phase of Beckett’s art of indigence as an infinite travail of 
reduction within his literary precedents, notably, the wisdom of Voltaire’s 
Pangloss, who declares this to be the best of all possible worlds, and Edgar 
in King Lear, who observes, “The worst is not, / So long as we can say ‘This 
is the worst.’”34
 In the afterword I discuss my production of Waiting for Godot in Zuc-
cotti Park during the Occupy Wall Street protests in New York City in Octo-
ber 2011. The Occupy movement sought to call attention to the iniquities 
of the global financial system that placed most of the wealth and political 
power in the hands of a privileged few (the 1 percent) while disenfranchis-
ing the many (the 99 percent). As with the other performances examined in 
the book, Zuccotti Park acquired the physiognomy of a Beckett stage before 
our group, the 99% Theater Company, performed the play. The Occupy 
movement, rather than march on the street in the manner of a more tra-
ditional protest, undertook vagabond existence, squatting on private land 
in a seemingly public space among the monoliths of capital that required 
constant policing. To throw light on conspicuous consumption, the protest-
ers chose the route of conspicuous habitation. The production set the stage 
for a collision between Beckett’s theater, a restless and downtrodden crowd 
of protesters, and hundreds of armed police that surrounded the encamp-
ment. Performances of Godot in Zuccotti Park resonate with San Quentin, 
Sarajevo, and the Lower Ninth Ward. A thread of Beckett’s poverty links 
the dissimilar but similarly exposed and threatened communities of prison 
inmates, flood survivors, citizens living under siege, and occupiers next to 
America’s most celebrated and yet possibly least hospitable street.
Convicts Introduce the Absurd
Martin Esslin begins The Theatre of the Absurd, his landmark study of avant-
garde drama, with the performance of Waiting for Godot at San Quentin 
State Prison in 1957. He asks, “Why did a play of the supposedly esoteric 
avant-garde make so immediate and deep an impact on an audience of con-
victs?”3 Esslin never quite answers this question, but in asking it he exposes 
a crucial problem: how can an aesthetic whose chief offering is alienation, 
in a play that stages the consciousness of tramps and hobos, be so popu-
lar? Popularity implies familiarity. By whom, and under what conditions, is 
Beckett welcomed as familiar?
 Prison inmates make a brief but stunning appearance in Esslin’s study. 
They usher in the ostensible essence of the absurd in the book’s introduc-
tion, titled “The Absurdity of the Absurd,” and they endure as the audience 
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Godot behind Bars
1
you will be surprised to be receiving a letter about your play, “Wait-
ing for godot,” from a prison where so many thieves, forgers, toughs, 
homos, crazy men and killers spend this bitch of a life waiting . . . and 
waiting . . . and waiting. Waiting for what? godot? Perhaps. . . . We are 
all waiting for godot and do not know that he is already here. yes, here. 
godot is my neighbor in the cell next to mine. let us do something to 
help him then, change the shoes that are hurting him!
—letter to beckett from k. f. lembke, inmate at lüttringhausen Prison1
 
i had never been in a theater. not even to rob one.
—rick Cluchey2
•  •  •  •
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that sticks in the reader’s mind. Though Esslin does not pay them another 
visit until the conclusion of his book, the prison appears repeatedly in the 
periphery of his analysis, as if it were trying to force itself back into the pic-
ture and back into Esslin’s consideration. About Genet, for example, Esslin 
writes, “It was prison that made him into a poet.”4 It returns again in his 
discussion of Beckett’s visit to Paris’s La Santé Prison, across from which 
Beckett would later live. Beckett goes there to see the pimp who had inex-
plicably stabbed the author one night on the streets of Paris. When Beckett 
inquires why he did it, his assailant replies, “Je ne sais pas, Monsieur.” Of 
this response, Esslin notes, “It might well be the voice of this man that we 
hear in Waiting for Godot and Molloy.”5 The voice of Beckett’s work, Ess-
lin suggests, emerges through the prison’s bars: this incapacity to reflect, a 
voice without motivation, memory, or knowledge, constitutes the poverty 
of self on view in Beckett’s work. The prison seems finally to offer us an 
institutional framework for understanding the absurd. Even Esslin’s opera-
tive definition of absurdity, borrowed from Camus, “the divorce between 
man and his life, the actor and his setting,”6 resonates emphatically with 
life in prison. The fact that “living in prison” so easily merges with the 
phrase “life in prison”—the difficulty of separating one’s existence in 
prison from one’s sentence there—gives us a syntactical understanding of 
Camus’s notion of the disharmony between who one is and how one lives.
 Esslin describes the riddle of Godot’s popularity with criminals in this 
way: “What had bewildered the sophisticated audiences of Paris, London, 
and New York was immediately grasped by an audience of convicts.”7 
How does a sequestered audience come to enjoy a play that metropolitan 
sophisticates regard as inaccessible? Esslin answers this question by devel-
oping a highly mediated approach to the absurd: he employs philosophy, 
the “criterion of psychological truth,” and the historical contexts of Jean 
Genet, Eugène Ionesco, and Beckett in order to understand our encounter 
with their work.8 His book is notably titled The Theatre of the Absurd, not 
The Absurd Theatre; indeed, Esslin’s is a theater that is beholden to, and pur-
veys, the concept of the absurd. It is hard to imagine such a tome on the 
shelf of a prison library, because it does not address what Esslin calls the 
“immediate grasp” of the criminal. He justifies his approach by observing 
that the theater of the absurd (and here he speaks of both the dramas and 
the critical text he is writing) “allows the audience to take home an intel-
lectually formulated philosophical lesson.”9 Yet the question begged by his 
own introduction persists: what do we take from Beckett if we have no home 
to take it home to? People who have the ability to return home can convert 
their encounter with Beckett into a kind of philosophical souvenir. But what 
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lesson is imparted by Beckett’s play if this lesson cannot be consumed, like 
a novel or a philosophical treatise, in private?
 Esslin remains spellbound by the immediacy of the convict’s grasp and 
circles back to this audience to explain the goal of his study. “It is the pur-
pose of this book,” he writes, “to provide a framework of reference that 
will show the works of the Theatre of the Absurd within their own conven-
tion so that their relevance and force can emerge as clearly to the reader as 
Waiting for Godot did to the convicts of San Quentin.”10 According to Ess-
lin, Beckett requires us, in one form or another, to do time. We must either 
break the law or read Esslin’s book. But do these two paths get us to the 
same place? In aiming to reunite the audience of scholars with the audience 
of thugs and thieves, Esslin neglects to observe what the prisoners actually 
do when faced with Beckett. Where Esslin wants us to go through a frame-
work of reference in order to see the relevance of the theater, the convicts 
do not distinguish reference from relevance at all. Instead, as I will show, 
they appear to respond to what speaks to their condition as prisoners. In 
collapsing reference and relevance, the prisoners create the address and 
elicit the force of the work. The pimp in jail is so intuitively familiar with 
Beckett’s world that he is already the so-called voice of that work. What 
kind of encounter does his predicament, rather than his knowledge of phi-
losophy, sustain with Beckett’s work?
Mink Coats and Striped Suits
Beckett’s play has been performed in numerous prison settings. These 
include performances done by and for prisoners (in Lüttringhausen, Ger-
many, in 1953, which Beckett called “the true Godot”), by groups that 
brought the play to prison (San Quentin in 1957 and the Florida State Peni-
tentiary system in 1974), and by outsiders who came to direct and train the 
convicts in the play (Jan Jönson in Kumla, Sweden, in 1985).11 The prison 
is a strikingly unexpected place for theater not only to appear but also to 
thrive, much like Sarajevo and New Orleans were, as I discuss in chapter 
2. The prison context offers a third kind of devastation area, one at only the 
slightest angle to both Sarajevo and New Orleans, as a ready-made back-
drop for Beckett’s play. The no-man’s-land of prison is, ironically, inhabited 
only by men.12 Yet as is suggested by its performance history, the appear-
ance of Beckett’s play is a recurring rather than a unique event. Sontag’s 
and Chan’s productions appear next to catastrophes that, according to the 
directors, have gone unaddressed. By contrast, performances of Godot in 
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prison are almost as old as the play itself: opening night in Lüttringhausen 
Prison followed the premiere of Godot at the Babylon Theater by only eight 
months. The ongoing appeal of Waiting for Godot to prisoners is another 
indication that the institution of prison is an ongoing crisis. The perform-
ances I discuss call attention to how the play resonates with experience as it 
is structured by carceral institutions.
 The failure of Beckett’s play at its American premiere at the Coconut 
Grove Playhouse in Miami is well known. The headline of the June 4, 1954, 
edition of the Miami Herald announced the unintended alienation effect of 
the play: “Mink Clad Audience Disappointed in ‘Waiting for Godot.’” What 
catches the eye is the way the distinctive evening wear of the spectators 
enters into the announcement of the play’s failure, as if the critic were look-
ing more closely at the audience than at the stage. It raises the question, 
does it matter what one wears to a Beckett performance? What is the cor-
relation between one’s place in the fashion system (here: the vacationing 
tourists in Miami) and the connection one might conjure with the shabby 
vagabonds on Beckett’s stage? A comparable title for this chapter might be 
“Striped Audience with Numbers on Backs Wildly Fond of ‘Godot.’” For 
one of the peculiar dimensions of Beckett’s play is its continuing resonance 
with an audience forcibly deprived of all fashion statements, who are allot-
ted a very standardized wardrobe, who are neither on vacation nor at work, 
and who dwell, as former inmate Rick Cluchey says, “in limbo, trapped in 
the greyness of your own uniform of flesh.”13
 The prison performances provide a substantial structure to the play. 
Unlike the Chan and Sontag productions, in which Godot is replaced by 
an expressly negligent public figure or agency (Clinton, FEMA), prison per-
formances of Godot transpire in a sequestered and nonpublic space, with-
out headlines and without clever proposals about who might terminate the 
waiting process. Staged in the recesses of the institution, the carceral Godots 
exist in a kind of infamy, befitting the contraband status of a play that slips 
behind the walls. He who never appears (Godot) nevertheless keeps bring-
ing his promise to arrive to Lüttringhausen, San Quentin, Kumla, and Rai-
ford prisons. A population under siege or the survivors of a flood may 
seem to suffer differently than a prisoner suffers: what can the experience 
of war and evacuation, of historical time breaking open under the force of 
traumatic events, have in common with the experience of the meticulously 
measured time of the institutional setting? Yet Beckett’s play links these dis-
similar but equally exposed communities: Sarajevo, New Orleans, and the 
prison form a constellation around the uncanny solace they find in Waiting 
for Godot.
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Exposure, Routine, Closed Space, Movement
When it is performed in jail, Waiting for Godot invites prisoners to relocate 
the performers and performance within their predicament, as the audi-
ences in Sarajevo and New Orleans do. Four aspects of Beckett’s play wel-
come this process: exposure, routine, closed space, and the movement on 
Beckett’s stage. Vladimir and Estragon’s unsheltered condition resonates 
unexpectedly with the inmate. Prisoners are exposed to a sea of forces, the 
cruelty of guards and inmates, in a manner similar to the vagabond’s forced 
exposure to the elements. They are an exemplary instance of what Giorgio 
Agamben calls “bare life,” la nuda vita, life in a permanent state of excep-
tion, shorn of qualities and traditional attributes.14 The nakedness of Beck-
ett’s characters is not the one that they had at birth but one they acquired, 
what remains after an endless process of stripping down and exfoliation: 
“Under this coat I am naked. Far more than when I was born.”15 A mere res-
idue to the implacable and barren stage, the characters display a placeless-
ness that resonates with men shuffled around by an indifferent institution. 
The itinerant, like the prisoner, lives without assurance.
 Waiting for Godot reduces drama to a set of routines. Critics have com-
pared these routines to that of circus performers and clowns: “A music 
hall sketch of Pascal’s Pensées as played by Fratellini’s clowns,” observes 
playwright Jean Anouilh in his review of Godot’s premiere.16 These rou-
tines have also been compared to the movements of a prisoner. Underscor-
ing first the weariness of these repetitions and then their futility, Adorno 
speaks of the “battered repetitions that Beckett’s whole oeuvre irresistibly 
drags in. . . . The repetition compulsion is learned by watching the regres-
sive behavior of the prisoner, who tries again and again.”17 Where Anouilh 
suggests that Beckett gives us philosophy (Pascal) articulated through the 
highly animated and effect-oriented pratfalls of circus performers, Adorno, 
by contrast, insists that the play gives us a lesson in regressive behavior, 
repetition, and ineffectuality. Adorno even proposes that Beckett’s situation 
of impasse, in which every action hits against a wall, was learned from the 
prisoner.
 Provisionality appears in the way Vladimir and Estragon kill time on 
stage. The tension here is between the improvisational quality that Anouilh 
and other critics attribute to Beckett’s “clowns” and the provisional qual-
ity of actions performed against the backdrop of despair. Provisional is a 
key term in the Beckett lexicon and describes that which is temporary yet 
urgent, ephemeral yet necessary. Beckett applies the term in describing the 
provisional hospital of the Irish Red Cross, observing, “‘Provisional’ is not 
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the term it was, in this universe become provisional.”18 Yet it accurately 
describes the way Beckett’s hobo figures occupy the stage and the mea-
sures (i.e., the habits and routines) they take in order to cope there. If Beck-
ett’s figures evoke a music-hall sketch, as Anouilh claims, then they do so 
only through the most damaged kind of improvisation, one drained of the 
spontaneity and surprise usually associated with the term. Beckett’s stage 
inverts Heidegger: rather than being “in time,” Vladimir and Estragon live, 
eat, and speak “for the time being.”
 The aimless and habit-structured interaction on Beckett’s stage speaks 
to prisoners who have every hour of their day organized from above. They 
grasp how habit, as Vladimir puts it, is the “great deadener.”19 In his essay 
on Proust, Beckett writes that “habit is the ballast that chains the dog to 
his vomit.”20 By showing only habit on stage, Beckett thereby implies the 
prisoner’s chain. Even the sun seems to be going through the motions, as 
familiar and recycled as a summer-stock theater: “The day,” says Vladimir, 
“is very near to the end of its repertory.”
 Martin Puchner notes the discrepancy that exists between the irratio-
nality of Beckett’s characters and the rationality, the methodical precision, 
of their movements. This rupture, Puchner observes, “must be seen as one 
of the strategies with which Beckett attacks the integrity of the actor. The 
association of verbal and corporeal expression and the expectation that 
they together represent a character are challenged by this dissociation of 
dialogue from gestural expressivity.”21 Vladimir’s thorough investigation of 
the emptiness of his hat and Vladimir and Estragon’s movements toward 
each other, one step at a time and only in between their moments of spo-
ken dialogue, are actions that indicate a paradoxical deliberation apart from 
conscious awareness. The stage directions tell Vladimir and Estragon to 
step toward each other only when they do not speak. Implicitly, a differ-
ent agency articulates their bodies. The directives come (literally) below the 
level of the script. These are the movements that the actor knows but which 
his body reads aloud.
 Beckett’s stage directions, more than those of any other dramatist, are 
rules for actors. Not coincidentally, he also does a great deal to confine his 
actors: in large urns (Play), mounds of dirt (Happy Days), and trash cans 
(Endgame).22 Beckett’s stage directions seep into the proceedings, under the 
principle that the less things happen, the more Beckett needs to keep watch 
over the things that do. The directions include complex readings of the tone 
and even motivation of dialogue: for example, when Pozzo tells Estragon, 
“Wait a little longer, you’ll never regret it,” Estragon’s response, “We’re in 
no hurry,” is preceded by the stage direction “(scenting charity).” The actor 
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is to deliver the line as if Estragon’s nostrils could detect the prospect of 
a handout, and this hypothetical whiff of charity underlies his insistence 
that they will stay where they are. Beckett’s objection to JoAnne Akalaitis’s 
production of Endgame, printed on a program insert, shows how gravely 
Beckett regarded the breach of these parenthetical imperatives: “Any pro-
duction of Endgame which ignores my stage directions is completely unac-
ceptable to me.”23 From this we can see how much more invested Beckett 
was in the procedure of the play than in its vision or concept. What Beckett 
writes within parentheses—never heard by the audience but enacted by the 
performers—is the repository for his authority. Stage directions to Beckett 
are not mere suggestions for how actors might move or deliver their lines; 
they are directives to the stage itself, to the entirety of the dramatic space, 
which is crisscrossed by Beckett’s invisible regulations.
 Stage directions simulate a penal institution in their distribution of 
movement and stasis across the space of the stage. Beckett’s directives 
include the arrest of the characters. The first and second acts conclude with 
Estragon declaring, “Well, shall we go?” to which Vladimir replies, “Yes, 
let’s go.” Only each time this resolution is followed with the parenthetical 
command “They do not move.” The desire to leave, the proclamation to go, 
collides with the stagecraft of the play and provides this vow with a coda 
of futility. In that sense, the play might aptly be retitled No Exit. The char-
acters in Sartre’s play of that name cannot leave because they are beholden 
both to the judgments of others and to their own inauthenticity. But in 
Beckett’s version, No Exit (or, more accurately, Non Exeunt) would receive 
its title from the play’s stage directions, a force not encountered directly on 
the stage but rather one unconscious to the stage. A moment that Camus 
(“the divorce between the actor and his setting”) and Esslin might term 
absurdist becomes jarringly real when performed in the context of prison.
 Beckett’s direction of Waiting for Godot in 1975 at the Schiller-Theater in 
Berlin suggests that he conceptualizes the rhythm of the play according to 
incarceration. In the theater notebooks, Beckett writes, “Thus establish at 
outset 2 caged dynamics, E[stragon] sluggish, V[ladimir] restless + perpet-
ual separation and reunion of V[ladimir]/E[stragon].”24 Beckett stages the 
simultaneous complementarity and opposition between the always restless 
and standing Vladmir and the sedentary and sluggish Estragon. Beckett 
reduces the four humors of medieval personality (melancholic, sanguine, 
choleric, phlegmatic) to the last two that are apparent in the bodies of the 
actors. During Lucky’s monologue they leave and run back as if they were 
being driven mad or as if the cage of the stage could not accommodate their 
mutual separation. Stefan Wigger, who played Vladimir in Beckett’s pro-
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duction, observes that Vladimir and Estragon come together time after time 
“like a rubber band.” The elasticity of the collision suggests that something 
(like a wall) bounces them back together following their sudden departures 
and conflicts. This is the dynamic, and even the moral, noted by inmate C. 
Bandman in his review of Godot for the San Quentin News: “We continue to 
wait. When the scenery gets too drab and the action too slow, we’ll call each 
other names and swear to part forever—but then, there’s no place to go!”25 
The prisoner suggests that the rubber band described by Wigger is in fact 
closer to a chain. Bandman picks up on the caged dynamic between Beck-
ett’s characters, an involuntary rapport between opposites who can neither 
stand nor leave one another.
 Beckett conceives of the stage space for Godot as hermetic. The closed 
space of the stage amplifies the feeling of imprisonment as well as the 
spectator’s frustration. When director Alan Schneider proposed to do the 
play in the round, Beckett objected, saying, “I don’t in my ignorance agree 
with the round and feel Godot needs a very closed box.” He elaborated 
that the proscenium sustains a formal confrontation with the audience and 
heightens “the sense that the characters are ‘all trapped.’”26 Beckett desires 
the squareness of a cell over the circular stage that would allow the audi-
ence to saturate the stage with their stares. Instead of tiers of spectators 
behind the actors from every angle, Beckett prefers the retaining wall of 
the proscenium that emphatically separates the stage and guarantees the 
emptiness of the space around the actors. As discussed in the introduction, 
Beckett pushes this wish to the point of desiring an empty theater for his 
performances, that is, the ultimately closed box of an auditorium whose 
doors never allow an audience to enter. Erin Koshal explains Beckett’s 
stipulation in this way: “In Waiting for Godot . . . solitude is never taken 
for granted. Didi and Gogo do not know what lies beyond the stage, but 
they continually wonder, listening for noises or making out forms in the 
darkness.”27
 Beckett’s play stages the precarious and threatened solitude of the 
inmate. In prison, one is always next to others but never with others. The 
only real solitude in prison, solitary confinement, is involuntary. Beckett’s 
Berlin production underscores the rapport between the characters and the 
empty space that surrounds them. He inserts four “inspection places” in 
which Vladimir and Estragon walk the perimeter of the stage and explore 
the three empty spaces confronting them, including the inaccessible “void” 
in the auditorium.28 How are we to describe this walk in which Beckett’s 
figures physically mark the periphery of the stage and take in the vast 
spaces that hem them in? Though they are “trapped,” Beckett’s characters 
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move like guards on a night watch during an evening in which nothing’s 
happening yet all is not well.
 Limitation of movement is a condition with which the prisoner is inti-
mately familiar. Two weeks before the arrival of Godot, adjacent to articles 
announcing the production, a column in the San Quentin News coinciden-
tally makes note of how prison inmates ambulate within the yard. A pris-
oner by the name of “Etaoin Shrdlu” writes a weekly column titled “Bastille 
by the Bay.” A week before the Godot performance he begins with this note: 
“THOUGHTS WHILE MILLING (Here one mills, doesn’t stroll, wander, or 
pace.)” These “thoughts while milling” are the prisoner’s retort to Schiller’s 
Spaziergang, Wordsworth’s strolls, and Nietzsche’s climbs. The prisoner is 
peripatetic, but with deep restrictions; consequently, his philosophy—the 
thoughts generated by his movement in the yard—is different. The think-
ing generated by milling begins by finding a vocabulary for this movement, 
differentiating it, for example, from both leisurely strolling and professo-
rial pacing. Over these Shrdlu chooses milling, a grinding in place, modeled 
on the repetitive movements of machines. Milling goes on in an enclosure: 
one mills about but never beyond. Two weeks later, Shrdlu will write one 
of the three reviews of the Godot performance. Perhaps without knowing 
it, Shrdlu was preparing himself to describe the movement of the actors 
he would see in Beckett’s play. On the stage one doesn’t stroll, wander, or 
pace. One mills. His choice pseudonym indicates how Shrdlu aligns even 
his writing process within a graphically confined space, something deader 
than a column. He takes his name from the lingo of newspaper typesetting. 
Linotype machine operators were unable to delete typing errors. When an 
error was made, the line could not be reused. The quickest way to get to the 
end of the line was for the operator to run his finger down the closest row 
of keys. The sequence of letters flagged the error for the newspaper com-
positor who would throw out the line. Etaoinshrdlu is therefore a nonsense 
phrase filling the dead space between the typing error and the end of the 
page, a codeword for erase me.
 The characters in Godot encounter a stricture on their freedom through 
the expansiveness, rather than the limitation, of space. For Beckett, incar-
ceration is not conveyed through a psychological condition such as claus-
trophobia. Waiting for Godot emphasizes both the formal limit of the stage 
and the vast emptiness beyond it. The fear he seems to cultivate in his char-
acters is Pascalian: a fear of infinite spaces. This is apparent in Beckett’s 
response to a 1961 television production of Waiting for Godot: “When the 
production was over, [Beckett] sat for awhile with his head in his hands. 
‘My play,’ Beckett said, ‘wasn’t written for this box. My play was written 
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for small men locked in a big space. Here you’re all too big for the place.’ 
And he went on, ‘You see, you could write a very good play for television 
about a woman knitting. You’d go from the face to the knitting, from the 
knitting to the face.’”29 It is the vast space of the theater auditorium, its 
atmospheric pressure, that encloses the vagabonds on his stage. The appa-
ratus of television (its seeing and enlarging across great distances) reduces 
the incarcerating quality of empty space in the theater. Light operates in 
the theater to isolate the characters on stage and separate them from the 
darkened audience. Where the illumination of the stage emphasizes the 
recession of the vagabonds, the television projects their image toward the 
spectator and brightens the living room with them.
 Beckett contrasts the locked space of the stage not only with the propor-
tions of the television box but also with the type of labor dramatized on 
television. His example, not accidentally, is a drama of constructive labor: 
television could enlarge the slight and understated gestures of knitting, 
focusing first on the face of the knitter, then the craft, then back to the face 
of the knitter. Waiting for Godot, by contrast, is a labor of undoing, as there is 
“nothing to be done.” In his “Notes Diverse Holo,” Beckett calls this work 
of undoing “Penelopizing,” after Penelope, wife of Odysseus, who took her 
knitting apart every night in order to postpone her promise to marry.30 Tele-
vision is the proper medium for Penelope by day. Penelope by night, how-
ever, is the province of theater. In Godot, as in the Odyssey, the unraveling of 
work, or Penelopizing, is tied to the activity of waiting.
Theme Not New to Cons
Waiting is the aspect of the play that resonates most emphatically with the 
prisoner’s condition. Institutionalized time is empty time and Godot’s time. 
An adult education teacher at the performance in San Quentin states, “They 
know what is meant by waiting. And they know that if Godot finally came 
he would only be a disappointment.”31 This knowledge of waiting, and 
the implicit knowledge of its emptiness (for what is disappointment but 
yet another missed appointment), is consistently attributed to the prison-
ers by writers grappling with the success of Godot behind bars. The homol-
ogy established between the play and prison life is not very different in an 
article about the return of Waiting for Godot to San Quentin in 1988: “There 
is a lot of waiting in San Quentin. Some 3028 inmates wait for meals; 777 
guards wait for their shift to end; 225 inmates on death row wait for the 
gas chamber; and, on this sunny Thursday, seven men wait around a table 
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in a cramped room. They are waiting for ‘Waiting for Godot’ rehearsals to 
begin.”32 The journalist lulls us with an enumeration of the instances of 
waiting in a prisoner’s day, thereby implying the almost natural emergence 
of Godot within its walls. He claims, with a wink, that they are even waiting 
for the waiting in the play to begin.
 The subheadline of the San Francisco Chronicle review of the 1957 San 
Quentin performance, “Theme Not New to Cons,”33 throws light on one 
of the unique historical trajectories of high modernism. This is a moment 
in the early 1950s when Waiting for Godot, rejected by civilian audiences, 
required the audience of pimps, thieves, and murderers to keep its viability. 
The reviewer welds the event of the play, the nonarrival that constitutes its 
curious (in)action, to the life of the prisoner. The subheadline is testament 
to the way that performances before an audience of criminals transform 
Waiting for Godot from a perplexing novelty to something not new, from 
something challenging (to sophisticated theatergoers) to something popular 
(with inmates).
 Yet these early reviews of Godot at San Quentin are the first instance of 
one of the myths of performing Godot, namely, that a rock-bottom commu-
nity is forged between audience and actors in their wait. As Sidney Homan 
phrases it, “In the presence of such challenges to the meaning of our exis-
tence, we can only say—and say only—that on any given night of a per-
formance of Godot we acted not alone but in concert. . . . Together, actors 
and audience, we waited for Godot.”34 Homan wants waiting to be beyond 
interrogation, sealing what we can say (and can only say) about it. Yet we 
lose our link to the play once we limit the ways we express waiting. The 
Chronicle author establishes waiting as something known to the prisoner (as 
if it were a skill) or, even more drably, as a theme (as if the inmates were 
watching an undergraduate essay on the play rather than the play itself). 
The journalists use the prisoner to block further inquiry into the tempo-
ral predicament both on stage and off. Can one know waiting? What does 
Waiting for Godot tell us about this experience of time, for example, that dif-
ferentiates it from the suspense one would feel watching any other play? 
How does the theatrical waiting during Beckett’s play address the institu-
tional waiting of the prisoner?
 The frequently proposed connection between the prisoner and the play 
resonates with the means that our culture employs to ingest Beckett. Pris-
oners initiate a way for audiences to access Godot; they provide a door into 
the very locked box of Beckett’s stage. The wider public thoroughly domes-
ticates (or thematizes) waiting because they have experienced waiting: for 
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a taxi, unemployment benefits, a call, a spot, tomorrow, or opening night 
of Waiting for Godot. The last scenario, waiting for Beckett, is practically 
scripted by the frequent abbreviation of Waiting for Godot to simply Godot, 
so that Waiting for Godot seems already to designate what we are doing 
before the curtain rises.35 André Gregory’s production of Endgame in 1973 
both evokes and implodes these idioms of waiting for a Beckett play to 
begin when, on the opening night of his production of Endgame, the audi-
ence was greeted with only locked doors and an empty theater.36
 Before even seeing Beckett’s play, audiences are formed, and formulate 
their response to the play, by taking up the implicit invitation to rewrite 
its title. Waiting for Godot has entered our culture primarily through this 
reinscription process (and secondarily through the syllabus). These end-
less reassignments of Godot’s name extend utilitarian waiting (as for a 
bus or cab) to the central dimension of the play. Utilitarian waiting under-
scores the for in waiting for; it assigns a clear endpoint to the waiting pro-
cess. Implicitly, the cause for waiting is also the terminal point of waiting. 
In the next chapter I discuss how Sontag and Chan repeatedly, and seri-
ally, inscribe various objects, authorities, and institutions in the blank space 
of “Godot,” thus inscribing the play’s waiting with an object and a termi-
nus. These productions underscore the absence of the figure awaited by 
Beckett’s vagabonds and rename that figure (as Clinton or as FEMA). They 
thereby highlight the absence of intervention, the undue negligence dis-
played by authorities toward the crises of Sarajevo and New Orleans. In 
sum, Sontag and Chan employ the most famous no-show in theater history 
to dramatize the need for intervention.
 Prisoners also play this game of alternative baptisms, yet in a crucially 
different way. In the San Quentin News, Shrdlu’s weekly column titled “Bas-
tille by the Bay” serves as a kind of New Yorker–style “Talk of the Town” for 
convicts. The day after the Godot performance, we read the following com-
ment: “WITS ABOUT THE YARD are belaboring the obvious as the result of 
the recent stage play and the recentest flick. Seems the picture was ‘Doctor 
at Sea’ with Dick [sic] Bogarde and Brigitte you-know-who. Which leaves 
the quipsters enough ammunition to chortle: ‘You live your life and I’ll live 
mine, I’m waiting for BARDOT!!!’”37 To the prisoner, Godot’s arrival seems 
as unlikely and as impossible as the arrival of a celebrity or the incarnation 
of Bardot out of her projected image. Bardot is at no less a remove from the 
prison yard than Godot, yet she enlists the prisoner in a different sort of 
waiting. Bardot gives the prisoner an image, whereas Godot gives merely 
the promise (through an intermediary, no less) to arrive. The image of Bar-
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dot is already in the prison, and its projection into the prison space allows 
the filmgoer to contour his desire to the screen. The theater, by contrast, 
gives something closer to a rumor, the rumor that someone cares, and hence 
is closer to the endless waiting that goes on in the carceral setting.
 Strategies of renaming Godot gibe with the fact that people remember 
Godot’s absence more than they remember the vagabonds’ waiting. Yet it is 
this arduous process, rather than its purported and vaguely apprehended 
goal, that we see on stage. The headline of the San Quentin News, written 
by prisoners, provides useful contrast to the one already cited from the 
Chronicle: “Workshop Players Score Hit Here: San Francisco Group Leaves 
S. Q. Audience Waiting for Godot.” The transaction that takes place in this 
headline leaves a bitter flavor in the mouth. Godot is not just a hit but, as 
a “hit scored,” a robbery. The gang (the actors) got in and got out (they 
retained their freedom). In the process they leave an ambiguous gift at the 
crime scene. The gift of the play is not the play itself (“Waiting for Godot” 
is not italicized in the headline) but rather something meshing indistin-
guishably with the everyday condition of the prisoner. Beckett’s lesson 
is neither moral nor conveyed by Brechtian slogans. The prisoners were 
aware of this. In his review titled “The Play’s the Thing,” inmate C. Band-
man observes, “It asked nothing in point, it forced no dramatized moral 
on the viewer, it held out no specific hope.”38 While the hope the play 
offers may not be specific, Bandman does not say that there is no hope, 
much less that the play nihilistically embraces hopelessness. Kafka’s obser-
vation that “there is hope, but not for us” leaves hope in the world but 
only as something unaddressed to us: we cannot take hope as one of our 
belongings. Bandman has something similar in mind here. He senses that 
the play offers no specific hope, but possibly an unspecific or generic hope. 
The hope that Godot offers the inmate is akin to the grasp of a new kind 
of drama: the absurd (and absurdly courageous) articulation of one’s own 
powerlessness.
 The lesson of the play brings to reflection what the prisoners were 
already doing, though perhaps without quite realizing it, and certainly 
without realizing it as a stageable drama.39 This lesson includes, and even 
depends on, the recognition that the actors, unlike the inmate audience, are 
free to go home. When the actors are released, the abandoned condition 
of the characters on stage is transferred onto the inmate-spectators. There 
is no specific hope in Beckett’s play, yet as the San Quentin News headline 
maintains, the visit of the actors and the nonvisit of Godot have already 
redefined the time spent behind bars. During the performance and in its 
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aftermath, the prisoners formulate their relation to the empty time of the 
prison.
 The prison does not trust the prisoner to wait. Waiting in prison, though 
a requirement for parole (at least among the nonlifers), is not a means to an 
end: it is not a waiting for something. Here, waiting is pure expenditure. It 
is not voluntary waiting, and it is not defined through desire or expecta-
tion for a thing or outcome. This waiting is society’s punishment for the 
prisoner whose crime is one of emotion and control. Before serving his sen-
tence, the prisoner effectively refuses perhaps the fundamental axiom of 
civilization: to defer gratification, to delay, to wait. So the institution takes 
waiting out of the hands of the prisoner. Waiting for Godot stages this con-
flicted relation to waiting, rather than the one that people assume in appro-
priating its title. 
 In Bandman’s review of Waiting for Godot in the San Quentin News, he 
suggests that the vagabond’s waiting on stage may be forcible detention. 
Bandman draws attention to the message relayed by the boy, and delivered 
twice in the play, that Godot will be coming—tomorrow. He calls the boy 
the “immemorial child-conscience which prods [Gogo and Didi] into wait-
ing for something more, tomorrow night. Keep them waiting. Even though 
they cannot help it.”40 Keep them waiting. Even though they cannot help it. That 
they cannot help waiting implies that they do not choose to wait. The pro-
cess cannot be begun, interrupted, or stopped. Waiting is not subject, claims 
Bandman, to deliverance or the idea of deliverance. The boy who delivers 
the promise of Godot’s coming, standing in for Godot himself, provokes 
the painful illusion in the hobos that there will be an outcome, “something 
more” to the waiting than just waiting itself.
 In the same edition of the prison newspaper, another reviewer writes 
that the boy “holds the slender thread of realism” of the play.41 The boy 
holds a thread in the manner of Ariadne, as a means out of the labyrinthine 
prison, promising a possible end to waiting. The instigation to wait, not the 
illusion that one waits for, is real to the prisoners. Its realism is located in 
the physical quality of the promise that prods Vladimir and Estragon into 
imaging a purpose for their being on stage. In this moment they lose the 
chance to realize that they are just waiting, apart from any object, any out-
come, or any Godot. The realization that the prisoner’s life is consumed 
by a waiting done, somehow, by someone other than himself, by an agent 
other than the “I,” comes across in an exchange in Endgame in a similar way. 
“Do you believe in the life to come?” Hamm asks Clov. Clov replies, “Mine 
was always that.” In this format life is a living for a future that will not be 
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part of life. Equated with life, waiting promises not more life but only more 
waiting.
Waiting versus Expectation
i suppose he is lucky to have no more expectations.
  —Samuel beckett42
The successful reception of Godot in prison has much to do with this wait-
ing beyond expectation. In The Theatre of the Absurd, Esslin claims that Wait-
ing for Godot succeeded with the prisoners “not because it confronted them 
with a situation in some ways analogous to their own” but rather because 
“they were unsophisticated enough to come to the theatre without any pre-
conceived notions and ready-made expectations, so that they avoided the 
mistake that trapped so many established critics who condemned the play 
for its lack of plot, development, characterization, suspense, or plain com-
mon sense.”43 The prisoner’s wait is different from the critic’s. Whereas the 
critic approaches the play knowingly and employs his familiarity with the-
ater to process his encounter with the performance, the inmates are waiting 
but without anticipation: they are used to waiting for nothing. The critic 
employs his expectation to pass judgment and condemns the play. The 
prisoner, ironically, avoids the “mistake that trapped so many established 
critics.” Esslin’s observation testifies to the need to stage Godot not only in 
unexpected settings (in the prison, after the flood, during the siege) but in 
unexpecting ones. Jonathan Kalb notes that one of Beckett’s legacies is the 
way “he actually changed many people’s expectations of what can happen, 
what is supposed to happen, when they enter the theatre.”44
 Godot forces us to realign the relationship between our expecting and 
our waiting. Vladmir’s question “Will night never come?” seems to coun-
terbalance his refrain that they are waiting for the title character to come. 
There is no inevitability to the night sky of the stage. Vladimir’s beseech-
ing question about the arrival of night strikes the audience, particularly 
those seated in the prison cafeteria, as a fruitless expectation. Expecting 
Godot to arrive is no less uncertain. Pozzo links the two events: “If I had 
an appointment with a Godin . . . Godet . . . Godot . . . anyhow you see 
who I mean, I’d wait till it was black night before I gave up.”45 Esslin sug-
gests that prison prepares inmates for this type of waiting within the play. 
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Why is expectation destructive of our experience of the play? No doubt 
because it seduces us into thinking we can envision the end of waiting and 
that we can see through to its other side. Where the performance of Godot 
begins unexpectedly—in Sarajevo, New Orleans, and prison—the waiting 
on stage continues the waiting inherent in the setting but, by staging the 
latter, transforms it. In other words, by showing that this waiting is stage-
able and dramatic, Beckett makes that real-world waiting (in the rubble of a 
besieged city, on the bayou, and in prison) worthy of fiction—and therefore 
life. In these settings Beckett’s intention that the theater is to be re-expected 
becomes transparent.
 Waiting on Beckett’s stage and waiting in prison merge with one 
another. A letter to the editor of the San Quentin News gives us an opportu-
nity to look at the dynamic of expectation and waiting in a particular con-
vict by the name (or pseudonym) of “Ed Realart”:
THE EDITOR—
I had to go to work before the play was over. Right between the first and 
second act. Will you please publish how it came out?
—Ed Realart
The editor responds: “It came out fine.”46 The inmate is forcibly removed 
from the audience because of work detail, and he is transferred from the 
cafeteria where the play is staged to another sector of the prison. Yet the 
interruption of his Godot experience does not make him stop waiting. Cru-
cially, he does not employ his expectations at this instance (“it wasn’t what 
I expected”) to block further thinking about the play. He implicitly wants 
to submit to a further undoing of his expectations. He can neither guess 
“how things came out” nor believe the synopses volunteered by his fellow 
inmates (that the play really loops back on itself, the second act concluding 
in a fashion identical to the first). He thus becomes an author and writes a 
petition in order to become a reader of the play. He would like the newspa-
per to print the part of the play that he was not permitted to see. The editor 
replies laconically, Beckettianly: it came out fine. To one who has seen the 
play, his answer is simultaneously extreme understatement and hyperbole. 
Instead of delivering the kind of useful wisdom or opinion that one expects 
from such a column, the editor offers only a vague euphemism, but one 
that does justice to the difficulty of saying precisely how it comes out. His 
answer offers no satisfaction, no illusory wrap-up.47
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Godot and Bariona
Waiting for Godot offers few concessions to prisoners, the audience that 
would presumably desire these most. It is illuminating in this regard to 
compare Waiting for Godot not to Sartre’s No Exit but his first play, Bariona, 
or the Son of Thunder.48 Sartre wrote Bariona while a prisoner of war in Stalag 
XII, and, on Christmas day in 1940, he performed it with and for his fellow 
prisoners. The play is set in Judea during the Roman occupation. Bariona, 
head of a small village, receives news that imperial Rome wishes to astro-
nomically increase taxes. Bariona declares that his town will not pay the 
tax. After threats from the Roman army, he states that his town will pay 
the tax but “after us nobody will ever pay taxes again.”49 He proposes that 
the town no longer reproduce: he wants everyone’s family tree to slowly 
resemble the one onstage in Godot. Sartre fabricates a landscape of growing 
destitution as the conditions for his carceral theater. Bariona adopts Beck-
ett’s asymptotic approach to poverty but in the form of his public policy, 
as an official order on resignation and dwindling. Beckett’s work similarly 
dabbles in eugenics as a means of unreproducing the world, a critique of 
mimesis expressed by a draining of the gene pool. In Beckett’s first play, 
Eleuthéria, Dr. Piouk articulates a sterility project a bit less sanctimoniously 
than Bariona.50 Indeed, the nonreproductive policy of Eleuthéria may shed 
light on some features of Waiting for Godot, its all-male cast, and its literal 
superimposition of birth over the grave.
 Yet Sartre, unlike Beckett, relinquishes what his title character calls the 
“religion of nothing.”51 Halfway through Bariona, there is a sudden dra-
matic turn. What arrives in Sartre’s play is closer to God than even Godot: 
Bariona witnesses the birth of Christ. Birth is suddenly hailed as the hope 
for prisoners. Bariona proceeds into the street with his armed townsmen to 
fight the Romans. Sartre’s play stages an allegory for the transformation of 
autonomous literature (one that, like Beckett’s, withdraws from our grasp) 
into a literature of commitment. But this commitment is underpinned by 
the holiday of Christ’s birth. The play concludes not with an aside from 
Bariona but with his direct address to the audience at Treves:
BARIONA. to the prisoners: And you prisoners, this is the end of the 
Christmas play which was written for you. You are not happy, and 
maybe there is more than one of you who has tasted that taste of gall 
in his mouth, that bitter salty taste I’m talking about. But I think that 
for you, too, on this Christmas day—and every other day—there will 
be joy!52
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Beckett’s Waiting for Godot is dedicated to that taste of gall in the mouth, the 
taste we cannot quite define. Just as Beckett avoids the dramatic downward 
turn, the catastrophe, his characters never turn directly to address the condi-
tion of the audience. That condition becomes apparent through the context 
of its performance. Sartre provides a play for prisoners, not a play about 
prison. Beckett generates a hermetic and microcosmal play that allows an 
alienated spectator to connect with it. Sartre’s play, by contrast, uses the 
holiday on which the play is performed, the celebration of the birth of 
Christ, to bring its poverty to an end. Bariona seemed to be undertaking the 
long wait, a wait to which he would give his existence. What interrupts his 
wait is the very day of its performance, the sanctioned and measured time 
of the calendar.
A Prison Faces the Study
Waiting for Godot nowhere names the prison. Unlike Genet’s Haute Surveil-
lance, it does not take prison as its explicit setting. This quality is consistent 
with Adorno’s observation about Endgame that “the name of the catastro-
phe is to be spoken only in silence.”53 Beckett described this quality as wari-
ness toward “explicitation,” that is, not only explanation but also anything 
that would upset the implicit and discreet quality of his work.54 Beckett 
keeps mum about the motivating crisis, maintaining an anonymous core to 
his play. This sustains the challenge of Beckett’s work: it is without ambi-
guity, at all moments as precise as an eye chart whose coherence at a for-
mal level does not somehow add up at an abstract level, commit itself to 
our understanding, or reward us with digestible themes. Diverse strands of 
Beckett criticism unite around the effort to supply a name to these articulat-
ing silences. Joseph Roach reads the poverty of Beckett’s work in connec-
tion to the Irish famine. Writing about the dead voices heard by Vladimir 
and Estragon but unheard by the audience, Roach observes, “To anyone 
who is prepared to listen, they speak of the consequences of the potato fam-
ine, or the Great Hunger, the effects which endured long after its deadli-
est years, 1845–51.”55 Noting that Lucky’s dance is called “the net,” James 
Knowlson deduces that “for Beckett man is, as Lucky’s dance suggests, 
imprisoned in a net” and that we can see this dance “as expressing in a 
dramatically arresting way a much wider view of man as what might be 
termed a ‘prisoner of life.’”56
 What Esslin calls the “immediate grasp” of the play by the criminals 
suggests that the play does not necessitate the mediated grasp of the theo-
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rist. Though Roach claims we need to be “prepared” to listen and have our 
ears “sensitized” to the values he finds in Beckett, the desensitized pris-
oners with little interpretive training successfully connect with the play.57 
What theorists most urgently want to mediate about Godot are its breaks 
and silences, the qualities that make the play uniquely available to prison-
ers. Godot is “about” prison, but not because the institution is its content. 
The dimensions of the play I have highlighted—the exposure of the vaga-
bonds, the routines of the actor, their management by an authority external 
to the actor, the closed space of the stage, and the separation of waiting 
from expectation—give only a latent image of the prison. These dimen-
sions are “about” prison in the sense that they stake themselves near or 
around the institution, but without mirroring it. The danger of handling 
the silences of Beckett’s work comes from confusing the activity of speak-
ing about the play with speaking for it. It is tempting to ascribe a content 
to Beckett’s silences and to move too quickly to metaphorize it. It seems 
unlikely that a prisoner serving a life sentence would speak of man as 
“prisoner of life”—or, for that matter, speak of prison at all within quota-
tion marks.
 The performance of Waiting for Godot before an audience of criminals 
helps us rethink the silences of Beckett’s work. The prisoners’ immediacy of 
reaction suggests that the latent image fulfills itself through their recogni-
tion. The imprisoned audience works to familiarize the play to themselves 
rather than trying to access the play through concepts that may help them 
interpret its meaning. The prisoners do not try to make sense of the non-
sense of the play; instead, they recognize the nonsense as familiar.
 Beckett’s characters speak frequently of reasoning (“Stoutly reasoned!” 
shouts Pozzo) but almost never of reason per se. In like fashion, the pris-
oners adjust themselves to the reasoning of the play (which may resemble 
the reasoning of a joke, a bureaucracy, or a set of prison rules), but they 
make no amends for the absence of reason.58 The fact that Beckett does not 
burden his characters and dialogue with context or explicit history makes 
these characters accessible to the audience at San Quentin. The director of 
the performance, Herbert Blau, writes that the play “had such an impact 
on the prison that the language of the play, the names of the characters—a 
Gogo, a Didi, a Pozzo—became part of the therapeutic vocabulary at San 
Quentin. It may be so to this day.”59 A “Lucky” becomes a man on death 
row, “Pozzo” a bull (a guard).60 In the next chapter I discuss how Chan and 
Sontag took the name “Godot,” already pointing toward the wings of the 
stage and toward an imminent arrival, and redirected it beyond the stage 
entirely, at authorities noticeably absent from the crisis at hand. Signifi-
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cantly, the prisoners show no interest in bestowing the title of Godot on 
anyone. Absorbed in the negative labor of waiting, they appropriate only 
the names of figures waiting on stage, relocating the names of Beckett’s 
trapped characters into the prison hierarchy. In addition, they also transfer 
the gestures of power from the stage to their world. In Etaoin Shrdlu’s col-
umn “Bastille by the Bay,” we find not a review of Godot but evidence for 
the way it cut into the prison environment: “One clown dropping his head-
gear from the fifth tier caught a ground-floor eye. Eschewing the polite 
request, this one pointed the fateful finger: ‘Haaat!!’”61 The one who loses 
his hat from the fifth tier does not ask politely for it; instead, he becomes 
Pozzo, the character with the whip who condenses his orders to Lucky into 
single words: “Baassket,” “Stool,” “Think.” The prisoner who dropped his 
hat reenacts Pozzo’s shorthand, in which no elaboration, no address to the 
subject, is needed to get him to come running.
 A biographical anecdote may help us specify how Beckett situates the 
theatrical institution in relation to the carceral institution. Beckett’s apart-
ment on the seventh floor at 38 Boulevard Saint Jacques has a view of three 
landmarks: Notre-Dame, the Panthéon, and the barred cell windows of 
the gray Santé Prison. In his biography of Beckett, James Knowlson notes 
that the prison faces Beckett’s study.62 In a direct sense, then, Beckett lives 
about the prison. He cannot help but note its proximity, for whereas the 
Panthéon never made a sound, he hears cries from the prison even at odd 
hours of the night. Beckett replies to the prison, using a mirror to commu-
nicate messages in Morse code to an inmate “housed in a cell clearly vis-
ible from Beckett’s study window.”63 Beckett’s German translator, Elmar 
Tophoven, reports that he came by the apartment to find “Beckett standing 
at the open window, clearly signaling to someone. Beckett promptly raised 
and lowered his arms to indicate to the prisoner across the way that the 
exchange would have to be interrupted because someone had just called to 
see him. He explained to Tophoven: ‘They have so little to entertain them, 
you know.’”64
 This anecdote offers a sense of the way that Waiting for Godot, which 
describes life as light that “gleams an instant” as off a mirror, speaks to 
prisoners. The method of communication that Beckett takes up is not very 
different from what prisoners use to communicate among themselves (e.g., 
tapping on a pipe). Without leaving his study, Beckett slips into the prison, 
communicating with the prisoner through unofficial channels. He foregoes 
the bureaucracy of visiting hours and phone calls made to someone vis-
ible through Plexiglas. This is not a choice, however, since Beckett, at least 
prior to communication by mirror, does not know anybody in the prison 
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other than the pimp who stabbed him years earlier: whom would he say 
that he wants to see? Beckett begins by communicating with no one, until 
a gleam of light comes back at him and initiates a different flow, a new tri-
angle formed by the sun, Beckett’s window, and the cell.
 In some ways this scenario fulfills a wish that Beckett expressed at a 
dinner party in 1937, when he was asked, “What would you most like to 
create?” Beckett’s answer: “Light in the monad.”65 Yet the scenario also 
gives us something surprising, a light that comes from the monad.
 Beckett’s study faces the prison: Knowlson’s description of the archi-
tectural layout of the Boulevard Saint Jacques is a model for the orientation 
of Beckett’s work toward the prison. As a study of man, a dramatic anthro-
pology of man’s essence, Godot fulfills the humanist protocol. Prison never 
makes an appearance in Beckett’s study, and yet it exerts pressure on it, 
countenances it, even shines a beam of information into it. Beckett says he 
was entertaining the prisoner from his study. He means that he entertains 
the prisoner as part of his study—something that enters his thought and 
temporarily retains in his thinking, but not as the subject of direct concen-
tration, as he can only see Santé when he looks up from his work. Enter-
taining the prisoner from his study, his play became entertainment for the 
prisoner. Beckett’s work, the condition it depicts, asks to be confronted by 
the prison, something that in fact happens when his plays are performed 
there.66
 Beckett writes Catastrophe for a particular prisoner, Václav Havel.67 The 
dedication “For Václav Havel” stands as the address “of” the play, para-
doxically both where it is and where the play is going. As in Godot, there are 
no cells, chains, guards, or uniforms. It presents a director speaking to his 
assistant about an immobile, exposed, “ashen” figure standing on a plinth 
on a stage (looking like Didi or Gogo after the second blast). The direc-
tor tells his assistant to make some alterations (whiten the subject’s face, 
remove the gown). The assistant responds to the imperatives of the director 
(“I can’t see the toes. I’m sitting in the front row and I can’t see the toes”) 
by saying, “I make a note.”
 The play’s absence of explicit statements about prison seems to be at 
odds with the fact that the play was Beckett’s contribution to a festival in 
which dramatists, including Ionesco, submitted one-act dramas as protest 
to Havel’s incarceration. Enoch Brater describes two possibilities for the-
ater, one aesthetic and the other political. “The energy of Catastrophe,” he 
says, “cannot be contained by anything as neat as a swift denunciation of 
repressive regimes, however attractive such a statement from Beckett might 
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be.”68 Brater concludes, “Catastrophe is far more a discourse on method, spe-
cifically theater method, than an argument about ethical imperatives from 
an agent provocateur. Theater tactics, not power politics, are implicated 
here.”69 Catastrophe is a study of a study: a rehearsal of a play in which the 
audience is to study this figure on stage. As the stage directions indicate: 
“D[irector] and A[ssistant] contemplate.” Beckett in fact underbids the pro-
test gesture by incorporating the assistant, who not only takes the requests 
of the Director to alter how the body is exposed on stage but also writes 
them down. She greets each request with the line “I make a note.” What 
is the nature of this note-taking, this note-worthiness of the director’s sug-
gestions? He puts stenography (or narrow writing) on stage since it is the 
most neutral shorthand for expression. Beckett does not direct the audience 
to think in prescribed ways about power. Rather, he induces us to similarly 
make note and register the study of the play. The writing of the stenogra-
pher lives up to its name by narrowing the distance separating us from the 
effects of power.
Author as Warden
Before Waiting for Godot could appeal to prisoners, it first had to appeal to 
the prison warden who makes decisions about what kind of performances 
are allowed: it had to be compatible with the culture of prison. The warden 
permitted the performance of Waiting for Godot at San Quentin because of 
something missing from Beckett’s stage, something that it filtered out of the 
picture, along with laughter and comfort: women. No women were allowed 
in the prison, and Beckett’s play does not feature one. Entering the prison 
to perform requires the actors to go through another filtering for the prison: 
“We could take in nothing metallic.”70 At entry the actors were told that the 
prison would not negotiate for their release were they to be taken hostage 
by the prisoners during an escape attempt.71
 Literary critic Mary Bryden makes an observation about Godot that we 
might conceivably find in a memo from Warden Duffy: “On the face of it, 
then, women (especially the fertile ones) are potential agents for distur-
bance, and are best excluded or (as in many Biblical genealogies) left in the 
wings.”72 Beckett objected to productions that featured women in the roles 
of Vladimir and Estragon. Thinking perhaps about the physiological basis 
for the incontinence suffered by the character Vladimir, Beckett justified his 
rationale by observing, “Women don’t have prostates.” Beckett’s injunction 
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has not prevented all-female productions of the play, such as Bruno Bous-
sagol’s at the Avignon Festival in 1991. These productions offer a reply to 
Beckett: the prostate is something performed, not given.
 By agreeing to allow the play to be performed not because of what it 
contains but because of what it eliminates, the warden seems to enhance 
the alarm system already in place.73 Likewise, the instruments of discipline 
employed on Beckett’s stage were managed and shown to remain in the 
control of the guards. The troupe was permitted to use the rope and whip 
only under the condition that a guard hand the props to the actor who 
played Pozzo as he went on stage and take them back immediately upon 
his exit. The prison was evidently afraid of these items becoming useful 
objects to the prisoners, either for threatening others or for hanging them-
selves. Prisoners grasp the wistfulness of Estragon’s line “If we only had 
a little more rope.” The warden surveys the stage exclusively in terms of 
security, with the performance itself and the handling of props remaining 
under the constant monitoring of the guards.74
 The work of the author who wants to remove ego from the stage gets 
along remarkably well with an institution that wants to do the same. 
Describing the tonal consistency of Beckett’s work, Adorno picks up on 
this aspect of monitoring and control: “There is a constant monitoring 
to see that things are one way and not another; an alarm system with a 
sensitive bell indicates what fits in with the play’s topography and what 
does not. Beckett keeps quiet about the delicate things as well as the bru-
tal.”75 Adorno here compares Beckett’s work to a securitized space, though 
he says it is done out of delicacy (Zartheit), not control. Beckett monitors 
everything that enters the stage and everything that transpires on it. It is 
as if Beckett were working during the tradition of actors being thieves, 
disrespectable reprobate types, and he needed to direct accordingly. The 
stage is fantastically sparse: the singular tree seems as if it were pulled 
through a barbed wire fence just to make its appearance. This stringency 
of Beckett is noted by Blau, who writes that Waiting for Godot and End-
game are plays “with magnitude, achieved through the most excruciat-
ing constraint. . . . Old endgame, lost of old, every move a crisis.”76 Blau 
emphasizes the constraint, Beckett’s exterior exertions over the stage, 
rather than some hypothetical self-restraint by his characters. Beckett set a 
trip wire around his stage in order to produce, paradoxically, a shockingly 
unalarmed theatrical space. Nothing on Beckett’s stage raises the charac-
ters’ eyebrows or calls undue attention to itself, and nobody reacts or com-
mits a wrong move. The stage requires us to take our shock up on our own 
time.
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The Closed System
A recurring motif within Beckett criticism is the comparison of his work to 
a “closed system.” Some background to this concept and its application to 
Beckett’s work is needed before appreciating how the term might be rel-
evant to Beckett’s theater. Beckett invited the term into critical discussion 
of the work. His novel Murphy constitutes an anthology of theorems, gen-
erated by and applied to the world of the tavern. In the novel, the char-
acter Wylie says, “The syndrome known as life is too diffuse to admit of 
palliation. For every symptom that is eased, another is made worse. The 
horseleech’s daughter is a closed system. Her quantum of wantum cannot 
vary.”77 
 Picking up Beckett’s cue in this passage, Hugh Kenner divides this 
moment of the closed system into the first and second laws of thermody-
namics: “It is a world locally freakish but totally shaped by two laws, the 
law of conservation of energy and the second law of thermodynamics. 
The former law states that nothing is added to or subtracted from the sys-
tem, but simply mutated, and the latter states that the degree of organi-
zation within this closed system grows constantly less and so constantly 
less improbable.”78 Kenner sees abundant examples for this hypothesis 
in Beckett’s work. Wylie demonstrates the first law. To this we could also 
add the opening sentence of the novel, which heralds Godot’s description 
of the sun’s repertory: “The sun shone, having no alternative, on the noth-
ing new.”79 The second law of thermodynamics, according to Kenner, is the 
“real theme of Lucky’s headlong oration,” with its unfinished labors and 
its dissipation into “fading, fading, fading,” “wastes and pines,” “the great 
cold the great dark.”80 Darko Suvin’s analysis of Beckett is deeply indebted 
to Kenner’s discussion. Terra Beckettiana—Suvin’s scientific term describ-
ing Beckett’s world—“is an aimless island universe, not only desolate but 
constantly running down.”81 Yet for Suvin, Beckett’s universe is not accu-
rately described by the first two laws alone: “There remained unnoted [in 
Kenner’s discussion] . . . the third law of thermodynamics (Nernst’s theo-
rem: absolute zero can only be approached asymptotically, i.e., getting ever 
closer to it without reaching it) which is just as characteristic of Beckett’s 
rhythm and vision, and which should be accorded as important a place in 
any conclusion about him.”82 Suvin’s inclusion of the third law addresses 
how Beckett’s system tends toward an ever-reduced impoverished mini-
mum, rather than the sheer zero of nihilism.
 David Houston Jones’s Samuel Beckett and Testimony offers the most 
recent and suggestive reading of the closed system. Like Suvin, he recalls 
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a scientific figure left out of the critical discussion thus far: “Maxwell’s 
demon,” a thought experiment by James Clerk Maxwell, which hypothe-
sizes an imaginary being able to prevent the loss of heat in a closed system, 
keeping entropy at bay, a scenario that would invalidate the second law of 
thermodynamics.83 Jones claims that Maxwell’s demon (a figure that enters 
into some of Beckett’s aesthetic essays) sheds light on how Beckett’s narra-
tors “are neither (in The Lost Ones) part of the population of searchers nor 
human beings looking into the closed space from a distance [in Long Obser-
vation]. The details of Maxwell’s scenario corroborate the immersion of the 
narrator in the closed space texts . . . while signaling his existence as hypo-
thetical.”84 Jones therefore utilizes Maxwell’s thought experiment to enter-
tain the idea that Beckett’s “closed space texts” are simulations, themselves 
experimental: “Rather than indicating a fully realized fictional world, they 
draw attention to the limited and unstable nature of that world, problem-
atising the reader’s imaginative investment in it.”85 Pushing toward the 
function of testimony in Beckett’s work and the interface between tech-
nology and the human, Jones observes, “The extraordinary abdication of 
narrative authority in the closed system works also to produce a space 
which . . . must be understood as archival.”86
 The fourth contribution to the closed system theory of Beckett’s text is 
less situated in scientific law. Former inmate Cluchey, whose case study I 
will discuss later in this chapter, uses the term while discussing the devel-
opment of a drama workshop in San Quentin a few years after Herbert Blau 
brought Waiting for Godot to the inmates there. He writes, “All of the plays 
were acted and directed by convicts for convict audiences. And so every 
weekend in our little theatre in San Quentin, it was standing room only for 
imprisoned Americans; and rightly so, because if as Beckett has stated, his 
plays are all closed systems, then so too, are prisons. I personally can say 
that San Quentin is a closed system, a very tightly closed system!”87 For 
Cluchey, his own experience is central to his contemplation of the closed 
system. He emphasizes its physicality, its tightness, rather than the law 
behind its operations.
 In his analysis of the closed space of Beckett’s Lost Ones, Jones explores 
the testimonial function of the narrative and what he calls the hypotheti-
cal status of the narrator. Cluchey basically says that the prisoner does 
not live in the world of thermodynamics or scientific principles. Only the 
first term of the phrase “closed system” catches the prisoner’s attention, 
since the prison is not evidently closed but, as Cluchey says, tightening. 
It is paradoxically always closing. In his “believe-you-me” stance, Cluchey 
evokes not only his general understanding of the system but also his per-
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sonal experience of the everyday pressure it exerts upon him. Only through 
the tightness of its collar does Cluchey become aware of how the system 
operates.
 Staging Godot in prison gives Cluchey a heightened awareness of the 
closed system of the prison. He evokes the phrase while describing the 
physically crowded space of the San Quentin Workshop performance. 
Cluchey’s use of the term “closed system” arises literally within that the-
ater, rather than in application to it from the outside. How does “standing 
room only” for a Beckett play performed by and in front of convicts elicit 
Cluchey’s citation of a “closed system”? First, the density of the group, the 
close proximity of convicts to one another, owes itself to the way the prison 
recycles old spaces: the San Quentin Workshop rehearsed and performed in 
the space previously occupied by the prison gallows.88 In a closed system, 
the place for hangings is repurposed into a space for theater—and prob-
ably without much change. We can only wonder about the atmosphere this 
gave to the performances, and about how much room it provided for spec-
tators. In his book on the sublime, Edmund Burke remarked that contem-
porary theater was so stultifyingly artificial that if ever an announcement 
were made of a hanging in the public square, audiences would rush out of 
the middle of a performance in order to attend it.89 Divested of theatrical 
tinsel, Beckett’s stage merges inconspicuously with the gallows on its day 
off. Waiting for Godot is the substitute sentence for execution: getting life.90 
The closed system of the prison allows these two spaces to overlap.
 Cluchey employs the term “closed system” to describe the strange air-
less space that exists between convicts in the audience and their fellow 
inmates on stage. This must have had the same déjà vu quality as a mas-
querade ball on a cruise ship from which one is never allowed to disem-
bark. What were these performances, free of outsiders, like? What desires 
did this strange monadological theater serve?91 Do we not have here some-
thing different from theater (representation, action, drama), something 
closer to the transfer of heat? What becomes of what Suvin called Beckett’s 
“aimless island universe” when it is performed within the aimless island 
universe of San Quentin? Cluchey says that at this moment, the inhabit-
ants of the closed system packed the “theater” to look at Beckett’s theatri-
cal closed system. To Jones’s question about Beckett’s “cylinder” narratives, 
“How can a closed system be observed?” we must add “within a closed 
system.”92 Cluchey answers by making the closed system synonymous 
with jail: the prison mediates Beckett’s play, rather than being a conception 
imposed from without. Through a sudden reversal, not only of Beckett and 
prison but also of reality and fiction, Cluchey claims that prison is packed 
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with Beckett characters. His comment sounds vaguely like the one made by 
Esslin, who found the unknowing voice of Beckett’s work coming through 
the bars of the pimp’s cell. Writes Cluchey:
If the critics are right when they proclaim that Beckett’s characters are 
drawn from his early life in Dublin, the streets, bogs, ditches, dumps 
and madhouses, then I can only add that the most informed, knowledge-
able and qualified people to portray Beckett’s “characters” would be the 
inmates of any prison! For here more than any other place in the world, 
reside the true Beckett people. The cast-offs and loonies, the poets of the 
streets, and all of the “bleeding meat” of the entire system. The real folks 
of our modern wasteland.93
For a brief instant, the world outside the prison enters into the picture 
for Cluchey. The closed system is inhabited by the “bleeding meat” of the 
“entire system.” Beckett’s characters, Cluchey says, are best portrayed by 
people already in prison: prison has cultivated the Beckett character. This is 
another way of saying that prison produces only fictional or, to use Jones’s 
term, hypothetical individuals. In prison, life is life in the same way that, 
as Beckett said about the stage of Godot, the sky is a sky: in name only. 
Adorno writes that Beckett’s plays show us only “what is left of the sub-
ject,” namely, “its most abstract characteristic: merely existing, and thereby 
already committing an outrage.”94
Perplexed by the Prisoner’s Response
About the impassioned response to Godot by his fellow inmates, Cluchey 
writes: “Our ‘affinity’ with the works of Beckett has perplexed many critics, 
but never our audiences.”95 In what follows, I will explore four examples of 
that affinity in prisoners, the way they express it, and how it pertains to the 
environment in which they dwell. I suggest that we can learn something 
particularly important about Beckett by learning how not to be perplexed 
by the prisoner’s affinity with Beckett’s plays.
 What is our obstacle to understanding this affinity? Are we perplexed 
because we imagine prisoners to be less capable of empathy than our-
selves? What is empathy to a convict, either within or outside a theater? 
Do we allot them only moral tears, those of regret? The empathetic convict 
contradicts the stereotype of callousness and brutality that seems to mark 
criminal life before, during, and after prison. If we stand within this bias, it 
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becomes difficult to picture the criminal feeling something like an elective 
affinity for Beckett’s work. Following a performance of Godot at the Florida 
State Penitentiary at Raiford, Sidney Homan remarks on how the prisoners 
rushed the stage, eager to talk about the play with Homan and the actors. 
He recollects “the discussions, those extraordinary discussions where these 
hardened, sullen men had opened up their hearts, had confronted a mys-
tery in Godot that we can no more solve than avoid.”96 Even this descrip-
tion is fringed with Homan’s surprise at the seeming paradox of the moved 
prisoner.
 Our second obstacle to the prisoner’s response pertains to an implicit 
understanding of Beckett’s work. Do we honestly feel it is a play with 
which to empathize? Waiting for Godot persists in critical discourse as 
a marvel of theatrical experimentation. The obstructions it places before 
the capacity of our critical intelligence to identify what happens on its 
stage limit our capacity to identify with it. We note the difficulty of his 
text first, and then we assume that this difficulty pertains to (or even hin-
ders) the feeling it may give us. Noting how the play fastidiously mea-
sures its breaks and the cadence of its silences, Blau writes: “Godot, indeed, 
gives the definitive turn to the idea of Alienation. A subterranean drama, 
appearing to care for nothing but its interior life, it searches the audience 
like a Geiger counter. No modern drama is more sensitively aware of the 
presence of an audience, or its absence. . . . Empathy is controlled with dia-
bolic precision.”97 In calling Godot the “definitive turn to the idea of Alien-
ation,” Blau suggests not only that Beckett’s play subdues our experience 
of pathos (in the same way that Brecht’s plays critique Aristotelian dra-
maturgy) but also that it benumbs the consciousness that is usually the 
windfall of distanciation. Blau writes provocatively that the play sweeps 
the audience like a Geiger counter; that is, the play seemingly looks back 
at the audience for the afterlife (or, to go with the radioactivity of Blau’s 
metaphor, the half-life) of our feeling for the play. What could this possi-
bly mean other than that the play exposes us to feeling (our own as well as 
the characters’), and that our encounter with the exposed figures on stage 
leaves an emotional deposit within us, belatedly and almost subcutane-
ously? The radical challenge of Beckett’s posttheatrical drama in fact rests 
in how we empathize with his vagabonds, how we orient ourselves toward 
what they expose (rather than simply give) to us. Is the way we encounter 
the vagabonds we see on stage any different from the way we encounter 
them in the street, where we might be able to recognize something (a ges-
ture, a look, a walk) in the hobo’s condition and yet pause before we call 
him familiar? Cluchey takes this a step further. He notes: “While all over 
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the world audiences were puzzled and fascinated, the critics astounded by 
the plays of Beckett, we, the inmates of San Quentin, in fact found the situ-
ation normal.”98 What is normal for individuals who turned their backs on 
normal? How do the disjunctions of Beckett’s theater become a mechanism 
by which the alienated recognize something about their place in the prison 
system? Blau says that our empathy is controlled with diabolical precision. 
Watching Beckett, prisoners identify with figures who cope under that dia-
bolical control.
 The prisoners help us unlearn certain habits of thinking about Beckett’s 
play. A case in point: Cluchey notes that prisoners view the figures on stage 
as couples. Upon seeing Vladmir and Gogo, followed by a man whipping 
another, named Lucky, with a rope around his neck, “Prisoners knew the 
score.”99 Critics refer to these as “pseudocouples,” a designation coined by 
the narrator of Beckett’s The Unnamable to describe the characters Mercier 
and Camier.100 The term has migrated from Beckett’s fiction into critical dis-
cussion about that fiction. Discussing Vladimir and Estragon, for example, 
Jonathan Boulter remarks, “His plays and novels are filled with charac-
ters in painful relationships which seem to offer nothing positive. Beckett 
referred to the people in these relationships as ‘pseudo-couples’ because 
often there is nothing formal (like marriage or blood relations) binding 
them together.”101 In isolating the prisoner from the bonds of matrimony 
and family, prison activates new terms for recognizing the couple. Prisoners 
do not recognize Vladimir and Estragon as a “couple” in quotation marks. 
Prison inmates understand the couple as they who wait together. For them, 
the couple is formed nonconsensually, through their needs, their interac-
tion, their inaction, their pathos. In The Unnamable, Beckett speaks of the 
“little murmur of unconsenting man, [murmuring] what it is their human-
ity stifles.”102 Vladimir and Estragon are a couple not formed by vow; they 
are tied through their endless murmur, a tie stifled by the officially sanc-
tioned badge of “humanity.” The stage, and not mutual fondness, desire, 
or even consent, bring Vladimir and Estragon together. They have nothing. 
Should we then disqualify them for having nothing in common? In 1955 
the New Repertory Theater asked permission to stage Waiting for Godot 
with two actors whose temperaments, acting styles, and physicalities could 
not have been more antithetical: Buster Keaton (as Vladimir) and Marlon 
Brando (as Estragon).103 If this production had gone forward, the end of the 
first act would have witnessed Brando/Estragon estimating that he and 
Keaton/Vladimir had spent “50 years maybe” together. Where would this 
statement uttered by Brando to Keaton acquire credibility? Where but in a 
prison cell?
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Prisoners on Godot: Godot as Prisoner
The rest of this chapter will investigate four instances of prisoners who 
illuminate our understanding of Beckett. Each reads Godot in a different 
manner through the environment in which he sees the play performed: the 
prison context. K. F. Lembke, whose letter to Beckett provides this chapter 
with its epigraph, is not only the first prison reader of Godot but the most 
fanatical, breaking parole in order to meet its author. In 1953 in Lüttring-
hausen Prison, Lembke gets a copy of En Attendant Godot and proceeds to 
direct, cast, and stage his translation, titled Man Wartet auf Godot. (Lembke’s 
rendering of the title emphasizes the anonymous “one” who waits, rather 
than subjectless waiting.) The actors and spectators are a UN delegation of 
scofflaws, the criminal castes whom he enumerates for Beckett in his let-
ter dated November 29, 1953: “thieves, forgers, homos, crazy men and kill-
ers.” Lembke’s response to Waiting for Godot is symptomatic of the way 
that prisoners seize Godot. Lembke’s letter makes clear that ownership of 
the play, performed in prison, has been transferred to the prisoners: “Your 
Godot was a triumph, something wild!—Your Godot was ‘our’ Godot, ours, 
our very own!” (“Votre Godot ce fut un triomphe, le délire—Votre Godot 
ce fut ‘Notre’ Godot, à nous! bien à nous!”).104 Repeating “ours” and “our 
own” several times, Lembke speaks of appropriation, not representation. 
His enthusiasm for the play befits its status as a piece of contraband. The 
delirium of someone enjoying Beckett behind locked doors (locked from 
without, not from within) is a curious rejoinder to the conventional wisdom 
about the tactical uselessness of modern art.105
 Lembke’s understanding of Beckett’s play emerges within this affec-
tive connection to it. In his assertion that “your Godot is our Godot,” we 
overhear the claim Godot—he’s one of ours. Lembke’s twist is not that we 
are waiting for Godot, where Godot designates some redeeming agency at 
a distance from us (like the warden). Instead he says, “We are all waiting 
for him and do not know that he is already here. Yes, here. Godot is my 
neighbor in the cell next to mine. Let us do something to help him, change 
the shoes that are hurting him!”106 Lembke suggests that Godot (the figure, 
not just the play) is being held in Lüttringhausen. In the sea of prisoners, 
however, Godot’s number does not stand out. We are waiting, but he is 
here: “Yes, here,” Lembke repeats himself, as if having anticipated Beckett’s 
(or his own) disbelief at the thought. Incarcerated, Godot is transformed 
into Gogo: “Let us help him then, change the shoes that are hurting him!” 
Lembke’s analysis recasts the unseen Godot as one of the figures we see on 
stage. Godot ceases to be the promise both endlessly deferred and endlessly 
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broken and becomes the adjacent and sluggishly corporeal figure who over-
does it on his carrots.
 Lembke reads the play as an imperative to help one’s neighbor. He 
inverts the dynamic of need in the play. We do not need Godot; our neigh-
bor needs us. He turns the play from a destitute state of “nothing to be 
done” into an urgent call to assistance. Since this crucial first line follows 
Gogo’s struggle to get his boot off, Lembke responds in Brechtian fashion 
to the situation: if we change Gogo’s boot, we change the philosophy of the 
play. At the same time, the pragmatic moral that Lembke finds in the play 
cannot thoroughly withstand its transfer into the prison without modifica-
tion. In trying to deflate the transcendence of Godot by assigning him a 
spot contiguous to ours, Lembke runs into a problem with the staging of his 
remake (his interpretation) of Godot inside the prison. This staging issue is 
apparent in the aftertaste of iron (rather than the taste of irony) left in our 
mouths by Lembke’s phrase, “the neighbor in the cell next to mine.” Prox-
imity and distance are not antonyms in jail. Contiguous cells are impossibly 
removed from one another, and prisoners in adjacent cells communicate to 
one another in Morse code, the language of passing ships. Coming to one’s 
neighbor for anything in prison is as difficult as finding a new pair of shoes 
for him. It raises the question: where precisely is Lembke pointing when he 
asserts that Godot is here, “Yes, here”? The here of the prisoner is always 
usurped by the “there” of the guard, and the way the carceral institution 
manages the movement of convicts through its space. This “here” is nei-
ther public nor private, only a perpetually scrutinized and unfree space: 
precisely the quality of prison that makes it resonant with Beckett’s theatri-
cal vision. Though he set out to attune our ears to the call of our neighbor, 
Lembke ends by envisioning a new play based on the infinite separation of 
neighbors: Waiting for Gogo (or maybe Gogo Waits).
 Lembke’s desire to make Godot less ghostly to us applies equally to his 
relation with Beckett. He invites Beckett to see the performance, and though 
Beckett declines, he casually suggests that Lembke call whenever he is in 
town. Lembke probably feels baffled by this impossible invitation of hos-
pitality to him, an incarcerated man, as he is by Godot’s absence. Lembke 
proceeds to go to work on Beckett’s absence. He does this by breaking 
parole and journeying all the way from Wuppertal to Paris, showing up 
at Beckett’s door unannounced. Lembke ceases writing letters to Beckett in 
favor of sending himself and accepts Beckett’s invitation not formally but in 
person. Knowlson reports: “A frozen figure, dressed in lightweight summer 
clothing, turned up at the theater in a freezing cold Paris. . . . The penniless, 
half-starved prisoner had broken parole to come to see him. Blin offered 
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temporary shelter and provided him with warmer clothing.”107 Since the 
prisoner has no identity papers, he cannot be checked into a hotel. Beckett, 
wary of meeting the prisoner on the lam (possibly because of his earlier 
run-in with the knife-wielding pimp), never goes to his door but gives Blin 
money to pass on to the prisoner, along with the information that Beckett 
supposedly will not be back in town for a long time. Lembke, having bro-
ken the law and turned himself into one of Beckett’s vagabonds in his pil-
grimage to the author, proceeds to reenact on Beckett’s doorstep what he 
learned from Beckett’s play and Lüttringhausen alike: he waits.
Prisoners on Godot: Waiting to Empathize
One of the most intriguing essays on Waiting for Godot is the review written 
by Bandman in the San Quentin News. The front page article of the Novem-
ber 14, 1957, edition of the paper offers straight reportage on the play and 
interviews with the actors (noting, for example, managing director Jules 
Irving’s admission that “frankly, we were scared to death.”) Bandman’s 
column, by contrast, is an astonishingly creative response to Godot, unruly 
in its effort to devise a language for what took place on the stage in the 
“barn-like space of the North Dining Hall.” Though Bandman structures 
the review as a summary of the play, he addresses the reader through a 
series of imperatives (“now look closely,” “but wait,” “see master Pozzo 
as the compelling spirit”). Bandman thereby directs our attention at what 
he is critically imagining for us. The essay is literally a re-view from the 
prisoner’s standpoint, at once a description and a hallucination. The essay 
moves erratically across the registers of interpretation, imperative, hypoth-
esis, objective description. About Vladimir and Estragon in act 2, for exam-
ple, Bandman directs us to “watch them finalize into precursors of doubt, 
depression, and death.” “Finalizing into precursors” is the prisoner’s per-
sonal articulation of the mixed temporality of the waiting process. Vladimir 
and Estragon simultaneously terminate and herald as they metamorphose 
into the sign of their waiting. Bandman’s sentences are tightly compressed, 
with dense terms crammed at odd angles to one another.108 Each sentence 
constitutes both a holding pen and the effort to see over its wall.
 Bandman’s review is also a landmark in Beckett criticism for the way in 
which it speaks of Godot, years before its canonization, as a “world play.” 
The phrase departs, however, from contemporary uses of the term: for 
Bandman, the term designates an object from beyond the walls of the prison. 
The term “world” recurs throughout Bandman’s essay: he calls Pozzo the 
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“drive that makes the world go round,” a figure who “occasionally turns 
the shaft straight in our collective backs.” Both worlds—the world on stage 
and the world outside the prison—turn at the expense, the exclusion, of the 
prisoner. Of each world, the prisoner is a pivot rather than one of its deni-
zens. (Bandman writes the essay in the collective “we” of the yard.) Our 
notion of Beckett’s play as a world play and as microcosm begins here, in 
the response of one deprived of world. The paradox of these two worlds 
is institutional rather than logical for Bandman: both worlds exclude the 
prisoner. So he brings in the term once more in a strong effort to appeal to 
his audience, to put it in their terms: “If you will allow an explanation, see 
this play with us as the vast world housed right inside your own mind.” The 
prisoner in his cell may already suspect his cell, in its mixture of familiar-
ity and unreality, to be his mind, and the walls of the prison his cranium. 
This staple interpretation of Beckett’s theater has its origin in the nagging 
suspicion of the inmate.109 The world shuts itself up in the mind when the 
prisoner loses the world.
 More importantly, Bandman’s essay bears witness to the ways in which 
the prisoner is conflictual in his empathetic response to Beckett. This hesi-
tation is overlooked in Esslin’s claims about the immediate response of 
the inmates. The title of Bandman’s review, “The Play’s the Thing . . . ,” is 
a partial citation from Hamlet. Hamlet’s mental anguish and self-divided 
monologuing provide an interesting antecedent to the harassed thinking of 
Beckett’s homeless figures. Yet the title withholds the remainder of Ham-
let’s line: “wherein I shall catch the conscience of the king.” Hamlet stages 
The Mousetrap, which “plays something like the murder of my [Hamlet’s] 
father,” in order to see if his uncle will evince signs of a guilty conscience 
while watching the play.110 The reference touches a sore spot for Bandman, 
as it proposes theater as an instrument of institutional memory: The Mouse-
trap is designed to catch the involved spectator, whose emotional responses 
are turned into his rap sheet. The Mousetrap is supposed to con the King. 
Bandman voids the rest of Hamlet’s quote because he argues that Beckett’s 
play mobilizes catharsis but does so with a purpose other than pricking 
conscience or making guilt manifest.111 Featuring two waiting vagabonds 
forgetful of where they were yesterday, Waiting for Godot elicits, for Band-
man, a complex dynamic of emotion and reflection in the prisoner. His 
essay ends by returning to the quote: “The play’s the thing. This one was 
effective.” The essay shows us how prisoners discover new effects in Beck-
ett’s play, in percussion with their imprisoned state.
 The dramatic structure of catharsis implicating both prisoner and 
prison gets particular attention in Bandman’s discussion. Empathy for 
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another’s suffering begins on stage in act 1, when Pozzo arrives with his 
servant Lucky, who is tied with a rope and carrying his master’s stool and 
lunch basket. In a gesture seldom seen in Beckett characters, Vladimir actu-
ally objects to Lucky’s treatment: the stage directions indicate he is “explod-
ing” as he exclaims, “It’s a scandal!” Pozzo replies, “Are you referring to 
anything in a particular?” This reply is particularly cutting: Pozzo wants a 
citation for Vladimir’s shock and disbelief. Vladimir tries to put his finger 
on the scandal, but is ultimately only able to repeat the phrase: “(stutter-
ingly resolute) to treat a man . . . (gesture toward Lucky) . . . like that . . . I think 
that . . . no . . . a human being . . . no . . . it’s a scandal!”112 Estragon chips 
in with “It’s a disgrace!” but the stage directions indicate that he is more 
interested in “gnawing on his carrot.” Act 1 therefore calls for empathy and 
then defeats it. Lucky’s state remains unaltered, and Pozzo remains uncrim-
inalized. The play seems here to weld itself shut as a situation bearing no 
intervention.
 Bandman’s essay focuses on the improbable reemergence of empathy 
in act 2, when Pozzo reappears with Lucky. Pozzo is now blinded, a con-
dition as inexplicable as Lucky’s servitude, and cries for help. Bandman 
comments:
Hear Pozzo’s cries for help, for mercy. Feel pity for a beaten Fury, and hold 
out your hand—but wait! Should we forget what we’ve learned in waiting 
and watching? What’s it worth? If we help him, then what? Let us ponder 
and discuss: weigh the pros and cons. And then, overcome with “spiri-
tual” effulgence, help this flailing vital force in its sightless death throes. 
Yet in our selfless charity we overlook the obvious. Even blind, he is stron-
ger than we! We fall. But resiliently. We are pulled down by the dying only 
to become renewed, and in turn set death on its feet again.113
Hear Pozzo’s cries, feel pity, hold out your hand . . . but wait. At the very 
moment the spectator’s hand is figuratively extended over the prosce-
nium to the character, Bandman says to hold it right there. He thereby 
usurps the play’s imperative to wait and lodges it within the immediate 
impulse to feel something for Pozzo. Bandman does not ask his spectator 
to be detached (Brechtian) or immersed, but rather to review his emotional 
allegiances. Recalling the undertow of futility in the play, he suggests that 
nothing is to be done either by the characters or for them: “Should we for-
get what we’ve learned in waiting and watching? What’s it worth?”
 Vladimir and Estragon bicker about empathy’s worth on stage. Regard-
ing their assistance to Pozzo as a promising employment opportunity, 
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they debate how much they should charge him for their services (one 
hundred francs? two hundred francs?). Whereas the characters on stage 
debate the price for helping Pozzo, Bandman urges the inmate spectator 
to assess its cost: “If we help him, then what? Weigh the pros and cons.”114 
Exactly what kind of advice is this to convicts, whose very name is given 
to the negative side of the ledger? Emotional catharsis is a losing wager for 
the criminal, and Bandman proceeds to lay out the reason why. “Do not 
overlook the obvious. Even blind, he is stronger than we!” The spectator 
remains curiously watched, not only by a blind man but by a blind man on 
stage. Feeling sorry for this blinded tyrant makes the inmate forget where 
he is in the auditorium. Bandman says, “Wait!” Look away from the stage 
not to cry into your sleeve but to remember the guards posted at every 
exit.
 Bandman asserts that emotional release ultimately works to sus-
tain something (a theatrical but clearly recognizable figure of power) that 
leaves the inmate spectator unfree. He says, “We fall. But resiliently. We are 
pulled down by the dying only to become renewed, and in turn set death 
on its feet again.” What Bandman calls our “spiritual effulgence” toward 
the stage is something akin to a rendezvous, not unlike the one that is sup-
posed to take place in the play: the spectator’s emotional investment in 
Beckett’s play, but this renewal is a meager concession from a process that 
destroys him. Fallen power merely cons the inmate’s feelings and reasserts 
his place within the structure of authority. Bandman concedes that it makes 
the prisoner feel better and “renewed,” yet he observes that this emotional 
transaction only allows a greater negativity to reassert itself. Theatrical 
catharsis originally serves a civic function: to purge distortion and emotion 
from the spectator and thereby clarify the citizen’s judgment.115 Its contrary 
theatrical model, Brecht’s alienation, shared the same goal: “The point is 
not to leave the spectator purged by a cathartic but to leave him a changed 
man, or rather, to sow within him the changes which must be completed out-
side the theater.”116 Catharsis loses its therapeutic function and retains only a 
negative one when access to civic space is denied. For the prisoner seeing 
Godot in San Quentin, unlike Brecht’s or Aristotle’s spectator, there is no 
“outside the theater.” The emotional release is choked up by the cognizance 
of guards standing at the exits of the cafeteria. Using a Beckettian turn of 
phrase, Bandman says that the prisoner’s catharsis merely helps readjust 
death’s posture, as if it had simply been taking a breather: we “set death 
on its feet again.” Bandman describes the dynamic between audience and 
stage as an exchange of postures: death stands up, and we fall as if we were 
standing, “resiliently.”
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 A resilient fall, a more wakeful version of what Beckett would call in his 
late work a “slumberous collapsion,” is Bandman’s way of charting posi-
tivity (“spiritual effulgence”) within an exchange that only ends up on the 
bad side. The counter-Hegelian dialectic he detects between audience and 
stage never synthesizes, never resolves. It is Bandman’s way of saying that 
the negative moment goes unredeemed. Or, in the language of the prison 
context, the con goes unrehabilitated. This aspect of Beckett’s work has 
been widely noted by critics.117 In his notes to Beckett, Adorno observes: 
“Very enigmatic remark about a kind of positivity contained in pure nega-
tivity. In view of such absolute negativity, one could be said to quasi live.”118 
Bandman’s observation differs from Adorno’s insofar as Bandman discov-
ers this “quasi” life within the prisoner’s emotional investment during the 
play, rather than within philosophy per se. For Bandman, the spectator’s 
immediate reaction to Pozzo sheds light on a curious kind of darkness: his 
own. Instead of “positivity contained in pure negativity” (Adorno), Band-
man speaks of Godot as “the most provocatively negative synthesis of the 
mechanics of human culture that it has been our pleasure to enjoy for a 
long time.”119 The situation of the prisoner-spectator who “weighs the pros 
and cons” realizes the abject math of Beckett’s play.
 Bandman calls out to the spectator to employ a balance, the kind that 
Justice might use, yet he urges this metaphor upon an audience of thieves. 
His audience, Beckett’s audience, knows the weight of that scale upon 
them; they cannot use it disinterestedly to monitor their own experience. So 
as he urges deliberation in the middle of their emotional surge, Bandman 
notes a very contrary effect of Godot. He calls it “an expression, symbolic in 
order to avoid all personal error, by an author who expected each member 
of his audience to draw his own conclusions, make his own errors.” The 
resolute and methodical proceedings on Beckett’s stage impress Bandman 
as an invitation to err. Beckett’s work encourages the spectator to put the 
scales of justice aside. To make one’s own errors, to undergo unguarded 
emotional investments and mental experiments, must have been appealing 
to the rule-bound audience.120
Prisoners on Beckett: Theatrical Recidivism
Cluchey says that before Godot came to San Quentin in 1957, he “had never 
even been in a theater, not even to rob one.” The joke tells us something 
about what we expect a prisoner to take away from culture: nothing but 
the cash box. The theater is too bereft to heist. The aspect of the stage that 
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turns away Cluchey the criminal ensnares him as a protégé of Beckett by 
issuing him a dare: what does one take from Beckett’s destitute work? How 
does one undo its lock? Cluchey’s work as a performer of Beckett’s drama, 
as the playwright of The Cage and The Wall Is Mama, and as one of Beckett’s 
preferred actors, indicates his debt to Beckett’s theater. To understand the 
shadow that Beckett and Waiting for Godot cast over Cluchey, we have to 
reverse the agency in the joke: Cluchey did not break into the theater. The 
theater broke into him.
 The circumstances under which Cluchey encounters the Godot perfor-
mance tell us something about the trajectory to come. While 1,500 inmates 
packed the north hall cafeteria to watch the play, Cluchey, in prison for life 
and considered an escape risk, is forced to remain in his cell. Yet Cluchey 
has no choice but to listen to the performance, as it is piped over the pris-
on’s radio system into his cell. How strange it must have been to hear such 
lines as “The English say cawm” and “How’s the carrot?” through the 
apparatus that habitually barked out the daily routine of the prison. It may 
have been the distance enforced between Cluchey and the play, rather than 
his proximity to it, that left its mark on him: Godot greets him not as a capti-
vated audience but as a confined one, behind bars. The layout of Cluchey’s 
first encounter with Godot inscribes him already as a Beckett character. 
Beckett’s Company begins: “A voice comes to one in the dark. Imagine.” The 
situation forces Cluchey, and us, to imagine that voice, that solitary one, 
that dark. Even though he commits no crime in a theater, Cluchey keeps 
returning to the scene. His life constitutes an incredible itinerary toward 
Beckett, toward that encounter he missed but which nevertheless came to 
him in his cell.
 Where Lembke’s pilgrimage to Beckett takes spatial expression, walk-
ing from Lüttringhausen to Paris, Cluchey’s path is through acting Beck-
ett. A telling memento is the slippers (Beckett’s own) that Cluchey wears 
in his performance as Krapp in Krapp’s Last Tape, under Beckett’s direction 
in Berlin in 1977, and which Cluchey donated along with his papers to the 
Depaul University Library. Beckett is unhappy with the sound generated by 
other slippers against the floor of the stage. Only Beckett’s own make the 
sought-after shuffling noise. Cluchey wears these slippers through several 
performances of Krapp over the next decade, performing the Krapp out of 
them and eventually donating the tattered slippers, held together by tape, 
to an archive. Cluchey therefore makes a pilgrimage, but only in character: 
he follows the path cut by the back-and-forth of his character across ump-
teen stages, and does so only in Beckett’s slippers, which make the precise 
sound desired by the director.121
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 Cluchey’s time in prison prepares him to be a Beckett actor. He founds 
an acting workshop in San Quentin, and between 1961 and 1963 he stages 
thirty-five performances of Beckett’s cycle (Waiting for Godot, Endgame, and 
Krapp’s Last Tape).122 If prison, as Lenin claims, is a university for revolu-
tionaries, then it might also be an acting school for performers of Beckett.123 
Cluchey methodically contours himself so closely to the everyday disci-
pline of prison life that he does not break a single rule in his twelve years 
there. The warden announces this at Cluchey’s release through a gover-
nor’s pardon. “That’s something,” the warden adds, “when you think of 
all the rules we have here.”124 Cluchey strikes no revolutionary or trans-
gressive stance while in jail and internalizes the irrational rules of the insti-
tution. This constitutes preparation for acting within Beckett’s sensitively 
alarm-wired stage. Beckett’s stage directions issue a restraining order on 
improvisation.125 Cluchey himself notes how Beckett requires the actor 
to stop acting, to learn inaction, and to acquire “a commitment to listen-
ing.”126 Looking for greater colorlessness to the voice, Beckett would tell 
Cluchey, “Don’t say it like that—they won’t hear you.” Beckett sees Krapp 
as “trapped in himself” and “full of a dangerous, concentrated violence.”127 
His advice to Cluchey in performing this role is “Make the thing your own 
in terms of incarceration.”128 Beckett summons the prisoner to reappear on 
stage as Krapp. To make the character his own, Beckett suggests he use 
the terms of his incarceration. This is curious advice, since the thing that 
Cluchey was while in prison, “driven mad by my own calendar maker, the 
Warden and State of California,” was not his own.129 This self forcibly dis-
owned of self inhabits Beckett’s stage.
 Cluchey’s play The Cage revises Waiting for Godot from the standpoint 
of prison. The one-act play unfolds within the contained space of a stage 
bounded by prison bars, with occasional interruptions by the guards. It 
shows us the relations improvised between four prisoners in the cell: Al (“a 
deformed petty thief”), Doc (a black convict), Hatchet (criminally insane), 
and a new prisoner, Jive, who may or may not have just murdered his girl-
friend. The play culminates in a mock trial of Jive, over which Hatchet pre-
sides as “judge.” At the play’s conclusion Hatchet gathers the verdict and 
strangles Jive before washing his hands in the water from the toilet at cen-
ter stage. Unlike Lucky’s monologue (to which his rants bear some resem-
blance), Hatchet’s insanity comes with consequences.
 The Cage resembles a transcription of Godot from memory: what Cluchey 
cannot recollect he fills in with his experience as a prisoner. This recidivism, 
in which Cluchey repeatedly returns to prison through the stage, is literally 
part of the play’s conception.130 Cluchey wrote The Cage while in San Quen-
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tin, using a typewriter he accessed in spare time while working in the chap-
lain’s office. After parole, Cluchey substantially rewrote it in the process of 
bringing the play to prisons throughout the United States, employing only 
ex-convicts in the roles. The Cage materializes the no-man’s-land of Godot 
within a prison cell. The curious immobility of Beckett’s characters at the 
end of each act is no longer an overdetermined and half-internalized condi-
tion. Cluchey’s play renders Beckett’s “They do not move” more tangibly 
as “They cannot be moved . . . without authorization.” The Cage articulates 
this immobility not as a stage direction but through the décor (the bars sur-
rounding three sides of the stage). Cluchey’s play does not imitate Beckett’s 
play but acts as a developing agent upon it. Earlier I described how prison 
forms a latent image within Beckett’s work and how it confronts his study 
rather than being ingested by it. Cluchey makes more patent the institu-
tional force of prison felt in Beckett’s theater. His play makes space on its 
stage for the guards who handled the props of Beckett’s play offstage dur-
ing the San Quentin performance of Waiting for Godot.
 These guards in The Cage show how Cluchey gives a coercive turn to 
the inconsistency and discontinuity of Beckett’s dialogues. When the play 
opens, two guards bring in a new prisoner. They rattle off instructions to 
the prisoner, speaking in alternation, before the prisoner who never speaks. 
Here are just a few of the lines that cover two pages of the script: 
Keep yourself clean at all times. Wash regularly—avoid disease. Never 
waste time, be productive. Stay busy, use the time well. Report everything 
to us. Remember gambling is forbidden. Never accept favors from other 
prisoners. Because they expect favors in return. It only leads to trouble. 
Cooperate with us, we’ll help you. Do your time and let us run the prison. 
If you don’t receive your mail don’t worry. If you see trouble brewing, 
we’re helping you. We want you to learn new ways.131
Separately, the lines all stand on their own, as insular as axioms. The state-
ments are hard to remember because they perform different functions: they 
threaten, they cajole, they place ultimatums, they invite, they describe, they 
warn. The discontinuity is exacerbated because some of the lines continue 
the preceding thought (“Because they expect favors in return”). The total 
effect of this list is not unlike the abstract incoherence that plagues much 
of Beckett’s dialogue, only in Cluchey the dialogue and effect is addressed 
to a particular subject: the prisoner, who must sit in witness to the dialogue 
and use it, hypothetically, as a way to survive in prison. The list of impera-
tives does not add up, and yet the prisoner must not make any mistake 
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about them. Like Kafka, Cluchey makes us do a double take at the concern 
shown to us by officials and subsequently has us wonder about his intent: 
“If you don’t receive your mail, don’t worry” could be a message from Kaf-
ka’s Castle.
 Cluchey’s play gives a more discernible shape to Beckettian futility. In 
Godot this futility is existentialist in nature and goes on and on. In Cluchey 
it goes on and on before a power. Beckett’s waiting has frozen into detain-
ment. Moments from Cluchey’s play match up with others in Godot so that 
their gestures ghost one another. These afterimages in The Cage material-
ize the prison-ghost on Beckett’s stage. In The Cage the new prisoner, insist-
ing on his innocence, shouts to the exiting guards, “Does the Warden know 
I’m here?” and “Tell the Warden I’m here. I have to see him right away, it’s 
important.”132 This resembles Vladimir’s answer to the boy who asks what 
message he should deliver to Godot: “Tell him . . . (he hesitates) . . . tell him 
you saw us. (Pause.) You did see us, didn’t you?”133 Vladimir articulates the 
uncertainty of being seen either by the boy or implicitly by us, the specta-
tors. By contrast, we detect the futility of the prisoner’s question through 
its urgent repetition rather than through ellipses or hesitation. The plea to 
make an appearance before the warden takes the place of Vladimir’s doubt 
about whether his existence on stage has been witnessed. The power struc-
ture of the prison in Cluchey’s scenario resets the phenomenological doubt 
of Beckett’s stage. Whereas Vladimir’s question concludes each act of Godot, 
the prisoner’s hopeless petition of the warden begins Cluchey’s play. We 
are introduced to Cluchey’s character by being introduced to his plea fall-
ing on deaf ears. The statement accompanies the arrival of the prisoner in 
the no-man’s-land. Cluchey’s cell telepathically channels and remixes lines 
from Beckett in accordance with the new stage reality of the cell. The noth-
ing-to-be-done intoned within Beckett’s absence of environment is reconfig-
ured by Cluchey’s character, who says simply, “I don’t belong here. I didn’t 
do anything.”134 In neither Godot nor The Cage is the stage a place where 
one belongs. On Cluchey’s stage, the apprehended prisoner must end-
lessly revise Estragon’s proclamation to himself: nothing was done; I didn’t do 
anything.
 Cluchey takes the dispossessed state of Beckett’s vagabonds and shows 
it to be a thoroughly managed condition. Maybe it always was a managed 
condition, Cluchey suggests, only one managed in our world by the institu-
tion of prison, rather than for the stage by the institution of theater. Cluchey 
turns the vague and fruitless landscape of Godot into a structural waste-
land. Beyond the stage lies not a void, à la Beckett, but merely more of the 
same, more cells. Offstage space acquires its unknown quality only by the 
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prohibition placed on the prisoners’ access to it.135 The sound of “a steel 
door, the rustle of heavy keys, voices, pans” send the convict, Al, leaping 
to the bars, yelling, “Hey, it’s garbage time. Hey Jesus, hurry up with the 
turnips will ya. I’m starving.”136 It is not accidental that Beckett’s prop, the 
turnip, makes a reappearance here (or rather fails to). The meagerness of 
the tramp’s life on Beckett’s stage is pondered through a turnip that Vladi-
mir has scavenged, kept in his pocket, and shares with Estragon as a poor 
substitute for a carrot. The inadequate quantities of carrots and turnips on 
stage enable Beckett’s tramps to debate their comparative taste and pro-
duce an immediate nostalgia for carrots (“I’ll never forget this carrot”). 
Yet in Cluchey’s prison, the turnip is Godot. Food is rationed by an agency 
beyond the stage, that is, outside the bars of the cage, instead of from within, 
from the folds of Vladimir’s pocket. Al’s starvation is a transitive condition, 
performed on him by the prison that starves him, as opposed to Estragon’s 
description of his condition: “I’m hungry!” In this way the rationality of the 
prison system exacerbates the absurdity of Beckett’s stage.
Beckett’s Silences in the Prison
The audiences of prison performances of Waiting for Godot are famously 
raucous, something unimaginable to the critic or theatergoer accustomed 
to decorum. Records of prison performances describe inmates’ reactions 
almost as if the actors were in the yard with them, not before them on a 
stage. They interrupt the performance by shouting questions, making fun 
of events on stage, and thinking aloud loudly. Unlike critics or traditional 
theatergoers, the prisoners are not willing to trust that the postponement 
of their understanding of what happens on stage will eventually pay off. 
The performance of the play, rather than reflection on the performance, pro-
vides the prisoner with an opportunity for its interpretation. The comments 
and questions the inmates shout are in a sense the instant verbalization of 
the inchoate critical reception. The shouted comments indicate impatience 
with the stage action and with some of Beckett’s more enigmatic formula-
tions. In fact, as Sidney Homan notes, the audience of his production of 
Godot in Raiford Prison did not even allow Vladimir to complete his sec-
ond sentence. Replying to Estragon’s “Nothing to be done,” Vladimir says, 
“I’m beginning to come around to that opinion. All my life I’ve tried to put 
it from me.” As Homan describes: “At this point an inmate leaped to his 
feet and cried out, ‘What the hell do you mean by put it from me?’”137 The 
inmate immediately poses the question again once it becomes clear that the 
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actors, refusing to fall out of their roles, will not answer: “I said, what the 
hell do you mean by put it from me?” The prisoner’s confusion is not a ques-
tion of vocabulary. The line, the third in the play, also seems to cut close to 
the intimate exchange the prisoner has with the power exercised over him. 
Vladimir uses physical terms to describe his attempt to forget or shrug off a 
conviction, as if this opinion (“nothing to be done”) were something he had 
to literally relocate far from himself. The prisoner in the audience would be 
the first to wonder: where is it to go? What means are available to erase a 
conviction, in a place where every gesture is scrutinized and where every 
convict is synonymous with his crime and his sentence?
 Photographs of the 1988 production of Waiting for Godot in San Quen-
tin inspire Beckett to observe that he “saw the roots of my play” there.138 
Yet the mute images compel Beckett to raise a question about what he can-
not hear in them. He asks Jan Jönson “about ‘the sound’ of his play in the 
prison environment. He wanted to know what ‘the silence’ of the play was 
like behind prison walls.”139 Are we to hear a bit of concern in Beckett’s 
question? What chance does a silence have between the infinite clamor, 
the literal mur-mur that happens between prison walls? Alternatively, the 
prison would seem to give an opportunity for silence to happen. Sontag 
remarked that the silences of Godot permitted the sounds of sniper fire and 
armored vehicles to filter in to the stage and make an acoustic imprint upon 
the play. This sonic breach of the stage is not an option within the prison, 
where nothing enters without first being frisked. So the silences within the 
prison are inordinately connected to the silences that greet them from the 
outside world. Similarly, the silences of Beckett’s stage in the play are not 
just the absence of noise from the characters but the sound of Godot’s fail-
ure to respond. “The air is full of our cries,” says Vladimir. Yet in the air-
tight system of San Quentin these cries are out of earshot of the outside 
world. No sounds from the streets can accidentally fill the silences of the 
play. In the stagnant recycled air of San Quentin, even these cries mesh 
with the silence. The cries fill the air, yet they form a kind of white noise.
 Beckett’s question goes to the heart of his play, noted in the earliest crit-
ical responses. Jacques Audiberti’s review of the premiere of Godot at the 
Babylon Theater notes that the characters “speak like Charlie Chaplin. As 
he would have spoken, not as the Count of Limelight, but when he had 
nothing to say.”140 Speech and silence are deeply indebted to one another 
in Godot. Nowhere is this more evident than in Beckett’s own production 
in Berlin. Beckett punctuates the play with sixteen moments of silence 
and stillness called Wartestellen, or points of waiting.141 Walter Asmus 
notes Beckett’s remarks about these tableaux: “There are fixed moments 
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of stillness, where everything stands completely still and silence threat-
ens to swallow everything up. Then the action starts again.”142 The stage 
directions give numerous indications of silence, as if it were something 
that could not adequately be conveyed merely by having no words on the 
page, or having come to the end of a sentence. So Gogo, quoting Pozzo, 
commands Didi, “Think, pig! (silence).” Or when Gogo asks Didi, “Do you 
see anything coming?” Didi responds “No,” and Gogo replies “Nor I,” 
followed by the stage direction “(They resume their watch. Silence.).” Beck-
ett’s production notebook underscores the text as a Cagean production of 
silences.
 Yet the silences broken by the prisoners’ replies are not the same silences 
prescribed by Beckett’s stage directions. Again, this illuminates how the 
prison performances are helpful to understanding the play. The prisoners 
call attention to new and unforeseen silences. The prisoners ask for clar-
ification from the characters about what their words imply. The inmates’ 
questions try to drag into the open what remains unsaid within characters’ 
articulations. During performances where theater etiquette imposes silence 
over the spectators, these moments of nonsense habitually go unresolved 
and hover in the air between stage and audience.143 By contrast, the prison-
ers are quick to speak when things do not add up: they do not wait silently 
for meaning. Homan reports that Lucky’s speech, a conspicuous anthology 
of incomplete meanings and a hymn to unfinished labors, was interrupted 
fifteen times. When Lucky proclaims, “God quaquaquaqua with white 
beard,” for example, a prisoner shouted, “You taking His name in vain or 
something?”144 Rightly, a prisoner knew to voice his suspicion of this speech 
that takes all names in vain, in a play in which things can only be done in 
vain. The interjection, which is both question and threat, sounds like the last 
words before throwing punches. The prisoner has added “or something” 
because he wants to allot Lucky a space of ambiguity, possibly to permit 
Lucky (if he could engage in dialogue!) a way out. He wants Lucky to back 
down or at least to clarify the matter and take accountability for his own 
monologue. At another moment in Lucky’s speech, a prisoner shouts, “You 
know something those assholes behind you don’t?” Once more, these are 
fighting words. This prisoner responds to the paradox presented by Lucky’s 
fragmented and turbulent monologue, which begins at Pozzo’s injunction 
to “think, pig!” yet offers only debris of knowledge (formulas, snippets of 
legalese and logical proofs, the taxonomies of sport). You think, the prisoner 
asks, but do you know something different from the assholes behind you? 
The disposition of the prisoner’s question brings the ambiguity of Lucky’s 
performance to a different level: it is both an invitation and an ultimatum. 
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In the closed universe of the prison, knowing something different from the 
others may be remarked upon with greater surprise and urgency. The pris-
oner greets Lucky’s avalanche of speech with a coercive reply: you know 
something? Then let’s have it! The prisoner adopts a practical and muscu-
lar stance toward dramatic ambiguity: he interrupts the torrent of Lucky’s 
monologue to ask, “What’s to know?” and “How is this performance any 
different from what we’ve heard already?”
 In these instances, the prisoners raise some of the fundamental ques-
tions about the play, not in an essay or review but by hurling the questions 
at the play itself and at the character on stage: What is a performance of 
thinking? What knowledge (useful or otherwise) is rendered by the charac-
ters? How do we separate blather and thinking? When does the thinking on 
stage become our own thought? There is a vast difference between the pris-
oner’s speaking at the character and rubbing his chin over these questions.
 The play takes great measures to keep the characters’ thinking from 
coagulating into knowledge, something for either us or them to know. We 
know that Vladimir and Estragon hate interrupted thought. They agree 
that “the worst is to have thought,” where thinking stops, acquires a past 
tense, and becomes something to be assessed in retrospect. They renounce 
the Hegelian perspective in which the owl of Minerva only takes flight at 
dusk. As the play transpires in a trapped twilight (“Will night never come?” 
asks Vladimir), the owl of knowledge seems neither to leave nor to land. 
The prisoner breaks the hermetic seal on Lucky’s monologue. Only by 
interrupting speech does thought come forth. Yet the prisoner does this not 
because he is interested in knowledge per se. The inmate wants to know 
if Lucky is just another asshole: who he is and how he figures, rather than 
what he knows.
 Homan notes that the actors were frequently forced to explain and fur-
ther define their roles to the audience. For example, after Vladimir says, 
“All my life I’ve tried to put it from me, saying you haven’t tried every-
thing yet. And I resume the struggle. So there you are again!” and Gogo 
answers, “Am I?” one of the spectators at Raiford Prison shouted, “Doesn’t 
he know whether he’s here or not?” Here, the convict heckler doubts 
Gogo’s doubt and suggests that Cartesian doubt will never do away with 
existence in prison, that prison (and possibly the stage) condemns you to 
appear and offers no hiding places. Prison never gives you the chance to 
forget you are in prison. The prisoner asks, “Doesn’t he know whether he’s 
here or not?” rather than “there” (as Vladimir specifies). What seems to be 
a misquotation by the prisoner is in fact testament to the ineluctable and 
indivisible reality of prison. The slippage from there to here demonstrates 
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how the prisoner is not in the same place as the critic. Novelist Alain 
Robbe-Grillet observes that the situation of the hobos on Beckett’s stage 
“is summed up on this simple observation, beyond which it does not seem 
possible to advance: they are there, they are on the stage.”145 Further on, he 
notes: “They are there; they must explain themselves. But they do not seem 
to have a text prepared for beforehand and scrupulously learned by heart. 
They must invent. They are free.”146 To the critic, there designates the yon-
der of the stage. The proscenium allows the critic to divide the existence 
on stage from his own. The prisoner shrugs his shoulders at this claim: the 
point “beyond which he cannot advance” is not an irreducible existence on 
stage but existence (including the existence of the theater) in prison, in here. 
The critic points to the stage. The reality of the closed system (here) is one 
to which one need not point: the prisoners sit with crossed arms. Instead of 
being sanctioned by theatrical custom (a text that would place their charac-
ters in a recognizable world), Vladimir and Estragon have the opportunity, 
or rather the obligation, to explain themselves. The prisoners implicitly 
agree with Robbe-Grillet, yet their response demonstrates the inadequacy 
of the vagabonds’ self-explanation. This inadequacy is not a matter of clar-
ity but of address: the prisoners want the characters to align themselves to 
the prison context. The comments and questions shouted to the stage sug-
gest a keen awareness of the unfreedom of the characters, rather than their 
ability to constitute their world at each moment. The contextlessness of 
existence is painful, rather than inviting, to the prisoner.
 Literary critics describe these interruptions as tearing down the “fourth 
wall” of the stage. As Erin Koshal notes:
The fourth wall of theatre enables spectators to become absorbed in the 
spectacle onstage in a way that ignores the physical and spatial contiguity 
between audience and actors, reality and fiction. It also helps construct a 
unilateral relation between dramatic performance and spectator in which 
the former reflects, educates, or in some way serves the reality outside it. 
These inmates, however, in offering their own advice to the figures, treated 
Didi and Gogo not simply as characters occupying a fixed dramatic regis-
ter but as two figures occupying a theatrical space adjacent to their own.147
Koshal implies that the prisoners’ responses have an unintended Brechtian 
effect, shattering the hermetic world of Beckett’s stage. Fragmenting ges-
ture, even forcing characters to repeat their lines, the audience distributes 
fractures into the play according to their needs. Koshal argues that this pro-
cess tears down the fourth wall of the theater: the illusion of separateness 
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“between audience and actors, reality and fiction” is undermined. Koshal 
here insists on the peaceful coexistence between stage and prison: the char-
acters on stage “occupy a theatrical space adjacent to the [prisoners’] own.” 
Koshal’s analysis overlooks the ways in which the prisoners’ responses 
are both more conventional and more alarming. The convicts engage the 
characters conventionally, through empathy. At the same time, however, 
this empathy is strangely coercive. Koshal’s summary of these responses 
as prisoners “offering their own advice” to the characters misses the simul-
taneously empathetic, brutal, and above all analytic (on equal footing with 
critics) nature of these intrusions. In addition to experiencing a kind of 
transference (of a psychoanalytic nature) onto Beckett’s characters, the pris-
oners undertake their transfer as well. Here we can reverse the direction-
ality of Homan’s comment that “it’s as if they want to get into the play.” 
It seems rather that the responses of the convicts constitute an attempt to 
transfer Beckett’s characters from the stage to a world more familiar to the 
inmate: the prisoners want to authorize the movement of the characters 
from the institution of the stage to the institution of the prison. The her-
metic state of Beckett’s stage becomes surprisingly communicative to the 
inmates, whose responses merge the nowhere of the play into the now here 
of the prison. The convicts subject the proceedings to review, not of the tra-
ditionally critical sort (a critical review in which they evaluate or analyze), 
but rather a review that one might give to troops (actors form troupes, after 
all), something closer to a frisking, a pat down, a calling to order, an ask-
ing to declare. Vladimir, Estragon, Lucky, and Pozzo are called to explain 
themselves to the inmates and fall into line with the everyday power rela-
tions that structure the lives of the audience. Where critics deem Beckett’s 
world unfamiliar, the prisoners set about to familiarize the characters to 
themselves, beginning with the gesture of hailing the character on stage as 
if he were just another person in the prison yard. The voice of the inmate 
is expected to turn someone, even someone on stage. Cluchey comments 
that he “felt secure with [Beckett’s] characters . . . because they were so like 
the people in San Quentin: extensions of disconnection, decay and uncer-
tainty.”148 This term “extensions” suggests that the literary and theatrical 
space appears as an add-on to the closed world of the prison, a space 
quickly annexed by the prisoners. Shouting at Gogo not to “take all that 
crap” and asking Lucky why he submits so silently and uncomplainingly, 
the prisoners request that the characters on stage reckon with the invisible 
forces that subject them. The prisoners’ responses thereby call attention to 
(and thereby make more palpable) the coercion that pervades Beckett’s play 
in a latent state, like the directives submerged within the stage directions 
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(whatever keeps them from moving, or the fact that Lucky enters with a 
rope around his neck). The prisoners actively force the characters to take 
stock of the subtle dynamics of subjection and domination in which they 
are trapped but to which they seem blind. Through their interjections, the 
inmates drag out into the open what otherwise goes unsaid. Lines such as 
Pozzo’s “The road is free to all” produce a kind of hollow echo, as if the 
assertion were waiting for someone to counterbalance its laissez-faire out-
look with the state of unfreedom palpable on Beckett’s stage. The convict 
assumes this articulatory agency.
 Contrary to Koshal’s assertion, these interruptions do not dispel the 
fictional status of the stage. As Homan observes, “Audiences don’t speak 
to you in character.”149 The inmates’ identification with the characters is 
so intense that it withstands, or is even articulated through, their shout-
ing. These shouts do not address the actors, nor do they call attention to 
the artifice or judge the quality of the performance. The actor here is just a 
useful tool to the character, a conduit through which the character explains 
himself further, rather than the agency behind the character.150 The inmates 
are not critical spectators, in Brecht’s sense of the term. The distance the 
inmates take from Brecht is as vast as the one they take from the thing 
Brecht criticized, namely, empathy in order to forget oneself (we cannot 
accuse the prisoners of seeking “escapism”). This distance between the 
inmate audience and Brecht’s alienated spectator can be measured through 
their smoking habits. Brecht advises the audience members to sit, removed 
from the action, behind their cigars. The prisoners, meanwhile, throw their 
lit matches in the air behind them after lighting their cigarettes, produc-
ing a “flickering luster.”151 En masse, the prisoners illuminate the stage with 
a cosmos of matches, investing the stage with the world familiar to them. 
They do not need a play to become alienated; they are already that. Instead 
of tearing down the fourth wall of the theater, they persistently remind 
the characters on stage that they are enclosed within the fourth wall of the 
prison—the one behind the audience’s back.
 Audiences attending Godot premieres in London, Dublin, and Brussels 
are equally incited to shout, but for reasons entirely different from those of 
the prisoners. These theatergoers react vociferously to what the play rep-
resents rather than to the intricacies of how it unfolds on stage. In Brus-
sels, for example, a scandalized old lady stands up in the middle of the 
performance and shouts “to her astonished companions in the stalls, ‘Why 
won’t they work?’”152 This irate patron wants the characters to do some-
thing useful, to produce the meaning, conflict, and action expected from 
actors on stage. Implicit in her objection is a criticism that Beckett’s play 
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does not perform its theatrical duty and that it does not “work” for her. 
A theatergoer at the London premiere yells, “This is why we lost the colo-
nies!”153 Civilian theater patrons feel free to assault theater etiquette under 
the affidavit of official culture. These comments bear the ethic of compul-
sory labor or melancholy for the dissolution of the British Empire. Break-
ing decorum becomes an opportunity to vent a greater outrage, as if the 
decision to interrupt the audience’s silence during a performance revealed 
a symptomatic wound and not just an isolated instance of boredom pushed 
to the boiling point. These patrons address their complaints to their fellow 
audience members rather than to the stage. At the Godot premiere in Paris, 
disgruntled audience members take their seats after intermission, only to 
depart loudly at the beginning of the second act. These theatergoers take 
advantage of the fact that there are no armed guards stationed at the exits 
of the Babylon Theater, as there are at San Quentin. The critical gesture of 
disaffection depends entirely on the conjunction of these cries of outrage 
with the movement of the group out of the theater. The demonstration of 
these patrons, in other words, signifies only that they are spectators, not 
prisoners.
 At the end of one of the performances, Homan notes that one of the 
prisoners yelled, “You guys—you oughta live here. That’d show you!”154 
Such an invitation can only be issued to a group that somehow already 
strikes the criminal as familiar, a group that has become recognizable (“you 
guys”) to the cons through their interruptions. (“OK! I know this guy! Now, 
you can get back to the play,” says one inmate after being answered.) As 
with the prisoner Lembke, who claimed that “Godot is among us,” this 
vociferous prisoner offers not a reading but a sentencing: the audience mem-
ber foregoes the activity of judgment on the play (the Brechtian response), 
the trial, and immediately offers them life in prison. What, exactly, would 
prison show them? That convicts know more about the total futility of wait-
ing, starting with the fact that it lasts longer than two acts? That waiting 
may enlist our most miserable solitude, one whose non-sense exceeds the 
banter of the vagabonds on stage? That you live in prison as a character, 
and not as an actor? That your agency, your actor, is felt at every moment 
to have been locked out of the prison? That prison is a dangerous space 
in which one may be addressed as “pig” but commanded to do more than 
think? What does it mean to show the theater something? Is it not that this 
particular prisoner senses that Beckett’s world is somehow attentive to the 
prison (studies the prison) but does not somehow yet incarnate the prison? 
That Beckett’s stage is the prison’s antechamber, or even its rehearsal? The 
shout reverses the priority of subject and predicate within Knowlson’s 
60 •  ChaPTer 1
description of the view from Beckett’s apartment. The prisoner says, “Let 
your study face our prison. You should see your study from where we 
stand.”
The Etiquette of the Theater
Koshal writes that “[it] is precisely their experience as the exceptions 
to [universal discourses of a shared humanity] that allowed prisoners to 
empathize with Didi and Gogo.”155 The supposition that prisoners do not 
have the status of humanity seems as cruel as giving a watch to some-
one with a life sentence. Prisoners exist not outside humanity but outside 
the discourse of etiquette and the pieties of bourgeois theatergoers. The 
inmates defy the idiom of “captive audience” that scholars winkingly apply 
to them.156 In this regard they take their cue from the play itself: Vladimir 
and Estragon compare what they are doing onstage to vaudeville and the 
circus. Critics have noted these affinities between the antics of Beckett’s 
characters and less refined forms of popular entertainment. Kenner notes, 
for example, how the “antecedents of Beckett’s plays are not in literature 
but—to take a rare American example—in Emmett Kelly’s solemn determi-
nation to sweep a circle of light into a dustpan: a haunted man whose fidel-
ity to an impossible task . . . illuminates the dynamics of a tragic sense of 
duty.”157 Yet the comparison remains abstract for cultured audiences: Pascal 
as played by Fratellini’s clowns. Only the inmates respond as a vaudeville 
audience.
 Though Esslin claims that the prisoners are a “hypnotized audience,” 
they are not hypnotized out of speech like well-to-do audiences, whose 
only assault on theater decorum is the sound of a nagging cough. In Eleu-
théria, Beckett inscribes the spectator onto the stage. A character named 
Audience Member climbs over the proscenium and engages the actors 
in dialogue: tellingly, the first thing he does is to emphatically clear his 
throat: “This farce—(He again clears his throat, but this time instead of swal-
lowing the result, he expels it into his handkerchief)—this farce has gone on 
long enough.”158 The “audience member” claims that he is a kind of collec-
tive subject: “I am not one audience member, but a thousand, all slightly 
different from each other. I’ve always been like that, like an old blotter, of 
extremely variable porosity.”159 Unlike Eleuthéria, Waiting for Godot does not 
inscribe the audience within its text. Yet the performances of Godot at the 
Florida State Penitentiary allow us to see how convicts assume, with great 
passion, this blotter function. A blotter is “written upon” only acciden-
godoT beh ind barS  •  61
tally, as a surface underneath the paper to which one applies ink. The pur-
pose of the blotter is to get the ink flowing from the pen onto the page: 
although a secondary surface, it enables the writing to begin. Using the 
figure from Eleuthéria, we might describe the criminal audience as being a 
blotter of such dense porosity that it absorbs Godot into carceral space. For 
the reasons I discuss, some lines of Beckett’s bleed through more noticeably 
than others. This transfer of ink, like the prisoner’s attempt to transfer the 
characters into the yard, describes a movement between institutions: from 
theater to prison. So much ink transfers to the blotter that this process pro-
duces a new script, the script of prison, composed of its gestures, its rituals, 
its relations under surveillance, and the immediacy of shouting at someone 
to get their attention. The blotter digests and bleeds back across the the-
atrical fiction of Godot. Eleuthéria depicts the audience-blotter as a passive 
surface that merely registers the excess ink. In prison, this blotter becomes 
the means by which Beckett’s characters are registered with the audience and 
admitted into prison. The performance becomes intimately entwined with 
its effect on the audience, the mark that it leaves on the criminal blotter.
 This absorptive porosity of the criminal audience becomes an agency 
during the performance. The inmates transfer their porosity over to the 
text itself, as if the ink absorbed by the blotter began to show through the 
page. Their interaction strangely fulfills what Beckett describes as his goal 
toward language. In a letter to Axel Kaun, Beckett states his desire “to bore 
one hole after another in it, until what lurks behind it—be it something or 
nothing—begins to seep through.”160 Refusing to be bored, the audience of 
criminals opens unforeseen holes in Beckett’s text in order to let the content 
of the play seep into the something/nothing of prison. In the process, their 
responses open holes in our thinking about Godot.
 Performances of Waiting for Godot in the Florida State Penitentiary sys-
tem force us to consider how indebted our understanding of Beckett’s play 
is to the conventions of the theatrical institution. Theater decorum ensures 
the riddle of Beckett’s work as well as its canonization. One can speak only 
at the intermission or at the conclusion of the play. Our piety toward eti-
quette in turn requires that we internalize our questions and postpone our 
impulse to respond to Beckett’s play. We must bite our tongue so often 
throughout the performance that this organ of articulation is in sorry shape 
by the time we are called upon to actually say something. We may never 
stop postponing our response to, and hence our encounter with, Godot. 
Indifferent to etiquette, the prisoners abandon their silence and thereby 
force the characters to abandon theirs (the unspoken rule that an actor 
speak only what is written in the script). Perhaps more than any other play, 
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Godot benefits from the decorum of the theater to sanctify a particular type 
of silence, to endorse those gaps authored by Beckett himself. Godot meshes 
with the simplest rules of bourgeois theater etiquette, the “Shhhhhh!” that 
provides Beckett’s Film with its only sound. Concerned more about forcing 
the characters to explain what is inaccessible to them than postponing their 
own misunderstandings, the prisoners reject the wait-and-see attitude. In 
the process, the inmates refuse to have their silence hijacked as the mean-
ing of Beckett’s play, to have mere decorum be mistaken for the grandiose 
silence of an unresponsive Godot.
Godot Summoned by Crisis
Shakespeare’s observation that “all the world’s a stage” turns unremark-
able and everyday reality into space of dramatic potential. The stage gives 
the world its shape, its value, and its possibility. Yet in what moments 
does the world begin to resemble Beckett’s stage? When does the world 
perform Waiting for Godot? Beckett’s work emerges in areas already desig-
nated as theaters: theaters of war, of covert operations, of surgery, of cri-
sis. In these contexts the term “theater” designates something other than a 
building with lobbies, balconies, and curtains. These theaters are formed by 
circumscribing action and shutting it off from Shakespeare’s world stage.2 
Enclosed, sparse, needful, and populated by two vagabond survivors, 
Godot provides the stage for these theaters.
 The catastrophe of civil war summons Godot. In 1993, at the height of 
the Bosnian crisis and amidst the violence of ethnic cleansing, Susan Son-
tag rehearses Godot in a partially destroyed theater in Sarajevo. Having 
“come to care intensely about the battered city and what it stands for,” Son-
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Waiting for Godot in Sarajevo and 
New Orleans
2
Whatever is said is so far from the experience . . . if you really get 
down to the disaster, the slightest eloquence becomes unbearable.
—Samuel beckett
Why not bouvard and Pécuchet in Somalia or afghanistan?
—Jean baudrillard1
•  •  •  •
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tag stages the play as a gesture of solidarity with those living under siege, 
calling attention to the city’s state of crisis.3 Once a multiethnic, tolerant 
metropolis of “serious culture,” which Sontag defines as an “expression of 
human dignity,”4 Sarajevo becomes a city scarred by genocide, shelling, and 
sniper fire. A play about waiting vagabonds casts light upon the political 
world order’s failure to intervene in Sarajevo’s abrupt turn from civiliza-
tion to barbarism.
 Godot is staged again in New Orleans by New York–based artist Paul 
Chan in the aftermath of the combined natural and man-made disaster 
of Hurricane Katrina. With assistance from the Classical Theatre of Har-
lem, which had just closed a Katrina-inspired production of Godot featur-
ing a flooded stage, Chan stages Beckett’s play in the Lower Ninth Ward 
and Gentilly, poor sections of New Orleans where the disaster is brutally 
apparent. The homeless state of Beckett’s vagabonds in Chan’s production 
resonates with the unremitting sense of displacement for the population 
of New Orleans caused by the official evacuation of many of its people to 
other states (without their subsequent return), the loss of habitable struc-
tures, the insufficiency of trailers provided by FEMA, the conversion of the 
city’s inhabitants into refugees, and the memory of its unrecovered dead. 
Chan’s play explores waiting in the continued chaos of disaster along class 
and race lines.
 Godot seems ill suited to bear an agenda. Its reticence about the avail-
ability of its meaning to historical, political, or aesthetic interpretation is 
matched only by the reticence of its author. Existentialism provides the 
foundation for much of Beckett criticism: it seized the paucity staged by 
this writer’s work to talk about man without faith or god, about ontol-
ogy and existence. The existentialist, humanist, and new critical angles on 
Beckett inevitably shear off, one by one, the possible relevancies that can 
be derived from Beckett’s text. Martin Esslin’s claim that “no universal 
lessons, no meanings, no philosophical truths could possibly be derived 
from the work of a writer like Beckett” is typical.5 The ironic byproduct of 
Beckett’s theater of insufficiency is that critics make Beckett’s work a self-
sufficient experience for the viewer. According to David Bradby, Godot’s 
disturbance to referential functioning makes rethematization or transfor-
mation of the play impossible: “[Godot] does not imitate an action (in Aris-
totle’s term); it does not even tell a complete story. There is thus little or 
no scope for relocating the story or setting the characters in a different 
environment, as, for example, Richard III may be relocated to the period 
between the two world wars.”6 Bradby claims that recoding Shakespeare’s 
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historical drama is possible because his play strives for likeness. By con-
trast, Beckett’s nonmimetic art furnishes no representation to either warp 
or recontextualize. As proof, Bradby cites Beckett’s remark about the work 
of James Joyce: “His writing is not about something, it is that something 
itself.”7 Bradby isolates Beckett’s work by equating it with an ontological 
state rather than the representation of one. This tendency culminates in crit-
ical works that suggest the audience should relate to Godot intuitively, as 
if to that which bears no message: music. Jonathan Kalb, for one, concedes 
that historical readings are possible, though he claims they interrupt our 
aesthetic experience of Beckett’s work. “Searching for social and political 
allegories,” he writes, “lead[s] viewers away from present-time experience, 
away from perceiving the play as music, and toward the refuge of older 
and more distanced viewing patterns.”8
 But even music is not necessarily a pure aesthetic object. Sontag’s pro-
test production was conceived, rehearsed, and performed in the harsh cli-
mate of the Siege of Sarajevo. It calls to mind Karl Eliasburg’s astonishing 
performance of Shostakovich’s Seventh Symphony performed in the sum-
mer of 1942 by a ragtag group of musicians before a starving audience in 
the midst of the Siege of Leningrad. Broadcast over the lines to the Ger-
man forces, this performance shows how music can have a rapport with 
crisis and may in fact help decide the outcome of that crisis. In his essay 
on Endgame, Theodor Adorno reworks the musical model by which crit-
ics have strictly underscored Beckett’s aesthetic autonomy: “In the act of 
omission, what is left out survives as something that is avoided, the way 
consonance survives in atonal harmony.”9 Therefore, Beckett becomes a wit-
ness to postwar experience by means of its explicit negation in his work.10 
Adorno claims, “It would be ridiculous to put Beckett on the stand as a star 
political witness.”11 Yet this is followed by a curious addendum about Beck-
ett’s work: “The name of the catastrophe is to be spoken only in silence.”12 
Adorno first undercuts Beckett’s suitability to stand as a witness: his name 
is not to be called. He then insists that if Beckett is called after all, he bears 
witness neither by speaking nor by remaining silent, but through a combi-
nation of both.
 Critics aside, there is some evidence that Beckett himself discourages 
the engagement of history and politics with his work, and encourages a 
more hermetic critical and directorial approach. In Beckett’s translation of 
Godot into English, for example, he removes the names Roussillon and Bon-
nelly, which provide context and situate the play historically.13 Specifically 
these names bind the text to Beckett’s own biography. They refer to the area 
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in the south of France and the farmer with whom Beckett and his future 
wife, Suzanne, stayed while pursuing Resistance activities during World 
War II. Beckett eliminates the names Roussillon, Bonnelly, and Suzanne in a 
novel way. He replaces them with a snapping of fingers, making them van-
ish into Vladimir’s amnesia: “But we were there together, I could swear to 
it! Picking grapes for a man called . . . (he snaps his fingers) . . . can’t think of 
the name of the man, at a place called . . . (snaps his fingers) . . . can’t think 
of the name of the place, do you not remember?”14 The physical inertia on 
Beckett’s stage becomes emblematic of a work where memory cannot be 
jogged.
 How, then, in the face of this kind of evidence (or lack of it) can Godot 
be called to testify for historical crisis? Do Sarajevo and New Orleans offer 
conditions that are suitably absurd or “ridiculous,” as Adorno claims, to 
call Beckett to the witness stand? As witness in these settings, does Godot 
offer only silence? The play clearly does not appeal through any therapeutic 
directive. Its only slogan is its first line: “nothing to be done.” From there 
it advances only to break God’s failure down into smaller degenerative 
disorders. Lucky hails “divine apathia, divine athambia, divine aphasia” 
(divine apathy, imperturbability, and muteness).15 The abandonment of man 
by God is a theme that courses throughout philosophy. Martin Heidegger’s 
essay “What Are Poets For?” describes a turning away not only from man 
by god, but from god by man.16 Heidegger’s essay even reads at times as a 
Godot explained to philosophers: “The era is defined by the god’s failure to 
arrive.”17 Like Beckett, Heidegger discerns this abandonment as a condi-
tion of destitution and ever-growing need: “At this night’s midnight, the 
destitution of the time is greatest. Then the destitute time is no longer able 
even to experience its condition. That inability, by which even the destitu-
tion of the destitute state is obscured, is the time’s absolutely destitute char-
acter. The destitution is wholly obscured, in that it now appears as nothing 
more than the need that wants to be met.”18 Godot emerges within land-
scapes of crisis, however, because of its dissimilarity to these concepts. Ulti-
mately, Heidegger is concerned with spiritual, philosophical, and aesthetic 
issues. Beckett’s play conveys a curiously practical concern about the obsti-
nacy of need: “curiously practical” because in conventional theater settings 
Beckett’s reduced forms strike us as the apex of theatrical experimentation. 
Within the context of war-torn Sarajevo and post-Katrina New Orleans, 
these same reduced means strike survivors as the provisional terms of their 
existence. Godot renders poverty not as concept but as condition. Within 
the “Sottisier” notebook in the Beckett Archive, held at Reading Univer-
WaiT ing for godoT in Sara Jevo and neW orleanS  •  67
sity, we find what might be the closest thing to a Beckettian motto: “Pen-
ury is all.”19 The fact that this line remains in Beckett’s notebook suggests it 
does not belong on his stage. Beckett’s work appeals to people in situations 
of need because it refuses to generalize their condition or convert it into 
a moral (as “penury is all” does). Beckett furnishes no philosophy to the 
audience. Likewise, Lucky enumerates the symptoms of divine failure. 
Compared to the dramatic turn away by Heidegger’s god, Lucky’s etiology 
is at once more particular and more radiant. As Beckett describes it, “It con-
cerns a God who turns himself in all directions at the same time.”20
 Replacing names and history with a snapping of fingers does not com-
pletely eliminate what is historical from the play. Taking Beckett’s removal 
of Roussillon and Bonnelly less as an elimination of the historical than its 
odd displacement into the gestural helps us think about what role history 
and politics may have within the confines of the play itself. In other words, 
Vladimir’s inability to remember the name of the historical place does not 
eliminate history from the play so much as personalize it. The audience is 
invited to supply the missing relationship, to remember where they might 
have been prior to the predicament that immerses them. For Vladimir, that 
memory is of picking grapes: for the survivor of the siege or flood, even the 
smallest memory of place might retain this utopic or Edenic flavor.
 This personalization in the moments of silence in Beckett’s text may 
help us account for the strange solace that besieged audiences take from 
Beckett’s vagabonds. An affinity between Sarajevo and Godot can be heard 
faintly in the following description of the city by Juan Goytisolo:
In this city where there is no wood to make coffins, you must get used 
to sleeping, moving, walking about fully aware of your defenseless, pre-
carious existence. Nobody can guarantee that a crack marksman hasn’t 
chanced to get your insignificant self in his sights or that a grenade or shell 
won’t explode inside your room. The inhabitants of Sarajevo have with-
stood for more than a year this risk of extermination, their life as inmates 
of an open prison, with integrity, dignity, and sangfroid. But the combined 
effect of hunger, exhaustion, and a general feeling of betrayal and aban-
donment has finally overtaken them from the day the shameful Washing-
ton accord was signed, forcing their moral resistance to the limit of what 
is bearable.21
History conspires to turn the description of a city under siege into a syn-
opsis of Beckett’s play. Abandonment, hunger, the limit of the bearable, life 
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without assurance: uncannily these are the fundamental terms for any anal-
ysis of Godot. It suggests that Sarajevo had become a living paraphrase for 
the play Sontag brings to the city. Most notably, Guytisolo mentions how 
inhabitants live “as inmates of an open prison.” Sarajevo prepares its resi-
dents in the labor of useless waiting they see on Beckett’s stage in the same 
way, as we have seen, San Quentin prepares Cluchey, Bandman, Lembke, 
and the other convicts. As with the inmates, it is not a question of what 
the Sarajevans see in the play but of how they experience a feeling of affir-
mation because the play sees (understands, anticipates) the audience. For 
Erika Munk, a theater critic who attends Sontag’s production, the audience 
becomes an emotional viaduct connecting the play to the situation of its 
performance: “The Waiting for Godot directed by Susan Sontag in Sarajevo 
is impossible to think about, on some deep level doesn’t exist, outside its 
immediate situation. The war’s emotional consequences—fear, hopeless-
ness, gallows wit, grief, defiance—permeated every moment and affected 
everyone involved, and the siege’s practical effects dictated rehearsal 
conditions, lighting, sound, seating, performance times, and the physi-
cal space.”22 Under what conditions might Beckett’s play provide not just 
an immediate reaction but only an immediate reaction? When might the 
unmemorable nature of a performance be a tribute to its power? While Godot 
dismays, perplexes, or invites appreciation from the audiences in the Old 
Vic, Lincoln Center, and the Babylon Theater, its performance in Sarajevo 
offers no residue for thought or memory. The experience of Godot expires 
in a transient emotive state, which afterward cannot rise into consciousness 
(let alone discourse). The catharsis is the work of a double performance: the 
war acts on the audience as much as Beckett’s play. Munk’s discussion does 
not make clear which way the audience is facing: toward the ruined city 
or toward the stage. The war’s “emotional consequences—fear, hopeless-
ness” are the themes of Beckett’s play. In the Sarajevo performance, these 
“themes” lose their obstinate form, their articulation becomes frailer, and 
they become recognizable to the audience.
 Beckett’s stage exposes something to audiences who are already wait-
ing, and the play emerges for them as a reading of their predicament. In 
the epigraph to this chapter, Beckett says that when you really get down 
to the catastrophe—the humble directionality of Beckett’s approach is 
important here—the slightest eloquence becomes unbearable. Beckett may 
appeal to survivors by his very slightness (Beckett’s signature minimum) of 
eloquence. Something like a stammer, rather than literary or political elo-
quence (speaking crafted for public effect), is needed in a catastrophe. This 
WaiT ing for godoT in Sara Jevo and neW orleanS  •  69
stammer is evident throughout the text of the play. Vladimir and Estragon 
frequently speak to one another as if locked in a game of hand over hand, 
having breath for no more than a few words at a time. This is how they 
diagnose the condition of Lucky, tethered with a rope:
VLADIMIR. A running sore!
ESTRAGON. It’s the rope.
VLADIMIR. It’s the rubbing.
ESTRAGON. It’s inevitable.
VLADIMIR. It’s the knot.
ESTRAGON. It’s the chafing. [ . . . ] Look at the slobber.
VLADIMIR. It’s inevitable.
ESTRAGON. Look at the slaver.
VLADIMIR. Perhaps he’s a halfwit.
ESTRAGON. A cretin.
VLADIMIR. (looking closer). Looks like goiter.
ESTRAGON. (ditto). It’s not certain.23
There is no steady progress through diagnosis here, just the heaping of 
statements that slightly mutate from one to the next. Instead of the con-
clusive authority of a second opinion, doctors Vladimir and Estragon offer 
only the slightly different, slightly redundant superaddition of an nth opin-
ion. They set the tone for a play in which language doesn’t entirely take. The 
twilit sky of Godot both inspires Pozzo’s exaggerated monologue (“What is 
there so extraordinary about it? Qua sky?”) and obstructs Vladimir’s effort 
to describe it to his blind interlocutor:
POZZO. (anguished) Is it evening?
VLADIMIR. Anyway it hasn’t moved.24
 Beckett’s play embodies waiting and a future that never arrives rather 
than a prescience. It thereby taps into a survivor mentality of weariness 
and futility mixed with inexplicable, unjustified persistence. The badges of 
despair and futility have been pinned firmly to Beckett’s work, as they have 
been to Kafka’s. The crucial difference between the two, and the reason 
why nobody volunteered to read Das Schloß aloud to the people of Sarajevo, 
is that Beckett’s work does not try to foresee our despair. Godot forecasts 
nothing because it never hints that things can change. In Godot, even the 
weather is stuck.
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Precursor to Sarajevo and New Orleans: 
Godot in McComb, Mississippi
Waiting for Godot appears in environments of need before Chan and Sontag. 
As part of the civil rights movement, the Free Southern Theater takes the 
play through thirty towns in the rural South. They perform for predomi-
nantly African American audiences in Mississippi, Louisiana, and Georgia 
before completing their tour in New York.25 Godot is adapted to the agrarian 
clock: performances are scheduled for late afternoon so the audience can 
get home. Many of the spectators apparently have never seen a play before. 
Reports of the performances indicate that their fascination with the theater 
begins with the fact that “it wasn’t a ‘meeting,’ and it wasn’t a movie; it was 
something else. Someone opened the window.”26 Beckett’s play opens the 
window to a different type of gathering combining the personal urgency of 
the town meeting with the distraction of cinema.
 Critics doubted the relevance of Godot to rural audiences. Part of this 
is an assumed incapacity of rural audiences to “understand” a play that 
remains opaque to people thoroughly familiar with theater as spectacle. 
Actor and director John O’Neal writes that the Godot productions in Mis-
sissippi “irritated the hell out of people. Time and time again, the ques-
tion was raised, ‘What possible relevance do you imagine Godot to have to 
the lives of Black people in the South?’”27 The irritated people are not in 
the audience, but are those who estimate the audience and have already 
arrived at a verdict on Godot. Their irritation implies Beckett’s play is a 
refined work of culture beyond the grasp of country bumpkins: What is a 
line like “there’s no lack of void” to these spectators, and they to it?28 Is 
Godot accessible only through one’s education, through research, or through 
criticism?29 Should one audience of Godot presume to claim ownership over 
the play’s relevance?30 A spectator to the performances of the Free Southern 
Theater offers a rejoinder to these skeptics: “If theater means anything any-
where, it certainly ought to mean something here!”31 This urgent exclama-
tion is closer to the heart of Beckett’s play: meaning is hypothetical and yet 
necessary, rooted in the place. The meaning of theater is not guaranteed. 
Though it may not exist, it might just have a chance in McComb.
 The varied and extreme circumstances of Godot performances provide 
an indication not of the capacity of an audience to appreciate the play, but 
of the necessity of an audience to create its relevance. Relevance is more 
intimate than meaning, as it pertains to the way a work addresses us and 
how we situate ourselves before it. Can the relevance of Godot or any play 
ever be calculated?32 Godot poses the question of relevance to the audience 
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by removing the stable psychological reference points, welcoming chance 
into the audience’s confrontation with it. Without these reference points the 
spectator (in the Babylon Theater in Paris as in McComb’s town hall) must 
work with and against the play to discern how it happens. “Finding” the 
play relevant only signals the discovery of this process—something the 
audience makes rather than something foreordained by the play. This is 
the reason why Beckett’s play persistently is interesting to people who 
have never seen theater, audiences unimpeded by either a preimagining 
of its relevance or an overexpectation of its uses for them. Richard Schech-
ner observes, “The New York audience looked for meanings; they saw 
the play in the context of a hundred critics. In New Orleans and McComb 
they looked at Beckett’s play—right in the face—and they laughed at the 
characters.”33
 The Free Southern Theater, part of the Black Arts Movement, enlists 
Godot not for the purpose of educating its audience, not to impart a lesson, 
but rather simply as an encounter. Noting how one man in the audience 
mumbled something toward the actors after the show, “slave . . . whupped 
him. . . . no! . . . ,” O’Neal observes, “He felt something, but he couldn’t get 
the words to say it. That’s our job: to help this man find the vocabulary to 
say what he wants to say.”34
 The tour of Free Southern Theater’s Godot sheds light on the way in 
which the play deceptively invites audiences to relate to it through their 
circumstances, who they are and where they happen to be. The perform-
ers suggest how audiences in New York engage the play differently from 
those in the rural South. Richard Schechner notes that “New York is a 
rich enough city for despair to become an occupation.”35 Despair is not 
a hobby for the New York spectator: it is a calling. By contrast, he notes, 
“The McComb audience doesn’t have the kind of despair which depends 
upon the separation of thought and act. Godot was really a comedy in New 
Orleans and Mississippi. They laughed at Lucky; in New York they were 
embarrassed by a Negro at the end of a white man’s rope.”36
 What happens to Beckett’s play when its existentialism goes unnoticed 
by the audience? The despair of rural audiences pertains to other aspects 
of their lives, perhaps to the limitations imposed on the life of a sharecrop-
per. But they do not invest in the despair emerging from the “separation 
of thought and act.” Existentialism does not intercept their understanding 
of the play. Consequently, they magnify the actors’ incapacity to move as a 
clownish game, not as the demonstration of a concept. Ironically, this audi-
ence’s refusal of this type of despair allows Godot to become a play for the 
activist cause. Schechner reports, “‘We’re not waiting!’ they said, during 
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and after the play.”37 This connects the despair of the audience to something 
other than a philosophy of despair (despair as occupation or as hobby). The 
spectators in Mississippi therefore react to Godot in a highly relevant but 
critically unconventional way: they see it as an injunction to act.
Sontag and the Usefulness of Theater
Sontag’s performance of Waiting for Godot is born of a desire to make her-
self useful to the cause of a battered city. In April 1993, when Sontag visits 
her journalist son covering the genocidal war in Sarajevo, then in Yugosla-
via, she arrives in a city under persistent attack from artillery and snipers 
positioned in the surrounding hills. “Without water, gas, electricity, pub-
lic transport, or telephones,” observes Goytisolo, “Sarajevo looks at first 
sight like a phantom city, a dislocated skeleton or a lifeless corpse. But the 
intermittent crackle of machine-gun fire, the occasional blast of mortars, the 
whistle of snipers’ bullets opportunely remind the visitor that its torture 
continues.”38 Sontag explains a need to take action: “I don’t want to be a 
tourist—it’s not, for me, enough to make a symbolic visit.”39 She expresses 
an idea to direct a play to Haris Pašovic´, a director who oversees wartime 
productions of Euripides’s Alcestis and Sophocles’s Ajax. When he replies, 
“What play?” Sontag notes, “Bravado suggested to me in an instant what 
I might not have seen had I taken longer to reflect: there was one obvious 
play for me to direct. Beckett’s play, written over forty years ago, seems 
written for, and about, Sarajevo.”40 As Sontag admits, this is a radical, even 
if unthinking, proposal.
 What makes Godot the “obvious” choice for Sontag? For her the play is 
not esoteric but illustrative, “so apt an illustration of the feelings of Sara-
jevans now—bereft, hungry, dejected, waiting for an arbitrary, alien power 
to save them or take them under its protection.”41 It may also be obvious 
because of the monologue in the second act that pierces the haze of inaction 
on stage. Vladimir’s speech is about the call to conscience, about respond-
ing to another’s need: “To all mankind they were addressed, those cries for 
help still ringing in our ears! But at this place, at this moment of time, all 
mankind is us, whether we like it or not. Let us make the most of it, before 
it is too late.”42 Vladimir defines mankind as those who hear the appeal for 
help. The cries ring in everyone’s ears like a general alert, but “mankind” 
discerns how these address us, according to the place and time in which we 
happen to be. “Nobody can plead ignorance,” writes Sontag, “of the atroci-
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ties that have taken place in Bosnia since the war started in April 1992.”43 
Sontag claims the failure is not of knowledge but of response, the very 
topic of Vladimir’s speech. “Why so little response to what happened in 
Bosnia?”44 In her mission in Sarajevo, Sontag may have been emboldened 
by the powerful contraction in Vladimir’s monologue: “all mankind is us, 
whether we like it or not.” Only responding makes us human and it may 
not be our choice.
 From Vladimir’s speech Sontag borrows the notion of an address that 
marks its audience. She applies this in her claim that Godot was writ-
ten “for and about Sarajevo.” This transposition ignores the way Godot 
is not “for” audiences at all, let alone about particular audiences. Rather 
than being addressed to audiences, Beckett’s work is abandoned to them. 
Beckett develops an aesthetic suitable to the indigence of the figures that 
populate his world. Though a few of Beckett’s stories begin with a literal 
eviction notice, his whole oeuvre bears the stamp of one. One of his char-
acters brings the vagabond moment back even further: “I gave up before 
birth.”45 If Kafka’s work embraces primordial guilt, Beckett’s embraces pre-
natal dispossession. Giving up predates having something to give up, or 
something on which to give up. Abandonment happens without prior own-
ership. His work does not welcome the model of reciprocity, of giving and 
taking, between a work and its audience. The last lines of Beckett’s late play 
What Where indicate that it intends no transfer of sense to the reader. They 
instead issue a conflicting mixture of specific demand and open invitation: 
“Time passes. That is all. Make sense who may. I switch off.”46
 What is the public utility of theater? Sontag claims that the play is 
“about and for Sarajevo” because she envisions it as useful to the Sara-
jevans in their plight. She discusses directing in relationship to plumbing: 
“I was not under the illusion that going to Sarajevo to direct a play would 
make me useful in the way I could be if I were a doctor or a water systems 
engineer. It would be a small contribution.”47 Brushing aside suggestions 
made by journalists that the Sarajevans would rather have escapist enter-
tainment for their suffering, Sontag writes, “In Sarajevo, as anywhere else, 
there are more than a few people who feel strengthened and consoled by 
having their sense of reality affirmed and transfigured by art.”48
 Ultimately, Sontag’s argument for the utility of staging Godot is that the 
threatened condition of the vagabonds on Beckett’s stage will evoke reflec-
tion upon the reality of the Sarajevans facing comparable threats. The util-
ity of the play is also practical in nature: she gives a maximum number of 
unemployed actors in Sarajevo a chance to perform by turning Vladimir 
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and Estragon into three couples. On this count she says the play becomes 
a microcosm of prewar life. The production “means so much to the local 
theatre professionals in Sarajevo because it allows them to be normal, that 
is, to do what they did before the war; to be not just haulers of water or 
passive recipients of humanitarian aid.”49
 Sontag defends the usefulness of performing Beckett in Sarajevo against 
the journalists who doubt her project. Much as the Free Southern Theater’s 
staging of Godot in McComb, Mississippi, had been questioned, so too is 
the performance in Sarajevo: “Why theater, in the middle of a war and a 
genocide?”50 “Isn’t putting on a play like fiddling while Rome burns?”51 
and “Why not Bouvard and Pécuchet in Somalia or Afghanistan?”52 By imply-
ing that war and genocide should go on uninterrupted by even the slightest 
impertinence, such questions implicitly cast their vote for the aggressor.53 
The query “Why theater?” never arises when Beckett’s play is performed 
at Carnegie Hall. Where it is sanctioned by wealth and protected by con-
vention, culture’s uselessness elicits no questioning. Emerging in the midst 
of crisis, however, theater is suddenly called upon to account for its exis-
tence. Godot is an interesting artifact to put against this wall. The play offers 
neither an evident gesture of protest nor a wholesome lesson. It provides 
the opposite of an enriching experience. Performing Godot seems indeed 
very close to fiddling, but with a reservation. Godot does not accompany, 
like a soundtrack, the burning of Sarajevo. Closer to contrapuntal fiddling, 
this play breaks up the secondary meanings of music as war’s accompa-
niment: to go with war, to vouchsafe for it, to supplement it, to befriend 
it. Jean Baudrillard attempts to rhetorically dramatize Beckett’s useless-
ness by facetiously suggesting that Sontag bring Flaubert’s novel (Bouvard 
and Pécuchet) to other settings of crisis. What if we were to honor Baudril-
lard’s hyperbole? What would Flaubert’s novel about two failures, engineers 
of countless futilities who clearly prefigure Vladimir and Estragon, sound 
like in a square in Mogadishu? By proposing for Sontag a work that is con-
sumed in solitude, Baudrillard indicates that he misses the point of both 
performing a play and performing Beckett’s play in particular. Godot begins 
by announcing that nothing is to be done. What it performs is all that must 
be undone, a diligently negative labor. It undoes the questions through 
which we coercively ferret out the practical value of the artwork. It requires 
us to rethink the use value of theater. Godot achieves this not by asserting its 
utility but by belaboring, even tiring out, all the variations on this question 
of “Why?”
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Aquilex: Reading Beckett’s (F)utility
One of the first casualties of the war in Sarajevo was the water and sewer 
system. Sontag locates Beckett’s usefulness in relation to these public utili-
ties. She says that as a director she does not have the same obvious useful-
ness to the city as a water systems engineer, yet she also says she produces 
something that treats the people of Sarajevo as “more than just haulers of 
water.”54 Comparing engineering, with its obvious necessity and applica-
bility, to theater begs the question: What is the value of theater and how is 
that value measured? Furthermore, how is that value different in an impov-
erished landscape—or a landscape of poverty?
 Beckett himself offers a way to think about the relationship between 
theater and water hauling. Specifically in an early essay on Joyce, he traces 
the author’s debt to the work of Dante, Bruno, and Giambattista Vico. Beck-
ett connects Joyce’s fiction to the evolution of language described in the 
Scienza Nuova. Paraphrasing Vico, Beckett says the oldest poetry must be 
regarded “not as sophisticated confectionery” but as “evidence of a pov-
erty-stricken vocabulary and of a disability to achieve abstraction.”55 The 
evolution of language into “a highly civilized vehicle, rich in abstract and 
technical terms, was as little fortuitous as the evolution of society itself.”56 
Beckett says that Joyce’s writing more closely resembles the material-
ity of the “poverty-stricken” vocabulary, in which content and form are 
entwined, than it does a “civilized vehicle,” in which language functions as 
the neutral bearer of abstraction.57
 Beckett’s emphasis on the poverty and disability of language (over its 
“richness”) anticipates Godot. It also tells us how to read Vladimir’s gesture 
of snapping fingers as a substitute in the English translation of the play for 
specific places in France. As an example of the evolution of language out 
of its “dumb form” (gesture) Beckett discusses the etymology of the Latin 
word lex.
1. Lex = Crop of acorns.
2. Ilex = Tree that produces acorns.
3. Legere = To gather.
4. Aquilex = He that gathers the waters.
5. Lex = Gathering together of peoples, public assembly.
6. Lex = Law.
7. Legere = To gather together letters into a word, to read.58
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I propose that aquilex, the fourth word in the etymology, provides us with 
a trope for understanding the utility of theater and offers a figure for read-
ing Beckett. If Joyce’s work rescues the hieroglyphic function of early sign 
systems, Beckett’s oeuvre compels reading that activates the full declen-
sion of legere. Beckett’s destitute work blocks reading defined as an abstract 
accumulation.
 Grazing on the failure of anything to happen, the characters in Godot 
furnish little for us to inventory or synopsize. There is little by way of flora 
and fauna for us to glean. What we can gather is gathered like water. Like 
the figure of an aquilex, we sense how the term “gathering” already over-
states our role. Reading Beckett, as the successful productions in Sara-
jevo, New Orleans, and prisons show, requires none of the expertise of the 
mushroom gatherer who must discern edible from poisonous. There is no 
expertise needed in the gathering of water. H. Porter Abbott uses the term 
“arbitrary winnowing” to describe the scattered and paratactic narration of 
Beckett’s “From an Abandoned Work.”59 Winnowing, however, separates 
what is worth keeping from what should be discarded. It is a gesture of 
discrimination, whereas water gathering is a gesture of both need and futil-
ity. We know it to be impossible to capture a moving source. Water flows 
together but is not something that can be gathered like acorns. The impro-
priety of the term is relevant to the “gathering” that we try to do while 
reading Beckett.
 The subadequate quantity of sense makes Beckett’s work elusive. There 
is no rushing force, no dramatic dynamism. Godot abounds in moments we 
call negligible or impoverished only because they do not hang around long 
enough for us to take note. For example, Vladimir picks up the “thinking 
hat” that Lucky leaves on the stage and asks, “How does it fit me?” To this 
Estragon replies, “How would I know?”60 The question of how he looks 
precipitates an epistemological crisis. Only after the conversation moves 
on do we belatedly register the difference between Vladimir’s understand-
ing of fit (Does it suit me?) and Estragon’s (How tight is the hat?).61 Such 
tears in the fabric of meaning—so small that they ask to go unaccounted 
for—propel the characters’ dialogues. Sense, abandoned as soon as the vag-
abonds gather it, slips like water through our fingers.
 That Beckett’s work frustrates the reader’s tight grasp over it is evi-
denced by an anecdote told by his friend, Romanian philosopher E. M. Cio-
ran. Cioran meets with Beckett one evening and announces that he will not 
go to bed until he thinks up a French translation for the title of Beckett’s 
short story “Lessness.” Together they consider the gamut of forms sug-
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gested by moins and moindre, but “none of them seemed to us to come near 
the inexhaustible lessness, a blend of loss and infinitude, an emptiness syn-
onymous with apotheosis.”62 Trying to align Beckett’s elusive term with a 
counterpart in French continues to gnaw at Cioran even after they part for 
the evening. He stays awake into the night, counting not sheep but deriva-
tions of the Latin sine, and goes to sleep only after settling on sinéité. Pos-
sibly because the term suggests a condition of being without, rather than 
being less, Cioran and Beckett decide to give up the search and settle on 
Sans. They conclude that “there was no noun in French capable of express-
ing absence in itself, pure unadulterated absence, and that we had to resign 
ourselves to the metaphysical poverty of a preposition.”63 Is this metaphysi-
cal poverty a resignation or an achievement? Beckett’s poverty baffles the 
resources of language such that it requires the translator to mix the parts 
of speech. In clutching at a preposition in order to translate a noun, Cioran 
reveals some of the impropriety of speech contained in the term aquilex.
 Whereas Sontag says Godot will address the audience as “more than just 
haulers of water or passive recipients of humanitarian aid,” Beckett’s work 
is careful not to have the reader exceed (either in value or cultural pres-
tige) the water hauler. Beckett’s work resituates the reader’s activity around 
earlier gestural forms of gathering. In Sarajevo the audience is literally one 
of water haulers, despite Sontag’s desire to have the play annul that sta-
tus. The Sarajevans themselves speak of the difference between New York 
and Sarajevo as a difference in plumbing. This difference for them becomes 
the step toward reimagining the theater along Beckettian lines. As actor 
Izudin Bajrovic says, “Let me explain the difference between Sarajevo and 
New York theater. It’s the same difference as the difference in significance 
between a four liter plastic water container here in Sarajevo and in New 
York. In New York you buy it full of water and you put it in the fridge 
and use it up and throw it away. No story. Here we can make a production 
about finding and filling this container which would last for 18 hours and 
a half.”64 Actor Emina Muftig quickly follows this up with “After that, with 
its contents, we could wash one human body.”65 Bajrovic pictures theater 
as a drama of the aquilex, beginning with the quest to find a container. The 
container is filled and emptied without stop, an infinite cycle resembling 
the punishment in ancient hell of the Danaïdes, forced to draw water using 
leaky buckets and hence guaranteeing their work would always be in vain. 
Bajrovic’s hypothetical play is the Sarajevan street version of Godot, much 
longer, much emptier, and transposing the water gatherer from the audi-
ence onto the stage.
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Theater without a Lobby
Sontag stages only the first act of Waiting for Godot and offers competing 
justifications for her decision to eliminate the second act from her per-
formance. On the one hand, she grounds this decision in practical con-
siderations: Sarajevo now lacks sufficient facilities for a full and proper 
production of the play, she says. On the other hand, Sontag invokes a 
humanitarian mission: the people of Sarajevo have been through enough 
already. They are hungry. They are injured. They have lost family members. 
A relentless shelling continues, and bombs threaten to destroy anything at 
any moment—including the space of the theater itself. It is too much to ask 
them to sit through a second act of Godot. Furthermore, Sontag seems to 
say, even if the theater were safe (which it is not), even if the people were 
not hungry (though they are), she would not stage the second act because 
it portrays a relentless hopelessness that runs counter to her mission and 
ambition for the play in Sarajevo.
 Critics have mostly been unable to unravel the logic and complexity 
of Sontag’s argument. They tend to emphasize either the infidelity of the 
production to Beckett’s play or the supposed selfishness of Sontag’s ges-
ture. Everett Frost does both in observing, “Chopping the play in half for 
Sarajevo, as if it were the lady in the circus, makes at least as much sense 
as tearing it into digestible little bits, like Pentheus, for sticking into film 
documentaries on Beckett, on modern theatre, existentialism, etc.”66 In this 
highly colorful remark, Frost distances himself from Sontag’s claim that 
abbreviating the play was a humanitarian gesture and blinds himself to 
Sontag’s argument for its necessity. “Chopping” for Frost is a magician’s 
stage spectacle performed on behalf of Sarajevo.67 He compares Sontag’s 
work to activities that go on ideally in isolation. Frost ignores how war 
is not a mere backdrop for Sontag’s play but behind Sontag’s decision. 
Cutting the play in two makes little sense, but not because it resembles 
a mysterious trick. It makes little sense because the break is precipitated 
by the senseless intrusion of the war into the theater. The war’s arrival is 
as senseless as would be Godot’s, were he to appear. Frost’s comparison 
ignores the violence of the interruption. In the circus act, neither the box 
nor the woman is really sawed in half. The wooden box is imperceptibly cut 
before the performance so that its two halves can be separated on stage. Yet 
Sontag saws prior to this cut. The war induces a fissure in the play along 
an unprescribed line, short of the one set by Beckett through the division of 
the play into two acts. Like an audience member at the circus, Frost is spell-
bound by the removal of the second half, but what are we to make of the 
more preposterous removal: the amputation of the intermission?
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 What tangible and practical constraints are placed by the war, and how 
do they force the directorial hand? Although the theater itself where the 
piece was performed was apparently intact, shelling destroyed most of the 
auxiliary spaces, including the lobby. Sontag’s performance deals with the 
loss of these spaces to the war. She describes how she had to take a path 
outside the range of sniper fire to get to the only usable entryway to the 
theater: a stage door in the back. She explains, “The theatre’s façade, lobby, 
cloakroom, and bar had been wrecked by shelling more than a year earlier 
and the debris still had not been cleared away.”68 This is no mere architec-
tural detail to Sontag’s story. It shows the effect of shelling on the place 
of performance and seems in itself to make her point that war affects the 
theater (the building) before it affects the theater (the institution). Theater 
contoured itself and reimagined itself in accordance with the spaces avail-
able in the besieged city. Dubravko Bibanovic, director of the Sarajevo War 
Theater, takes this further: theater becomes a refuge, a strategy for survival. 
He performs his work Bomb Shelter in basements throughout the city, “not 
because they are appropriate environments for the theme but because they 
offer a safe haven from snipers and bombardments.”69
 But Sontag is not content just to assert that the physical space does 
not allow for the full performance. She also has a humanitarian mission: 
she says that the audience is itself bombed out. No more than the physi-
cal space of the theater is the audience capable of absorbing more Beckett. 
It is as if it, too, is shell-shocked and lacks, due to trauma brought on by 
the war, the capacity to experience the full play as Beckett wrote it. “How 
could I ask the audience, which would have no lobby, bathroom, or water, 
to sit so uncomfortably, without moving, for two and a half hours?”70 Thus 
Sontag mediates the ruined performance space and the grimness of the 
play itself. The two seem to have an additive, even synergistic impact in 
that Beckett’s drama and the impaired theater facility create an uncom-
fortable and immobilizing experience for the spectator. Sontag’s practical 
impulse involves the physical world and physical and spatial limitations. 
Her humanitarian impulse is grounded in the psychological, the subjective 
condition of members of the audience.
 The destroyed lobby of the Youth Theater of Saravejo changes the 
function of waiting for a play in which, like no other, waiting is essential. 
One way to tackle the question of the double emergence of the practical 
and humanitarian impulse in Sontag’s writing on the production is to look 
closely at the role of the lobby in Sontag’s directorial argument. In destroy-
ing the lobby, the war inflicted damage on the architecture of the Godot 
experience. The elimination of the paraperformance space exemplifies this 
lack of choice the war imposes. Stated differently, the war occasions only 
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an uninterrupted Godot. In her introductory remarks to the audience before 
the play, Sontag suggests that it was the war that somehow cut the play in 
half. Only act 1 is performed because “Sarajevo itself seems to be in a his-
torical first act.”71 The war forces Sontag to extract from Waiting for Godot 
that period of grace in which the spectator can ask whether she wants to 
go back, either for more or for less. The spectator returns either because 
her expectation (a type of hope) has not been adequately undone by act 1 
or because she wants to affirm the futile waiting of the play and get away 
from the socialized waiting of the lobby space.
 But because there is no place to go, no lobby for the audience to retire 
to and no space outside the space of performance, the audience in the 
Sarajevo production is quite literally pulled on stage. Illuminated only by 
the “uncontrollable chiaroscuro” of a few candles, Sontag has the audi-
ence huddle at the periphery of the stage.72 War conditions bring the audi-
ence nearer to the waiting characters. In a separate context, Hugh Kenner 
remarks that “the stage is a place to wait. The place itself waits when no one 
is in it.”73 In Endgame, the curtain rises to reveal figures covered in sheets, 
like objects in storage protected from the gathering dust. Where Endgame 
confines waiting to the stage, the waiting process bleeds out of Godot into 
the spaces adjacent to the stage: the audience area and the lobby, a space 
less often noted as significant to Beckett’s play. Soon after the curtain rises 
for act 2, Vladimir asks, “And where were we yesterday evening, accord-
ing to you?” To this Estragon replies, “How would I know? In another 
compartment. There’s no lack of void.”74 The structure of the theater con-
sists of a series of waiting compartments: the lobby, the house, the empty 
prison cell, or the depopulated areas outside the Youth Theater. The stage 
is as empty and unremarkable as these other spaces. The Sarajevo perfor-
mance of Godot without a lobby and before an audience—locked first in 
a theater of war and then in a theater during war—is in fact highly Beck-
ettian. Sontag notes that the audience is as if paralyzed, “unable to move 
for two and a half hours.” She does not clarify the source of the audience’s 
paralysis, whether it is caused by Beckett’s play (partially hypnotic, like a 
broken stopwatch swinging before the eyes) or the fact that this audience 
has nowhere to take a break, that is, no recourse.75 The war triggers not only 
Sontag’s decision to stage half the play (no lobby, no second act) but also an 
audience experience wholly locked inside the theater, in the manner of the 
prisoner in his cell.
 The lobby is typically a theater’s designated space for waiting. For 
every play, the intermission is when the audience waits for the second act 
to begin. The waiting during Godot’s intermission brings the waiting during 
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the play to a different level of reflection. The spectators wait among each 
other and convert their waiting into opinion, chatter. The setting enforces 
a gregarious and more occupied form of waiting, yet the suspicions about 
what we are waiting for (during the play) do not abate. The war forces us 
to approach the question of directorial fidelity differently. How does one 
remain faithful to an intermission? What function is served by the pause 
between the acts of Godot? Focused on the production as she is, Sontag fails 
to ask these questions. She attributes the potential discomfort of her audi-
ence to two and a half hours of sedentary waiting. No play makes us more 
painfully aware of our seated posture as spectators: the characters’ conclud-
ing vow to leave, freezing into an immobile tableau before the drop of the 
curtain, inspires an awkward uncertainty in us about getting up. While in 
the lobby we ponder whether we want to return to our seats. Without elec-
tricity the Youth Theater cannot even oblige the ceremony of dimming the 
lights to signal the end of intermission.
 The lobby provides the space of a decision, where we either affirm or 
break our contract with the play. Only here can we curtail waiting with-
out interrupting that of either the audience or the actors during the 
performance. Innumerable anonymous departures in the intermission coun-
terbalance the one great no-show after which the play takes its name. We 
have, however, one departure on record.76 Giacometti sculpts a tree and a 
single leaf for Beckett’s stage in a 1961 production of Godot. Beckett writes, 
“Giacometti did a fine tree for Godot. . . . But at the Générale [he] left at 
the interval because he couldn’t bear it any longer! His tree, he said, per-
haps he meant something else.”77 Knowlson’s comment that “both tree and 
leaf have disappeared” does not address the question: Why does Giacom-
etti disappear?78 Sitting at a forced remove from his own work, did the art-
ist feel the waiting process eating into him? Was he dismayed at the way 
the vagabonds do everything but take an axe to it? Giacometti’s luminous 
tree, resembling a subaquatic creature with long tentacles for branches, 
undergoes slow defoliation throughout act 1.79 Did Giacometti depart out 
of pride? Vladimir and Estragon first want to instrumentalize Giacometti’s 
artwork by hanging themselves from it, before it is made inadequate for 
that purpose. They undercut the singularity of the sculpture by suggesting 
Godot means them to wait by another tree—lone-standing, the tree is not 
unique and has a forest of likenesses. It might even be the wrong tree. They 
argue over its classification: willow or bush? The artist did not hang around 
long enough to hear Vladimir say, “[looking round] ‘It’s indescribable. It’s 
like nothing. There’s nothing. There’s a tree.’”80 The dialogue in the first 
act is a verbal handbook on how to disassemble not just Giacometti’s tree 
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but also the tree image Ferdinand de Saussure uses in his Course on General 
Linguistics to exemplify the imprint left in the mind by the signifier arbor/
un arbre.81
 It is not clear whether or not Sontag needs or wants a lobby in Sarajevo, 
since there were humanitarian reasons not to perform the second act. The 
bombs ruin the lobby and make intermission impossible. The sedentary 
confinement of her audience offers only part of Sontag’s reason to break 
the play off at intermission. She also says that their suffering outside the 
theater may be placated by her decision. She amputates their grief. About 
act 2, Sontag observes, “Not only has one more day gone by. Everything is 
worse. Lucky no longer can speak, Pozzo is now pathetic and blind, Vlad-
imir has given in to despair. Perhaps I felt that the despair of Act I was 
enough for the Sarajevo audience, and I wanted to spare them a second 
time when Godot does not arrive.”82 Munk, in attendance at several per-
formances of Godot in Sarajevo, echoes Sontag: “The unrelenting grimness 
of a second act in which things repeat themselves only to get worse was too 
cruel a gift for this audience.”83 An intermission in this context would only 
offer a pause in the steady escalation of misery in the play. Sontag’s produc-
tion ultimately replaces this worsening with a finality. She underscores the 
positive by-product of this decision. By seeing nothing happen only once, 
and not twice, hope would be spared for the audience: “Maybe I wanted to 
propose, subliminally, that Act II might be different.”84
What Is Enough: 
Is Beckett’s Intention Lost in Sarajevo?
Regardless of its context in Sarajevo, Sontag’s reading directly counteracts 
the intended experience of destitution in Beckett’s work. Beckett’s play is 
an experiment in subtraction: not only are the characters’ states worsened, 
but the waiting process gnaws deeply into the now of the performance, fol-
lowing the logic that the more things stay the same, the more things change 
(for the worse). The crucial interception and misunderstanding of Beckett’s 
work is in Sontag’s statement of how the despair of act 1 was enough for 
the Sarajevo audience. Is it the director’s responsibility to decide what is 
enough despair for her audience? The intermission between acts in fact 
forces the spectator to ponder this ceiling of misery for herself.
 Beckett’s play offers a language with which to question Sontag’s deci-
sion. She justifies her decision of a terminal limit with a word drawn from 
the play itself: “enough.” Does her use of the term here indicate an under-
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standing of Beckett’s play, and what kind of reading of Godot does Son-
tag enact with her justification? Vladimir and Estragon push the term 
“enough” back and forth tirelessly. “Enough” seems to designate a provi-
sional measure, wholly in keeping with the play’s world of immeasurable 
destitution. The term makes meek adjustments each time it is uttered. As 
Estragon is trying on recently found boots, Vladimir inquires, “They don’t 
hurt you?” to which Estragon replies, “Not yet.” (That is the hurting in this 
world, by the way. You cannot say no to the pain of a shoe, only “not yet.”) 
Vladimir’s inquiries increase in their intensity:
VLADIMIR. Then you can keep them.
ESTRAGON. They’re too big.
VLADIMIR. Perhaps you’ll have socks some day.
ESTRAGON. True.
VLADIMIR. Then you’ll keep them.
ESTRAGON. That’s enough about these boots.
VLADIMIR. Yes, but . . . 
ESTRAGON. (violently) Enough! (Silence.) I suppose I might as well sit 
down.85
In this “Enough!” we see the suddenly exposed skin of the conversation, 
suggesting an impatience we do not expect from those condemned to wait. 
How do the hungry get fed up? Estragon’s “enough” signals a kind of irri-
tated limit where need grinds against need. Screamed, the word actually 
induces silence from Vladimir. Yet the term registers neither a lasting limit 
nor a new topic for conversation (no new leafs are turned in this play). 
The beggars constantly scrutinize the adequacy designated by the term as 
well as the adequacy of the term. When Vladimir says, “DON’T TELL ME,” 
emphatically indicating he has no interest in hearing his cohort talk aloud 
about his dreams, Estragon replies, “(gesture towards the universe) This one 
is enough for you?”86 Sontag passes a verdict on the enough, decreeing one 
act to be adequate despair for the audience. In doing so, she tries to play 
the role of Vladimir, saying to Beckett’s play, “Don’t tell me!” Estragon’s 
gesture therefore encompasses both Sontag and Sarajevo. Estragon sug-
gests that Vladimir’s desire not to hear him is his satiation, even com-
placency, with the world-as-nightmare. His gesture toward the universe 
echoes his earlier one over the rags he wears. It is a gesture sweeping over 
rubbish we plainly see and offered anew to our consideration. His ques-
tion addresses Vladimir’s censorship by pointing out the sorry state of 
the world. The world is a joke, so you don’t want to hear mine? In this 
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moment Estragon gruesomely mirrors the title of the James Bond film The 
World Is Not Enough. In the film, wanting more is the only option, and the 
world becomes just another object for desire to exceed. Estragon starts here, 
with the inadequacy of the world as dream. The world is not enough for 
Estragon, but from the standpoint of need, not desire. Estragon config-
ures the world as dream because it is the model for a half-remembered and 
unpossessed experience, one that remains at odds with conscious life. Dur-
ing the performance of the Sarajevo production, Estragon waves his hand 
over the debris of the ruined Youth Theater. His question highlights the 
inadequacy of Sontag’s limit of adequate despair.87
 Measures for need are at best temporary and unstable. “Enough” has 
a troubled valence. It can suggest both a maximum and a minimum, too 
little (just barely enough) and too much (enough already!). The irritability 
with which Vladimir and Estragon employ the term suggests it can des-
ignate both at the same time. Sontag thinks she can use the term to issue 
a ceiling to the despair of Sarajevo, as if to say, “Enough with despair; act 
1 is enough.” She fails to hear how the play works to remove the illusory 
satiation (of both joy and despair) from the term. For Beckett, the most slen-
der quantity designated by the enough, its minimum, is not enough: not 
because we need more but because we need less. Beckett creates Godot as 
a laboratory of the enough in which the vagabonds whittle this negligible 
quantity (of hope, of meaning, of carrots) down further, rather than whit-
tling time away, as is often claimed. When we think meaning has hit a max-
imum state of depletion, Estragon pushes it further.
VLADIMIR. This is becoming really insignificant.
ESTRAGON. Not enough.
  Silence.88
Sontag employs enough only as a limit, without taking into consideration 
the possibility that it is also an injunction: to reduce, to get worse, to mean 
and to become less.89 Estragon’s Beckettian poverty is a worsening condi-
tion and not a static one.
Chan’s Inspiration: 
Terrible Symmetry and the Uncanny
The landscape of post-Katrina New Orleans has been described as many 
things—a moonscape, a postnuclear disaster, the fulfillment of a biblical 
prophecy. When Chan visited the city in 2007, he saw Beckett’s stage. Chan 
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ascribes this initial impression as the inspiration for staging Godot in the 
most devastated areas, which retained the appearance of a ghost town two 
years after the flood: “Friends said the city now looks like the backdrop for 
a bleak science fiction movie. Waiting for a ride to pick me up after visit-
ing with some Common Ground volunteers who were gutting houses in 
the Lower Ninth, I realized it didn’t look like a movie set, but the stage 
for a play I have seen many times. It was unmistakable. The empty road. 
The bare tree leaning precariously to one side with just enough leaves to 
make it respectable. The silence.”90 The impression this scene makes on 
Chan lies between what he sees and something he half remembers. Chan’s 
friends respond cinematographically to the post-Katrina landscape. They 
push New Orleans into the future and into the background of the future. 
Grasped as a potential film image, the disaster is one that is both yet to 
happen and already will have happened.91 This landscape does not exist 
for Chan in the future any more than the past. It has a different kind of 
implication for him—not as something unseen, not as something recorded 
in biblical mythology. Though it is devoid of signs, the landscape suggests 
a déjà vu moment. The destroyed city is familiar, writes Chan, but neither 
as imaginary wrath nor as film, and not from the other disaster areas to 
which he has been witness, such as Baghdad after the shelling by US troops 
and the “ghost town known as downtown Detroit.”92 New Orleans com-
pels an involuntary memory of Godot, filling Chan with inner conviction: 
“It was unmistakable.” In this vision, theater and disaster mutually articu-
late one another but do not synthesize into one thing: “What’s more, there 
was a terrible symmetry between the reality of New Orleans post-Katrina 
and the essence of this play, which expresses in stark eloquence the cruel 
and funny things people do while they wait: for help, for food, for hope. It 
was uncanny.”93
 Chan’s impression passes through the aesthetic experience of the 
uncanny. In fact, he repositions the notion of the uncanny through the rap-
port between Beckett’s stage and the devastated landscape. Chan turns 
Freud’s definition of the uncanny inside out. In his essay on the topic, 
Freud explores the uncanny (das Unheimliche) as a disturbance to the famil-
iar, an interruption to our seamless intimacy with the well-known.94 Freud’s 
examples include Hoffman’s The Sand-Man, a short story featuring a doll 
that takes on the appearance of an animated being, and the figure of the 
double in psychoanalysis.95 Freud also cites from his own life in exploring 
his definition of the uncanny. Discussing his experience of “walking in the 
deserted streets of a provincial town in Italy which was unknown to me,” 
he describes his repeated attempts to get out of a certain section of town, 
only to find himself once again back in the same place.96 Freud remarks that 
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this failure to navigate a foreign city, illuminated by the sudden familiarity 
of the spot one was trying to leave, “recalls the sense of helplessness experi-
enced in some dream-states.”97
 Chan’s use of the uncanny has a twin focus. In New Orleans, the stage 
becomes the unexpectedly animated double of the living environment, and 
Beckett’s stage is the space to which Chan returns in trying to find his way 
through the unfamiliar city. Chan thereby merges Freud’s two examples 
of the uncanny. Like Hoffman’s doll, Beckett’s stage loses its customary 
“theatrical” status and the stage disappears. Chan calls this “the realization 
of the play through the city.”98 Chan finds an exacerbation of the Unheimlich 
in this city where the citizens are renamed refugees and where for months 
after the flood innumerable stoops escalate into empty space leading up to 
a vanished home. As sections of the city are made foreign and uninhabit-
able, New Orleans becomes uncanny on a scale greater than Freud’s experi-
ence in the provincial Italian town. The helplessness that Freud considers 
reminiscent of “dream-states” becomes an everyday waking-state reality for 
the survivors of Katrina. A landscape of people displaced from their homes 
or finding it impossible to feel at home in their trailers becomes the setting 
for a municipal uncanny.99
 For Chan, Godot ultimately provides the means to understand and artis-
tically process devastation. In particular, Chan envisions the performance 
of Beckett’s work as a way to remark on losses suffered by the community 
in New Orleans. “Seeing Godot embedded in the very fabric of the land-
scape of New Orleans was my way of reimaging the empty roads, the 
debris, and above all, the bleak silence as more than the expression of a 
mere collapse.”100
 New Orleans attracts many artists with the same intention. Graffiti 
artist Banksy leaves his stenciled figures on buildings in Tremé, another 
impoverished and devastated quarter, and the flooded Lower Ninth Ward. 
One of Banksy’s graffiti features the Morton Salt Girl. In this version, rain 
pours down on the girl from under the umbrella while she reaches out her 
hand to catch a single drop of oil sludge rolling off the umbrella’s exte-
rior. Painted years before the 2010 BP Deep Horizon gulf oil spill, Banksy’s 
vision prophetically compresses that disaster with the Katrina catastrophe. 
He allegorically reworks an iconic brand figure. The umbrella is a longtime 
symbol of insurance agencies and works here like the failed levee. Though 
designed to keep the girl from getting wet, it is in fact the source of water 
falling upon her. Instead of reimagining the catastrophe à la Banksy’s dense 
layering of meanings, Chan says he seeks to “reimage” it. This means 
using the stage as an echo chamber for the empty roads, the debris, and the 
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silence after the flood. Chan’s theater allows us to notice these elements of 
the landscape, to take stock of them through a stage meshing with the envi-
ronment in which they appear. Reimaging means imaging them in order 
to make them more visible, to cultivate within the spectator that déjà vu 
between Beckett’s stage and the Lower Ninth Ward that inspired Chan’s 
project. Filming these elements within the post-Katrina landscape, as 
Chan’s friends imagined, would only metamorphose them into a sensation-
ally empty landscape. Film would transform the condition of mere collapse 
not into expression but into spectacle. Where cinema would extend our rub-
bernecking, Chan’s theater elicits a double take in which we take stock of 
landscape, characters, and audience.
Theater of Aftermath: No-Man versus Anybody
Staging Godot in the Lower Ninth Ward and Gentilly raises questions about 
the specificity of performance in Beckett’s work. Here, a tension arises 
between keeping the play generic and giving it a specific dimension, a spe-
cific meaning it may assume by placing it within the landscape of a historic 
disaster. Many critics argue that the play rejects this. Calling Godot “out-
side all temporal reality,” Bert States, for example, describes how the dia-
logue uttered by the vagabonds “implies the same refusal to come to rest 
in a specific history as the refusal of the play’s tree (a squandered space) 
to abide by the laws of botanical growth.”101 States emphasizes the time-
lessness within Beckett’s play and argues that this accords the play its clas-
sic status. States regards Beckett’s generic as purity easily contaminated by 
details involved in any specific performance:
You can destroy the generic effect of Beckett’s wasteland (“A country 
road. A tree. Evening.”) or at least set it at odds with the action it is to 
contain, by simply littering it with the content of a history (refuse, ruins, 
billboards), things heavy with a definite past and consequently destined 
for future use. Chekhov’s famous remark that if there is a pistol on stage in 
Act I it must be fired in Act IV is a condensation of this idea: objects in the 
dramatic universe are “waiting” objects; like traps, they exist only to exert 
their potential.102
For States, ruins are a directorial choice, placed on stage through littering. 
This refuse vitiates the utopic emptiness of the play as it would the grass in 
a brochure from the parks department. Cluttering Beckett’s wasteland with 
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proof of its wasteland status only counteracts the play’s “refusal of history.” 
In his reference to litter, States may have in mind such productions as the 
1955 Broadway version, which “takes place in what appears to be the town 
dump, with a blasted tree rising out of a welter of rusting junk, including 
plumbing parts.”103
 Chan’s production constitutes a reply to the claim that Beckett is 
intended as generic and that historical specificity is a betrayal of Beckett’s 
intention. Chan stages Godot in an environment where ruin exceeds con-
finement to the stage or the delicate status of litter. The dump is not staged; 
it is real. Debris is not ornament, but inevitable and constitutive of the per-
formance place: signless posts, an empty road without street signs, a storm-
bent light pole, a sea of weeds where houses once stood, stoops ascending 
nowhere, a FEMA trailer, and (in Gentilly) an abandoned house. In the set-
ting of desolated New Orleans, this is already the generic. To remove the 
litter would be to introduce a specificity that Beckett did not intend. These 
remnants of the flood are, as States claims, “things heavy with a definite 
past.” Yet we cannot piece their sense together into a future the way States 
claims, for they do not “exist only to exert their potential.” The Lower 
Ninth Ward setting reverses the temporality of Chekhov’s example because 
the gun has already gone off.
 Andrea Boll extends the metaphor of Chan’s Lower Ninth Ward produc-
tion in which the generic conditions for Beckett’s play are achieved through 
the wearing down or stripping away of specificity. She notes that follow-
ing the play the actors as well as the audience members disappear into the 
wasteland. For Boll, the lesson of the play arrives only as an afterthought 
and with the disappearance of both actors and audience. What we have wit-
nessed is not a no-man’s- land but “somebody’s life.” She observes, “The 
lights fade. The play ends. We applaud. The cast disappears into the black 
night as does the audience. And yet, the setting remains: a destroyed house 
in a sea of destroyed houses. Not a backdrop, but somebody’s life they do 
not know what to do with.”104 The landscape is not there to merely provide 
our line of vision with an abstract point of disappearance. Not the disap-
pearance of vision, but somebody’s life they (the somebody? FEMA?) did 
“not know what to do with,” life in a state of extreme obsolescence. This 
suggests another angle from which Godot in the Lower Ninth Ward forces 
us to rethink the status of the generic. No-man’s-land and anybody’s life 
are emphatically different types of anonymity. The no-man’s-land is States’s 
vision of Beckett’s formal purity, a space born generic and without qualities.
 Chan (and Boll) underscore the imperfect and acquired anonymity of 
Beckett’s landscape, whose defining characteristics and contours have been 
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forcibly wiped away. Anybody is a person dispossessed of the right to be 
somebody, or to be known, to have a name. Critics frequently discuss Beck-
ett’s vagabonds as the Everyman. Yet this term only underscores allegorical 
possibility and an inclusiveness that suggests the vagabond to be a levia-
than figure.105 Anybody suggests intrinsic vacancy, a slot no longer occupied 
by this anybody. Boll notes how this context affects how she overhears cer-
tain lines in the play:
So when a blind Pozzo asks Didi what it looks like out here and Didi 
replies, “It’s indescribable. It’s like nothing. There’s nothing,” “nothing” 
takes on a different connotation than the setting Beckett had imagined as 
“A country road. A tree. Evening.” This sort of nothing is worse—more 
terrifying because this sort of nothing has been created by loss, by the 
absence of what was once living and whole, filled with light and possibil-
ity rather than a nothing that is nothing because it never existed.106
Boll’s stocktaking of this difference between nothing and loss is the effect 
of theater in the aftermath. The fracture between no-man’s and somebody’s is 
initiated in Chan’s decision about the location of the play. Beckett’s generic 
space has a name and can be found on the map of New Orleans after the 
flood.
 Thus the Lower Ninth Ward and Gentilly designate places the disas-
ter levels into noplaces. They have become shorthand for the way in which 
the city was destroyed along lines of class and race, as the poorer, lower-
lying sections of the city are inhabited mostly by African Americans. Areas 
around Tulane University, by contrast, go unharmed. The failure of the 
levee system, not Hurricane Katrina, destroys New Orleans. The leveling 
of the city does not follow the indiscriminate swath of a tsunami. The disas-
ter discriminates according to the class that can only afford to live in the 
low-lying areas. Vladimir and Estragon are played by J. Kyle Manzay and 
Wendell Pierce. Chan’s Godot played before a predominantly white audi-
ence, and in this regard differed sharply from the prison and Sarajevo per-
formances in which the line between actor and spectator was only faintly 
drawn. The waiting figures in the play are performed by African American 
actors.  Chan confines the more evident hierarchy of master-slave (Pozzo 
and Lucky) to white actors.107
 The tree created for this production signifies the hybrid nature of the 
disaster. The base of the tree is a light stand. Halfway up the stand is a 
metal arm that resembles a branch. A thin wooden trunk, from which a 
wooden branch extends, completes the vertical. Cardboard is haphazardly 
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gathered at the base of the tree, seemingly to conceal the extended legs of 
the stand. In the context of the Lower Ninth Ward, this tree is no longer 
required to emblematize the barrenness of the stage. Instead it becomes a 
cue, a weather vane, to the hybrid of the man-made and the natural. Its con-
struction points back to the conjunction of forces that crafted the disaster. 
 The spectator literally keeps this disaster in view. At the far end of 
Prieur Street the levee is clearly illuminated. Its distance from the stage 
endows its image with the quality of an afterthought or an insurgent mem-
ory. Productions of Godot in traditional theater settings labor to create an 
indistinct horizon on stage, a grey backdrop in which ground and sky 
merge indistinguishably. Yet the point of disappearance in the Lower Ninth 
was a spotlight shining on the levee as if it were something to be watched 
closely, even at a distance. Chan devises two spatial scenes for Godot: the 
play before us in which nothing happens (twice) and this other scene where 
something catastrophic (a failure of civil engineering) had already occurred. 
Instead of foreground versus background/backdrop, Chan’s staging intro-
duces a terrible symmetry between two events (the levee and the play, the 
disaster that transpired and the disaster of something not transpiring).
 The aftermath quality to the performance reveals itself in the resonance 
words have in the setting. The disjunctive dialogue between the vagabonds 
generates tools for the displaced. In her review of the play, Boll envisions 
the conditions of the Lower Ninth Ward as the setting in which Beckett’s 
play fulfills itself:
“What is there to recognize?” asks Gogo. Yes, what is there to recognize 
anymore? One day you wake up in your formaldehyde FEMA trailer, and 
somebody has chopped down all the trees on your street because even 
though they appeared to be alive, they were actually dead. An entire block 
of houses has been demolished. Everybody has left except you.108
 You will confess like Gogo to your best friend, your neighbors, your 
contractor, yourself, to anybody who will listen, “I can’t go on like this,” 
and have them pat you on the back and say with amusement like Didi, 
“That’s what you think.”109
Boll suggests that context does not restrict the meaning of Beckett’s play 
but releases it. The performance of Beckett’s play in a disaster setting does 
not produce interpretations per se, but rather a deeper echo of the work 
within spaces and situations throughout the city. For Boll, Beckett lets us 
see the tragicomic gesture in the contractor’s pat on your back. Beckett adds 
his aftermath to that of the disaster. In the process, it acquires an address, 
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perched somewhere between anybody and somebody: the you. “Every-
body has left except you.” Boll does not hereby personalize the experience 
of Beckett, even as this “you” is not the collective you of her readership. 
She addresses the single you, the one deprived of context, neighbors, and 
what the law calls all personal effects. This you is the last you, the generic 
particular.
Beckett’s Poverty in Sarajevo and New Orleans
Beckett’s play resonates in environments where the destitution exceeds that 
of Beckett’s stage. In these environments the very production of Waiting for 
Godot colludes with the stage deprived of its deus ex machina, leaving only 
the scantiest of theatrical machines. The memory of a couple living without 
shelter informs Sontag’s vision for the play. She models one Vladimir and 
Estragon pair “on homeless people I’d seen in downtown Manhattan.”110 
Yet Sontag experiences the force of the play, its central topic of futility and 
the inadequacy of means, most clearly in the effort of putting the play on: 
“Sometimes I thought we were not waiting for Godot, or Clinton. We were 
waiting for our props.”111 The candles that light the stage seem to arrive 
mysteriously. Like the boots Estragon finds on stage in act 2, the candles 
just appear: “When I asked for additional candles, I was told there weren’t 
any. Later I was told that they were being saved for our performances. In 
fact, I never learned who doled out the candles; they were simply in place 
on the floor when I arrived each morning.”112 She cannot find any rope for 
Pozzo until a week before the opening, the bowler hats and boots mate-
rialize only in the last days of rehearsal, and the costumes arrive the day 
before the opening. Sontag notes how carrots are in such short supply that 
she substitutes rolls “scavenged” from the Holiday Inn where she is stay-
ing.113 The rationing inflicted on Sarajevo by the war makes it impossible 
to find not only a chicken for Pozzo but an edible substitute for one. To 
paraphrase Hamm in Endgame: “There are no more chickens” in Sarajevo, 
“nor are there any counterparts.” Sontag designs a fowl for Pozzo out of 
papier-mâché. The absence of electricity forces Sontag to rehearse and per-
form the play by flashlight and candlelight. Even Beckett’s text has to be 
parceled between the three Didi/Gogo couples on stage. An interviewer’s 
question, “How did you decide what to give to whom?” suggests a sec-
ondary motivation for tripling the pair: to distribute two roles among six 
unemployed Sarajevan actors and subsequently to ration their lines from an 
already skimpy text.114
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 The staging of poverty that Beckett’s play demands is difficult outside 
of devastated areas, such as Sarajevo and New Orleans. Beckett’s play does 
not illustrate sociological conditions of poverty. These conditions are not 
illuminated, as they are in Victor Hugo’s work, by what people are forced 
to do on account of them. Beckett’s poverty militates against self-evidence, 
and the recognizable markers of destitution are put in retreat in the pro-
cess. Critics sometimes become accountants in trying to enforce a verisi-
militude over Beckett’s work that is only too apparent in the New Orleans 
productions. In his study Beckett/Beckett, for example, Vivian Mercier states 
his goal to “establish the extent to which [Beckett’s] leading characters can 
be said to have ‘come down in the world’ in a social and economic sense as 
well as a psychological or even moral one.”115 Mercier quantifies the “for-
mal education” of characters (and hence their “comfortable upbringing”) 
by tallying the “unambiguously learned references” they make.116 In dis-
cussing All that Fall, Mercier gets down to brass tacks: “If we are to take 
Mr. Rooney’s calculations seriously, he earns only about £2 a week yet 
pays £12 a year for his season ticket alone. Clearly he is losing money by 
going to the city every day. But in all probability, since he owns a house in 
a desirable location, he has a private income.”117 Mercier here audits Beck-
ett’s characters rather than listens to them. Mercier wants to establish posi-
tive textual proof for the destitution of Beckett’s characters, wants to close 
the condition by ascertaining its beginning and end. This method ignores 
Beckett’s more thoroughgoing poverty, which pushes beyond the question 
of character income and includes our engagement with it. Here we might 
recall Beckett’s remark in his essay on Joyce: “Literary criticism is not book- 
keeping.”118 For Beckett, criticism should not convert the literary work into 
data. More importantly, the critical gesture cannot keep or retain posses-
sion of the book it addresses. The book is to recede from and baffle the 
critic, and the interpretation is not to interrupt (or arrest) the dereliction 
of the book. We witness this recession by the text of Godot in the moment 
Estragon calls attention to the visible index of his impoverishment: his rags. 
Vladimir says, “You should have been a poet.” Estragon replies, “I was. 
(Gesture towards rags.) Isn’t that obvious?”119 Here the play inserts a new 
(and, to us, foreign) understanding of the obvious, the sign in its state of 
maximal exposure. Should it have already been obvious to Vladimir and to 
us that Estragon was a poet or that poetry is the only suitable preparation 
for dereliction? Beckett makes it difficult for us to separate the joke from 
the commentary, the gesture of ecce homo! from one that furnishes proof.
 The landscape of New Orleans conjures the image of Beckett’s destitute 
stage without the need for Mercier’s calculations. Speaking of the devas-
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tated areas of the city, Chan notes, “It was truly a landscape of impover-
ishment.”120 Chan ultimately stages Godot in two areas from which people, 
road signs, and habitable structures have been notably uprooted by the 
flooding: an intersection in the Lower Ninth Ward and an abandoned house 
in Gentilly. Here Chan experiences something like an involuntary memory 
of Beckett’s stage: “Standing there at the intersection of North Prieur and 
Reynes, I suddenly found myself in the middle of Samuel Beckett’s Waiting 
for Godot.”121 The setting hallucinates Chan into Godot.
 In a seeming answer to Chan’s visual image of devastation, Lois 
Oppenheim notes in her analysis of Beckett’s visuality, “In Beckett’s the-
ater the image outweighs the word: The two tramps of Godot, Winnie in her 
mound, heads peering from within trash cans and funerary urns in End-
game and Play have a force more enduring than the scripted text.”122 Oppen-
heim ascribes enduring force to Beckett’s images of bodies trapped within 
monstrous enclosures, the mounds of dirt, urns, and trash cans that usurp 
our focus. The couple, Vladimir and Estragon, however, form a memorable 
image through an inverse condition: exposure. Exposure both to the ele-
ments—Estragon says he sleeps in a ditch—and to the spectators’ view 
combine to make the stage a defenseless space, both temporary and restric-
tive, like an unauthorized encampment. This is the precise environment of 
both Sarajevo and New Orleans. As Goytisolo observes, every remaining 
inhabitant of Sarajevo “must get used to sleeping, moving, walking about 
fully aware of your defenseless, precarious existence.”123 The exposure of 
Beckett’s characters is accented in Chan’s production by the absence of a 
proper stage, which is signaled only by the sudden and impertinent group-
ing of the audience risers at an abandoned intersection.
 In the light of the exposed condition of destitution, we must qualify 
Oppenheim’s claim that Vladimir and Estragon form an image of enduring 
force. Their endurance comes from a place other than strength. Vladimir 
and Estragon weather their exposure with something closer to obduracy 
than to traditional courage. They endure as survivors who have fallen 
through the cracks; they endure by chance. They bring to mind what Kafka 
says about the wax Odysseus puts in his ears to save himself from the 
Siren’s song: “Proof that inadequate, even childish measures, may serve to 
rescue one from peril.”124 In the dispossessed world of Beckett’s characters, 
Odysseus’s wax would strike us as sheer luxury. Vladimir and Estragon 
seem without means, even inadequate or childish ones. Unlike Odysseus, 
they consequently have no choice but to take in the silence that engulfs the 
stage. At the end of his study on Proust, Beckett writes that Proust’s narra-
tor is preoccupied with an “invisible reality” of art that “damns the life of 
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the body on earth as a pensum [a routine burden] and reveals the meaning 
of the word ‘defunctus.’”125 Where Proust’s narrator reveals the meaning of 
defunctus, Godot just reveals the state.126 The exposure wrought by Beckett’s 
play is not to be confused with “explicitness,” with a conveyance of mean-
ings. Nothing works, usefulness is a quaint idea, and life itself has become 
an anachronism, yet this does not come to us courtesy of a character’s solil-
oquy. The poverty of Beckett’s stage offers no terms or conditions for itself, 
just a condition.
 The destitution wrought by the war in Sarajevo is visible in the very 
bodies of the actors on stage. Sontag notes how the actors evince physi-
cal exhaustion in excess of the script’s talk about futility and hunger: “The 
actors were visibly underweight and tired easily. Beckett’s Lucky must 
stand motionless through most of his long scene without ever setting down 
the heavy bag he carries. Atko . . . asked me to excuse him if he occasion-
ally rested his empty suitcase on the floor. Whenever I halted the run-
through for a few minutes to change a movement or a line reading, all the 
actors, with the exception of Ines, would instantly lie down on the stage.”127 
Godot in Sarajevo illuminates how labor-intensive it is to be (or even just 
play) the vagabond—a character who seems to have nothing to do. Vladi-
mir and Estragon conduct methodical ceremonies of movement on stage. 
The Sarajevan actors, by contrast, register more emphatically the physical 
exhaustion that accompanies futility. Where Beckett’s hobos use the pauses 
in the script to think, to listen intently, or to survey the stage, the perform-
ers in Sontag’s production seize upon these to lie down. Sontag’s words 
give a glimpse into a historical situation that overlaps the truth of Beckett’s 
stage where simply standing vertically or holding a suitcase throughout 
rehearsal of act 1 constitute labors that push the human figure to the brink. 
The war environment rations even the postures of the actor.
 Both in New Orleans and Sarajevo the audience is already trained in 
waiting. At theaters with prestigious addresses, Beckett’s wait is absorbed 
with the patience of understanding that one gives to a uniquely demand-
ing piece of theater. In the Lower Ninth Ward and Sarajevo, waiting can 
be tempered neither by patience nor impatience. Whether it be waiting for 
FEMA, for NATO, for Clinton, or for the bombs to stop falling, waiting is 
endemic to life after a catastrophe. Waiting is the temporal dimension of 
poverty, and the vagabonds’ wait is one that famously does not pay off. 
Audiences in New Orleans and Sarajevo, like the characters on stage, do 
not rightly know for what they are waiting, or stated otherwise, the waiting 
itself is so long and so inevitable that it usurps any reason for waiting.
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 Part of the frivolousness of the Beckettian waiting is the way its termi-
nus abruptly changes. The characters are waiting for Godot, waiting for 
night, and also waiting for nothing—just waiting.128 Waiting makes the now 
of Beckett’s stage recede in this manner: waiting displaces the things Vladi-
mir and Estragon do while waiting, and yet the things they do also seem 
to negate waiting. (We encounter this inability to see waiting and acting 
simultaneously any time a waiter at a New York restaurant assures us that 
he or she “really” is, in some other but distant reality, an actor.) In the con-
text of postapocalyptic New Orleans, waiting undercuts any coherent mes-
sage that the play might seem to offer. The occasional reminder of what the 
characters are waiting for seems only to interrupt their antics on stage. In 
the shadow of this afterthought of Godot, they resume their cycle of games. 
Action and waiting impoverish one another. The abstract inactivity of the 
waiting process makes it impossible to act on stage or give it a form (some-
thing we can “see happening” on stage). The form waiting assumes is the 
repetition of the play’s title.
 Titles usually stand outside or above the work, as an umbrella term for 
the work, providing the identity by which the work is formally recognized 
(by copyright offices, institutions, etc.). Beckett’s is the only play whose title 
provides its own enigmatic purpose, what we might call the irrationale of 
the play: simultaneously description, justification, and (implicitly) ques-
tion. The title is immersed within the locution of the play, surfacing when-
ever Vladimir and Estragon offer their reason for being on stage (phrased 
as an inability to leave): “We’re waiting for Godot.” The repetitions of the 
title within the dialogue merit the retitling of Beckett’s play Godot 26, after 
Anouilh’s Amphitryon 38, dramatizing the innumerable versions of its 
mythic tale. Recirculation within the dialogue wears the gleam off the title. 
It does not become more lucid, just more familiar. The play turns the title 
into a sentence (in all senses of this word). Vladimir and Estragon add a 
“we.” Yet the intratextual movement only saps this announcement of its 
function. Instead of furnishing the vagabonds with a purpose, their declara-
tion/citation only sounds like a confession that they are here for the play, 
that they constitute the acting troupe assigned to perform the impossible: to 
act waiting.
 In the setting of the Lower Ninth Ward, waiting is inscribed within a 
landscape that is self-evident for the audience. Director Donald Harworth 
asks Beckett a question that Chan would never need to ask: “Why is there 
nothing on the road? Beckett replies, ‘Because it’s not a road, it’s a track on 
wasteland.’ Silence. Then, smiling as though seeing the two friends in that 
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place, he leaned back and said, ‘They play a series of games. When one has 
ended, they start another.’ His smile lingered.”129 Beckett clearly wants to 
cut down or away from the associations Harworth gleans from the stage 
direction, “a country road”: traffic, people, cars, business. Beckett here feels 
obliged to impoverish what seems on the face of it an already impover-
ished term—a road. The director’s discussion is helpful. It follows the same 
course of impoverishment that Beckett’s work takes, a progression from a 
road to a track on wasteland. “Track” suggests repetition, like an athletic 
track, where doing the same thing dominates (rather than a country road 
suitable for a stroll, as in Kerouac or John Denver). Beckett underscores his 
stage as closed system (the vagabonds’ endless resumption of their games) 
rather than as a road that is either a destination or a means of traveling 
between two points. In its very existence, the Lower Ninth Ward incorpo-
rates Beckett’s reductions. Its unnerving desolation is incarnated through 
force majeure rather than Beckett’s stage directions. Dismissed by some crit-
ics as Chan’s “overtly clumsy attempts to blend in” with local culture, the 
gumbo and second line/marching band served a vital function in helping 
the spectators find the stage.130 The corner of Prieur and Reynes constitutes 
not a theatrical no-man’s-land but a municipal one, as street signs were still 
absent and the roads remained undesignated. Chan’s is the first Godot locat-
able only through GPS.131
 Beckett’s poverty exposes without explanation. This makes seemingly 
simple critical gestures rather difficult. What, for example, do we call Vlad-
imir and Estragon? The play instills a hesitation in us before naming their 
status. This hesitation is overcome in Mercier’s attempt to ascertain the 
class status of Beckett’s characters, as it is lost in Oppenheim’s list of Beck-
ettian images: she names Winnie and names the body parts peeking out 
of the urns and trash cans. Godot ultimately bequeaths to us the image of 
the tramps rather than that of Vladimir and Estragon. Many critics note 
that the term “tramp,” like the term “clown,” is never mentioned in the 
text or stage directions.132 Yet it displaces all others in critical discussion 
of the play. Its massive circulation turns Vladimir and Estragon into the 
play’s emissaries and Beckett into a celebrity. Herbert Blau speaks of Vladi-
mir and Estragon as refugees, long before they appear on the stage in New 
Orleans. Blau has it right. The term “refugees” as opposed to “tramps” 
suggests a more forcible displacement or eviction surrounding their con-
dition.133 And yet, though the term applies to the people of New Orleans 
en route to Houston or elsewhere, would Godot be as widely disseminated 
through culture were their figures designated as refugees? “Beggar” would 
underscore the demand made by the figure, rather than their movement 
WaiT ing for godoT in Sara Jevo and neW orleanS  •  97
of tramping. Akin to “bumpkin,” “tramp” makes the state of need more 
digestible to the spectator. It implicitly forges an alliance with the cin-
ematic tramp, Charlie Chaplin. Beckett’s characters, however, share none 
of the pliancy with which Chaplin adapts to his environment (fed into a 
machine, Charlie emerges unscathed). Where Chaplin communicates across 
his silence, his eyebrows stamping the mood for us like emoticons, deep 
silence punctuates all the things Vladimir and Estragon say, but leave 
unaddressed, to each another.
 Chan’s production of Godot engages the scarcity of recognizable mark-
ers on Beckett’s stage. Weeks before the opening, Chan posts the famously 
concise stage directions of Beckett’s play at intersections and dilapidated 
areas throughout New Orleans: “A country road. A tree. Evening.” Chan 
takes the stage directions out of hiding and posts them among the other 
makeshift signs—ads for contractors, homemade street signs—that multi-
ply on telephone poles and park benches following the disaster. Made visi-
ble, the stage directions lose their informational function (to stage designers 
creating a world to be measured by its fidelity to the recipe) and gain a 
designatory one. The conditions for Beckett’s stage play become an index to 
the existing condition of the city. Chan’s production contests the traditional 
model of site-specific artworks, which are uniquely contoured to a particu-
lar landscape.134 The dispersal of Beckett’s directions to the stage calls our 
attention to New Orleans as a set for multiple productions of Godot. Chan 
uses the play to situate the city and its many forsaken areas rather than tai-
loring his work to it. Possible stages abound in New Orleans because this 
play requires the very opposite of a site-specific work. Godot needs a space 
without qualities, a no-man’s-land, a generic site.
 The impoverishing effect of waiting can be illuminated in contrast to 
Emmanuel Levinas’s concept of vigilance. Levinas differentiates between 
attention, “which is turned towards objects,” and vigilance, “absorbed in 
the rustling of the unavoidable being and which goes much further.”135 In 
this absorption into impersonal being “I still become aware of this anon-
ymous vigilance, but I become aware of it in a movement in which the I 
is already detached from the anonymity.”136 He continues: “Our affirma-
tion of an anonymous vigilance goes beyond the phenomena, which already 
presupposes an ego, and thus eludes descriptive phenomenology. Here 
description would make use of terms while striving to go beyond their con-
stituency; it stages personages, while the there is the dissipation of person-
ages.”137 Levinas makes a clear separation between the anonymous vigil 
and conscious attention to phenomena that “presuppose an ego.” For Beck-
ett, the ego is not so easily shed:
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ESTRAGON. We always find something, eh Didi, to give us the impression 
we exist.
VLADIMIR. (impatiently) Yes, yes, we’re magicians.138
In these lines Beckett, more than Levinas, expresses the futility of let-
ting go of the ego. If Levinas wants to go beyond the ego, Beckett shows 
how its occasional reoccurrence (the trivial things it does to give us “the 
impression that we exist”) only testifies to the dreadful norm—an impres-
sionless existence. This stage coincides with the state of survivors of disas-
ter, who are only reminded of being alive. The “I” in Godot is never fully 
detached from anonymity, and hence waiting never transforms into vigi-
lance. Levinas suggests that philosophy can do without the theater (i.e., 
phenomenology, which “stages personages”). Beckett uses the stage to sug-
gest the irrelevance of philosophy. The vagabonds, partially anonymous, 
slowly wither away. Levinas is helpful to people whose understanding of 
need is part of a conversation that includes its opposite: the rich and var-
ied discourse of civilization. This is to say that nobody reads Levinas after 
a disaster. Levinas’s figure faces the other, and this sets ethical obligation 
that precedes existence. Beckett stages something that is in danger of fall-
ing short of existence. Need occurs on the stage but outside a dialectical 
framework. Obligation is replaced by compulsion and inexplicable inertia. 
People in historical crises forcibly deprived of home, like Didi and Gogo, 
empathize with the state of anonymity on Beckett’s stage, which offers no 
countenance.
 Unlike Levinas’s vigilance, Beckett’s waiting demands a scarcity of 
objects rather than their erasure or dismissal. Adorno notes the careful 
monitoring of what appears on Beckett’s stage. He notes, “The strict ration 
of reality and characters which the drama is allotted and with which it 
makes do, is identical to what remains of subject, spirit, and soul in view of 
the permanent catastrophe.”139 Western theater is bound up in the notion of 
mimesis, the adequation between stage and world. Adorno keys in on the 
inadequacy upon Beckett’s stage to counteract this tradition. Whereas Aris-
totelian theater depends on reason (ratio), Beckett’s reality depends on the 
ration. Artaud ascribes the birth of theater to a gesture of useless expendi-
ture. During the plague, he writes, “[The] dregs of humanity, apparently 
immunized by their frenzied greed, enter the open houses and pillage 
riches they know will serve no purpose or profit. And at that moment the 
theater is born. The theater, i.e., an immediate gratuitousness provoking 
acts without use or profit.”140 According to Artaud, theater begins with an 
obscene disturbance to the property of the rich: the moment the “dregs” 
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gratuitously pillage their coffers. Beckett’s plays begin not in gratuity but in 
scarcity, one prior to any act or gesture. The dregs Artaud speaks of are on 
Beckett’s stage but are fishing carrots out of their pockets:
VLADIMIR. How’s the carrot?
ESTRAGON. It’s a carrot.
VLADIMIR. So much the better, so much the better. (Pause.) What was it 
you wanted to know?
ESTRAGON. I’ve forgotten. (Chews.) That’s what annoys me. (He looks at the 
carrot appreciatively, dangles it between finger and thumb.) I’ll never forget 
this carrot. (He sucks the end of it meditatively).141
 Every object seems somehow to have penetrated the fundamental 
vacancy of Beckett’s stage. Beckett’s world is no less administered than Kaf-
ka’s. Yet the labyrinthine bureaucracy that crams Kafka’s novels is felt but 
not seen in Beckett through the ration, through the logic of scarcity.142 Beck-
ett disposes of the idea that need has a natural basis (mere hunger). Every 
item, everything edible, appears on his stage with the precision of a bowl of 
soup pushed through the door to a prisoner in solitary confinement. Need 
is managed. Moments of excess are infrequent. “You overdo it with your 
carrots,” Vladimir says to Estragon.143 Vladimir’s expression echoes like a 
verbal remnant from a distant world where people could intimately chas-
tise one another for wanting something in excess of its necessity. The weak-
ness before excess and the articulation of desire over need make little sense 
between two hobos who have nothing. Here nothing is to be done, let alone 
overdone. We blink at Vladimir’s statement because there is only a single 
carrot on stage.
 We connect this strict rationing behind the play to the privative condi-
tion of the beggar. The scantiness of what remains of “subject, spirit, and 
soul” and even carrots is incorporated into the survival of the characters. In 
the postapocalyptic scenario of Endgame, by contrast, the characters survive 
the objects. It surpasses the point reached in Godot in which objects seem 
marked for extinction. Characters openly proclaim, almost as a reminder 
to each other, that an array of objects has achieved extinction: “There are 
no more coffins!” and “There are no more bicycles.” This “no more” is 
the idiom of Beckett’s poverty. But whereas Godot suggests there “are no 
more carrots” for the beggars, Endgame suggests the catastrophic absence of 
these objects: bicycles are no more. Scarcity escalates into gone. If in Godot 
it seems that objects interrupt the void of the stage, Endgame declares the 
end of the world as to a customs agent: object by measly object. As befits 
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a bomb shelter, there is mention of a “larder” in Clov’s kitchen. This space 
of reserve crucially changes the economy of scarcity and allotment in End-
game. Even if locked (only Hamm knows the combination), it suggests a 
potential “more.” The total exposure of the vagabonds’ condition in Godot 
depends on the absence of any reserve off stage, any place for potential 
stockpiles. Their only larder is in their pockets.
Naming Godot
The Sontag and Chan productions of Godot share the common political 
ambition of publicizing the vulnerability of the cities of Sarajevo and New 
Orleans. This project becomes visible if we compare the titles of Sontag’s 
essay (“Waiting for Godot in Sarajevo”) and the book Chan edits (Wait-
ing for Godot in New Orleans: A Field Guide). These titles lack an indication 
that a play is being staged. Instead, the titles emphasize the waiting and 
suggest that these cities are places in which Godot is awaited. Both Sontag 
and Chan underscore what I describe in chapter 1 as utilitarian waiting. 
This type of waiting focuses on the “for” in waiting for someone or some-
thing and thereby assigns a clear endpoint to the waiting process. The wait-
ing inscribed in the play is different because, although Godot is putatively 
the objective, the characters in fact have little expectation or hope that he 
will ever arrive and waiting itself—and the character of waiting, rather 
than waiting for Godot—takes precedence. The waiting of Vladimir and 
Estragon only resembles waiting for a bus if that bus is being anticipated in 
Sarajevo or the Lower Ninth Ward.
 The Sarajevo and New Orleans productions are political because they 
encourage a figuration for Godot and the waiting process in the play. Both 
productions serially inscribe objects, authorities, and institutions in the 
blank space of “Godot.” Though Beckett’s play wages war on this “for,” 
both Sontag and Chan calibrate the need afflicting their cities by suggest-
ing a number of possible Godots. Chan remarks, “In New Orleans in 2007, 
Godot is legion.”144 Sontag speaks of “waiting for Clinton” and waiting for 
props: “‘You’ll definitely have the cigarette holder tomorrow,’ I was told 
every morning for three weeks.”145 True to his grassroots approach, Chan 
distributes a questionnaire to the residents of Gentilly, a Gallup poll of need 
asking, “WHAT ARE YOU WAITING FOR?” The answers enumerate famil-
iar failures: “FEMA,” “Waiting for the Tzar, Blakely, to do something,” 
“Waiting for the Road Home people to give me my money. It’s been a long 
wait.”146 Other responses reveal the surprising absences in post-Katrina 
WaiT ing for godoT in Sara Jevo and neW orleanS  •  101
Gentilly: waiting for street signs; waiting for someone to get onto the peo-
ple who are not back and make them clean up their properties; waiting for 
the shopping center to reopen; waiting for more police, not military police: 
we need community-oriented people patrolling our neighborhood; waiting 
for a plan; waiting on money.147
 Chan’s question furnishes the residents’ answers with a structure: “I am 
waiting for . . .” This is a leading question: it leads to all of Godot’s name-
sakes. For this reason, very few answers respond to the question’s implicit 
interrogation of the worth of the waiting process (i.e., what good is wait-
ing?). Sylvester Desponza, resident of the St. Roch neighborhood before the 
storm, describes waiting as “waiting for the utilities to stop going on and 
off.” Yet his other answers impulsively protest the structure of the question. 
Desponza writes, “Everything that has not happened is disgusting.” The 
“not happening” in the play itself, but without any reference to a Godot, is 
disgusting. “I am not waiting,” Desponza says, “but puking.”148 He fash-
ions a truly provisional response to Beckett’s drama: he does not need a 
Godot, he needs a Dramamine.
 Responses to the Chan survey draw our attention away from hypotheti-
cal cures to the visible dislocation of post-Katrina New Orleans.149 Despon-
za’s comments have an urgency not seen elsewhere in the questionnaire: 
“Go to the 2900 and 3000 block in St. Roch and see how empty it is—the 
conditions are still the same.”150 Instead of an answer, Desponza offers an 
injunction outside the political compass set by Chan’s poll. Desponza is 
saying enough with this Christmas list; “go see St. Roch for yourself, with-
out the actors and risers.” He senses that the arrival of these objects, peo-
ple, and policies, each a Godot we await, would only be the start, not the 
end, of what the flood survivor needs. Maurice Blanchot writes, “When [lit-
erature] names something, whatever it designates is abolished; but what-
ever is abolished is also sustained, and the thing has found a refuge (in the 
being which is the word) rather than a threat.”151 Desponza suggests that 
listing and naming what the residents of Gentilly want (awarding them the 
title of Godot) only destroys that thing as an option. The title of Godot is 
not a threat but a refuge, because these things only remain true to Beck-
ett’s play by staying absent. Desponza suggests that the panoply of existing 
options should not provide us with our only possibility.152
 Sontag and Chan articulate the political message of their productions 
through the figure in absentia. Though they stage a play about vagabonds, 
Sontag and Chan are interested less in a state of abandonment per se than 
in the figures by whom the characters (and the audience) have been aban-
doned. This message is curative and optimistic and conforms to the existing 
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political structure far more than does Desponza’s despondent rage. Nam-
ing Godot allows Sontag and Chan to orchestrate vectors of need, desire, 
and absence around a more possible, more earthbound figure. They wres-
tle with the figure of Godot as with a weather vane they redirect so that it 
points no longer at the theater (to some figure waiting in the wings) but out 
to our world.
 Since the no-man’s-land has been removed from quotation marks, how 
will we do the same to “Godot”? This is the real question asked by both 
Sontag and Chan. Can Godot’s prestigious stage absence be mobilized to 
coerce a political figure or agency from the shadows? The play itself insti-
gates this sudden incarnation of its title, as Vladimir and Estragon repeat-
edly mistake Pozzo for Godot. It schools us in the ease, but also the error, 
with which Godot is recognized. Characters in the play are dubbed Godot, 
not officially as by the queen, but painfully as in a desynchronized kung fu 
film where sound (the name) poorly matches the image (the body). Absur-
dity and amusement abound in the effort to grapple with the potential of 
the name “Godot,” to bestow the proper name for something that never 
arrives or that may have always been there. The audience tends to remem-
ber Godot’s absence rather than the vagabonds’ need for him. This allows 
them to maintain the comic value of this no-show rather than the arduous 
poverty it entails. The casting call for a Wall Street production of Godot I 
discuss in the conclusion receives many replies. One is from a wag claiming 
he wants to play Godot. I wrote back: “Sure, but only if you have the ward-
robe.” Our joking hides what we do not know about waiting.
 This reconsignment of Godot’s name allows Chan to integrate his pro-
duction into the local political landscape. Waiting for Guffman is a popu-
lar reworking of Godot. In the film, an amateur theater group tries to get 
its shot at the big time by inviting an established drama critic, Guffman, 
to their performance. They are confident that Guffman’s critical approval 
will change their summer-stock status. They reserve a seat for the esteemed 
critic in the front row. The seat remains empty throughout the play until an 
individual walks in and takes the seat midway through the performance. 
Figuring their Godot has arrived, the actors are palpably excited until they 
realize after the performance that this audience member is not Guffman. 
Instead, the spectator is merely a passerby who enters the theater to get a 
balloon for his child. The man is a kind of Mr. Godin or Godet—as Pozzo 
twice mistakenly names Godot. The film turns the topos of Beckett’s play 
inside out, as it is the stage actors (rather than the characters) who are wait-
ing, and they wait alone, unaccompanied by the audience. Throughout the 
performance, the players’ eyes can only look askance at the empty seat. 
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The emptiness of the seat facing the stage goes unnoticed by the audience, 
which is unaware that this drama of waiting is the real drama beneath the 
one they see on stage.
 The performances of Godot in the settings of New Orleans and Sarajevo 
allocate not only the actors and the characters in the play but also politi-
cal powers that be. Their presence or absence from the city is exemplified 
by their presence or absence from the production itself. In Chan’s perfor-
mance, this is highlighted by the drama surrounding the invitation of Ray 
Nagin, the mayor of New Orleans, for whom a seat has been reserved. The 
densely packed audience in the Lower Ninth Ward calls attention to the 
emptiness of his seat, which remains starkly empty throughout the first 
half of the play. Here Chan taps into the Guffman scenario. Unlike Godot, 
Guffman suggests that intervention will not come from the stage but from 
the stands and the area around the stage. Nagin never does arrive, possibly 
because he was informed that he would not be allowed to make a speech.153 
Chan assigns Nagin a seat in the audience rather than a spotlight on the 
stage. Forced to be more a Guffman than a Godot, and unwilling to watch 
the play in solidarity with the audience, or to become a witness to the city, 
Nagin opts not to come. Chan sets up a seat for him as critical spectator 
whose response, like Guffman’s, may have intervened to change the state of 
the actors at the corner of Prieur and Reynes.
Performance Context as Inscribed within Godot
Every performance of Waiting for Godot abuts its environment in a highly 
idiosyncratic way. Godot asks where an event that does not take place is 
supposed to take place. The play is not content with displaying a missed 
encounter for us. Instead, it pulls the audience in by actively subtracting 
from the stage. As they try to recall where Godot said to meet them, Vladi-
mir and Estragon throw the time and place of the stage they occupy into an 
acid bath of doubt: Is this the tree? Is it today? Where were we yesterday? 
When Vladimir declares that Godot says to wait on Saturday (“I think”), 
Estragon replies, “But what Saturday? And is it Saturday?”154 Vladimir 
can’t remember whether he wrote it down somewhere and looks for it in 
his pants and coat, “bursting with miscellaneous rubbish.”155 For a brief 
instance the content of the play, and our encounter with it, rests upon the 
archival power of a hobo’s pocket. The play does not give us a no-man’s-
land so much as the wrong no-man’s-land. In this way Beckett scours away 
at our own appointment with the theater and dethrones the stage as a site 
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of expected dramatic encounter. Godot offers a theater as rendezvous in the 
wrong place, kept at one end, by one party only.
 Beckett’s play delegitimizes its own space in that whatever happens 
goes on in default of the anticipated meeting with the title character, Godot. 
Emerging out of the happenstance gathering of vagabonds and spectators, 
and within a wholly provisional space, Godot assimilates itself to the condi-
tions of theater under war or within a landscape of aftermath. After Vladi-
mir is unable to locate Godot’s card in his pocket, Beckett’s stage directions 
inform us that Vladimir is to be “looking wildly about him, as though the date 
was inscribed in the landscape.”156 Sarajevo and New Orleans become land-
scapes into which the date for this appointment has been written, but illeg-
ibly, by the disasters of war and flood.
 The rapport between stage and off stage is the very topic of Chan’s and 
Sontag’s plays. The dialogue envelops the surrounding space in its devas-
tation. Vladimir and Estragon periodically name the horizon by pointing 
toward the audience and the wings. Discussing with Estragon whether the 
place looks familiar, Vladimir says, “All the same. . . . that tree . . . (turning 
towards the auditorium) that bog. . . . ”157 Later when Vladimir asks, “Do you 
not recognize the place?” Estragon replies, “(suddenly furious) Recognize! 
What is there to recognize? All my lousy life I’ve crawled about in the mud! 
And you talk to me about scenery! (Looking wildly about him.) Look at this 
muckheap! I’ve never stirred from it!”158 Beckett gets rid of what Estragon 
calls scenery, settings designed for consumption, in favor of the muckheap. 
The theater projects a hypothetical disaster area. The characters’ turns 
toward the audience are closer to surveying land than traditional asides. 
Instead of providing the characters’ inner thoughts, these moments merge 
the spectators into the unrecognizable landscape. The characters absent us 
from their address, as if the “house,” our space as designated in theater 
parlance, had been abandoned.
Localization and Performance Context
How do performances treat the desolation of Beckett’s stage? How much 
concrete detail does a stage provide—or withhold—in rendering a work 
that aspires to be nondescript? Localization refers to the way directors use 
the stage to create a specific social or political context for a play. JoAnne 
Akalaitis’s Endgame at the American Repertory Theater, for example, turns 
the stage into a blasted-out subway tunnel, replete with life-sized subway 
cars, a charred corpse, and Philip Glass’s synthesized music. Akalaitis’s 
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stage establishes the aftermath setting of Beckett’s play with sensational 
clarity.159 By contrast, Beckett’s scenario suggests the apocalypse that has 
transpired has taken all evidence of the event with it.160 Likewise, the pro-
duction history of Waiting for Godot is punctuated by efforts to bring its 
potential meanings into definite focus. Ilan Ronen, for example, situates 
the play within the Israel-Palestine conflict by casting Arab actors as Vladi-
mir and Estragon (speaking Arabic) and Israeli actors as Pozzo and Lucky 
(speaking Hebrew).161 Other directors supply greater historical definition to 
the gray backdrop of Godot. In his 1991 production in Nanterre, Joel Jouan-
neau populates the stage with the ruins of an abandoned electrical plant, 
morphing Vladimir and Estragon into urban street trash. Pozzo and Lucky 
are cast as a “cynical bourgeois exploiter” and immigrant laborer, a precur-
sor to the sans-papiers.162 Bradby remarks that the director “did not want to 
show a generalized picture of humanity, but to give his characters clearly 
localized, specific qualities: ‘restituer l’image de la dérive d’êtres exclus 
dans la France des années 90.’”163
 Localization is a powerful way for a director to develop meaning, but 
this comes at a cost. Fully mobilizing the décor to contextualize Beck-
ett’s play in a particular place and within a particular debate, these direc-
tors turn Beckett’s exposed stage into exposé. The difference between these 
like-sounding terms becomes apparent in Jouanneau’s statement about 
his intention to “restore the image of drifters, of people excluded from the 
France of the 1990s.” Jouanneau seizes Vladimir and Estragon as an oppor-
tunity to both create and renew that image of excluded people and thereby 
recall them to political discussion. In exposing the vagabonds to the ele-
ments, to view, and to an unknown trajectory, Beckett’s play impoverishes 
their image. Photographically speaking, Beckett simultaneously underde-
velops and overexposes the image of the vagabonds.
 Savaging the idea that theater is a place for types (the armature of liter-
ature as sociology), Beckett withdraws his couple from culture’s repertoire 
of images (including that of “couple”). The play joins in with the termite 
activity that Vladimir and Estragon perform on the set itself, as their dia-
logue eats away at the sorry image of the tree before our eyes. Where 
Beckett wants to subtract fantasy, these directors want to add it. This fan-
tasy invested into Beckett’s work goes by the name of infidelity. Bradby 
makes infidelity a condition of making Godot politically resonant: “To 
give the play a specific political meaning, it is necessary to alter it, how-
ever subtly.”164 Akalaitis, Ronen, and Jouanneau must stray from their rela-
tion to Beckett’s work in order to have it articulate the desired network of 
references.
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 Sontag’s and Chan’s productions break with the notion of context as 
enforced by the localization of a play. They submit Godot to a condition of 
war and flood rather than a fabricated context. This condition exerts pres-
sure on the very process of the play’s production, affecting the actors and 
not just the characters, the play’s process and not just its effect. Represen-
tation, staging, and the whole parade of mimetic questions that a director 
considers are obviated by the setting given by the crisis itself and over-
whelm them. The ground for performance is a space unresolved and in the 
lurch, like the audience itself. The disaster environment, spectacularly con-
fined to the stage in Akalaitis’s production of Endgame, spills in all direc-
tions from the stages in New Orleans and Sarajevo. War and flood produce 
the lifeless décor for a Beckett play exceeding the space of the stage. In 
light of a landscape fraught with suitably desolate stages, the choice of per-
formance space in Sarajevo or New Orleans has a provisional and arbitrary 
quality. Where the proscenium arch conveniently contains Akalaitis’s after-
math, Sontag’s performance space cannot adequately withstand the siege 
of the context, cannot ensure that the theater will hold out if an adjacent 
building is struck with mortar fire. In this way the war provides conditions 
to the play, as for terms of surrender. Sontag notes how Godot involuntarily 
registers the situation outside the theater because the play’s protracted 
silences are no longer silences: “The only sounds were those coming from 
outside the theatre: a UN armored personnel carrier thundering down the 
street and the crack of sniper fire.”165 Something similar takes place in the 
Lower Ninth Ward, as the locale becomes part of the performance by neces-
sity rather than design. Anne Gisleson describes how the staged silence 
invites context: “The soundscape was just as integral: distant police sirens, 
tugboat and train horns, the sharply wailing birds, all pulsing quietly in 
the background, muted by the once-treacherous canal and the empty lots 
of former homes.”166 These performances absorb the environment beyond 
space of audience and stage, not like a sponge but like a concussion.
 Alterations to the actors’ roles and even to the text of the play itself 
function differently in crisis environments. Chan’s production at Gentilly, 
for example, transpires in front of an abandoned house, a placeholder for 
the many others in the area. During the performance, Vladimir spray-paints 
“Godot” onto this house. It is unclear whether by this gesture he is vandal-
izing a set, tagging, or contributing to the rest of the graffiti in post-Katrina 
New Orleans. (This ambiguity would not characterize the identical ges-
ture performed on a conventional stage.) The defacement channels broader 
questions: is he defacing a prop, and if so, has the whole of Gentilly become 
a collection of props? After the flood, many abandoned buildings become 
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archives of acerbic commentary: “AS NOT SEEN ON TV,” for example.167 
These painted barbs compete with the fluorescent orange markings of offi-
cial search parties, which designate inspected buildings or those with bod-
ies found inside. As writing on the wall, Godot is cosigned: within Beckett’s 
play, the name functions as a protest for the endpoint of the waiting pro-
cess, but also as shorthand for the futility and deathly absence at the heart 
of the waiting process.
 Chan also contextualizes the waiting of Beckett’s characters through 
popular culture. Vladimir and Estragon wile away their time through 
impersonations: a Louis Armstrong impression, Michael Jackson’s moon-
walk. These citations of African American performance markedly con-
trast with the countercelebrity status of the black homeless characters we 
are watching on stage. What is their poverty (and their performance) to 
the immediately recognizable figures they cite with their voices and bod-
ies? Does pop culture distract the African American community from their 
aftermath condition? What dream or escape from the conditions of Beck-
ett’s poverty is enlisted by imitating a performer rather than performing 
the long wait?
Parable and Asymptote
Critical response frequently regards Sontag’s and Chan’s productions as 
variations on the theme of localization, as if the disaster areas of Sarajevo 
and New Orleans were no different from the one Akalaitis constructs on 
the stage of the American Repertory Theater. Though offering her guarded 
approval, Oppenheim, for example, faults Sontag for diminishing Beck-
ett’s vision: “While the primitive, brutal even, dimensions and the alien-
ation, illusion, hope and despair that characterize the work are without a 
doubt relevant to the Bosnians’ situation, the parabolic vision of the play is 
clearly diminished both by its localization within a highly charged political 
arena and the substitution of a collectivity for a single couple.”168 On the 
one hand, Oppenheim concedes how the Sarajevans respond to the “primi-
tive” quality of Beckett’s work. This brute uptake, however, contaminates 
the dimension of Beckett’s work that holds itself in reserve and outside 
application to the world: its status as parable. Oppenheim constructs an 
opposition between the supposed immediacy of Beckett as depiction ver-
sus a more reflective and meditative mode of signification.169
 Yet in what ways does Godot exhibit a “parabolic vision”? Parable gives 
us the fruit of learning without its painful acquisition process. Godot offers 
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us no such leverage, no outcome of the learning experience. On Beckett’s 
stage, bodies monstrate rather than demonstrate principles for the specta-
tor. A character cannot be a mouthpiece when his mouth is crammed with 
his last carrot. These qualities make it difficult for us to take the first step 
in receiving Godot as parable: we do not disembody Vladimir and Estragon. 
Their stage presence evinces the dolor and sluggishness one imagines 
Aesop’s animals might have when not talking or when not in the limelight 
of parable.
 Oppenheim clearly mistakes the loss of qualities in the vagabonds for 
the advent of some general condition or concept. The parable remains a 
genre indebted to the humanist tradition, and existentialism has seized the 
nakedness of Beckett’s characters as an opportunity to discuss “human-
ity” on his stage. Adorno succinctly warns against this move in his notes 
to Beckett’s Endgame: “Subtraction, not abstraction.”170 That is, Beckett does 
not wear down action, ego, stage, and tree in order to filter out everything 
unnecessary, leaving only a concept in its wake.171 Subtraction cannot be 
equated with a refinement into concepts. Beckett’s technique does not fol-
low the path of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction or epoché, bracketing 
whatever does not contribute to a study of the essential.172 The last words 
of Endgame, “You, old stancher, you remain,” indicate the play’s survivor to 
be the half-bloodied cloth with which Hamm cloaks his face. Beckett’s work 
seems to retain only inessential and downtrodden elements, obtuse forms 
that cannot be subsumed under rational concepts. The inexplicable residues 
derail the parabolic function and should not be confused with exemplary 
monuments.
 To recover the truth of Oppenheim’s critique of Sontag, we need to 
turn her image of Beckett’s “parabolic vision” by ninety degrees, that is, 
her parabola must be made into an asymptote. Instead of parabolic vision, 
Beckett’s work enacts a parabolic function. Etymologically, “asymptotic” 
derives from the term meaning “not to meet” (a mathematical synopsis for 
Beckett’s play) and designates a curve that approaches zero without ever 
attaining zero.173 Oppenheim notes that the parabolic vision is not lost but 
merely “diminished” when contextualized in Sarajevo. This reduction of 
meaning, of potential, complies with the asymptotic process in and around 
Beckett’s play. The scantiness of means, the doing with less, the barely 
enough: these describe what Vladimir and Estragon are enduring as well as 
the actors who are rehearsing to play them.
 Oppenheim claims that theater has no chance in “the highly charged 
political arena.” She seems to say theater (high culture, refinement) does 
not belong in the arena of either politics or vulgar sport. Beckett does not 
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agree with this, as can be seen by the way he brings theater asymptoti-
cally to near zero, diminishing our expectations and subtracting from the-
ater its pretensions, its ornamentation, its theatricality. In revising theater, 
Beckett’s work emerges as a theatrical experiment that echoes the dismal 
political experiment going on in Sarajevo and New Orleans. This politi-
cal experiment entails the revision of the institution of the arena: in New 
Orleans, the Superdome ceases to be the space where the Saints play and 
becomes a massive and enclosed holding center for citizens displaced by 
the storm. In Croatia, the stadium in Slavonski Brod functions as a holding 
area for civilian refugees and is a frequent target for Serb artillery. Beckett’s 
revisionary theater emerges in settings where arenas are refunctioned as 
holding pens.
Absurdity
Contrary to the tradition within literary criticism, Paul Chan suggests that 
Godot is not an example of the theater of the absurd, but rather a theater 
that responds to the absurdity of the world. The irrationality of the levee 
failure outbids the nonsensical banter between Vladimir and Estragon:
It didn’t look like a play. . . . It looked more to me like the emphatic expres-
sion of a community trying to come to terms with the irreconcilability of 
it all. What happened, and what is still happening, makes no sense. This 
nonsense has its own reason. And this reason must not be the only one 
worth using to make sense of what is happening to us, around us, against 
us. Waiting for Godot in New Orleans wanted to create another reason, to 
make another kind of sense, because art, if it is in fact art, is the reason that 
makes reason ridiculous.174
Godot offers another reason, the reasoning of art. The sense of art is not 
subsumable under the instrumental reason that is operative everywhere 
in society, from its machines, to its bureaucracy, to its levees, to its man-
agement and facilitation of disaster.175 Art’s poverty and impotence, the 
fact that it cannot enter the world and remains useless to it, is its utility. In 
remaining only in terrible symmetry with the world rather than dissolving 
into it, Beckett’s play becomes a gym—one in which non-sense is exerted, 
exercised, and sweated, where one undertakes preparation for the “irrec-
oncilability of it all,” which is the irreconcilability between sense and the 
world, between people, between people and their situation, between need 
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and the measures taken to address it, between individuals and their own 
waiting.
 The image made by Godot in Sarajevo and New Orleans differs starkly 
from images of the respective disasters disseminated through television 
and other media. Images from Sontag’s and Chan’s productions demand a 
new understanding of the situation on the ground in devastated cities and a 
new understanding of Beckett’s play. Chan and Sontag are focused primar-
ily on this first goal. They turn toward the seemingly anachronistic medium 
of the stage in order to offer an echo chamber for it rather than a repro-
duction of it. In the media-saturated landscape of Sarajevo, Sontag remarks, 
“Suffering is visibly present, and can be seen in close-up; and no doubt 
many people feel sympathy for the victims. What cannot be recorded is an 
absence—the absence of any political will to end the suffering.”176 Televi-
sion saturates our vision with close-ups of the disaster, turning the absence 
of intervention into an image of interest.
 Photographic documentary of the disaster equally falls under Son-
tag’s indictment. Her observation supports Walter Benjamin’s assertion 
that photography “makes poverty into an object of consumption.”177 Two 
well-known photographic studies of Katrina’s aftermath, Robert Polidori’s 
After the Flood and Chris Jordan’s In Katrina’s Wake, demonstrate Sontag’s 
and Benjamin’s points. The fascination of these images lies in the mixture 
of nausea and curiosity they inspire in their registration of landscapes dis-
mayingly emptied of all people. The work of both photographers relishes 
the sheer mass (a better word might be wealth) of possessions disengorged 
from people’s homes by the floodwaters. Polidori establishes the photo-
graphic idiom of this disaster in three phases: photos of homes’ exteriors 
(watermarks near the roof; clear signs of abandonment); the mucked inte-
riors of homes (furniture rearranged by the strong waters, lines indicating 
where the floodwaters rose up to a father’s chin in the family portrait); and 
the survey of possessions strewn across the desolated landscape of New 
Orleans. Both Polidori and Jordan position us within the aftermath of the 
flood. Like Beckett, they even ask us to take stock of this disaster. Yet in 
these photographs this stocktaking is made literal while it becomes the 
mourning of lost property. Our eyes comb through the swath of posses-
sions dispossessed of owners. Sadly, the name brand emerges here as a life 
raft for our perception. The “quirky” image of a refrigerator lodged up in 
a tree, a Hammond organ overturned in the water, the Barbie doll stuck in 
the mud, the purse and shoes forcibly wedged within the fence. The pho-
tographs hook our eye with these muddied and sullen commodities. The 
emotional effect of the photographs depends so forcibly on such merchan-
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dise that we slowly realize we are auditing the images (as if we were rep-
resentatives for an insurance company) much more than we are replying to 
the disaster they signify. In contrast to this decisive instant of recognition in 
the photograph, Beckett’s theater suggests temporality (the long wait with-
out promise of its end) and protracted misrecognition to be crucial parts of 
the disaster experience.
 But Sontag’s and Chan’s productions not only raise our awareness 
about the war or the flood; they also help us understand the play itself. 
Godot in Sarajevo does not try to record the absence of an intervention by 
Clinton; Godot in New Orleans does not merely record the failures of FEMA 
or an inability to “make it right.” Instead, the play registers the effects of 
this absence. The play is already a tightly wound articulation of this con-
dition. But Sontag’s and Chan’s performances enact a subtraction pro-
cess directed at the remnants allotted to the stage. From the destruction of 
Sarajevo that transpires in default of intervention, the media make images 
sufficient unto themselves. By means of vagabonds speaking in rage and 
irritability about the “enough,” Beckett produces images insufficient unto 
themselves, which echo (rather than merely indict) the absence of Godot.
 Beckett’s vagabonds exist on the periphery of culture, yet suffer its 
blows and imperatives most directly. To audiences enduring the war or the 
aftermath of the flood, the performance of Godot illuminates the condition 
of abandonment overlooked by public officials and the news media: George 
Bush’s “I’LL FIX IT” headlining the front page of the New York Post on Sep-
tember 3, 2005, or the moral imperative that serves as the title for Brad 
Pitt’s neighborhood rehabilitation project, Make It Right. Godot dramatizes 
the “nothing to be done,” the inertia of life cut off from the transformative 
rendezvous. The play remains responsive to the unfixable, incurable, irre-
solvable nature of catastrophe. The dislocated inhabitants of Sarajevo and 
New Orleans encounter this incapacity as the daily condition of their lives. 
To them, Waiting for Godot comes like a State of the Union address.
The first two chapters explored Beckett’s aesthetic of poverty as public 
performance and how Waiting for Godot becomes an echo chamber for the 
powerlessness, need, and inconsolable waiting beyond the stage. This chap-
ter turns inward to the private crisis of Beckett’s characters. Beckett’s figure 
of private crisis is the vagabond who speaks in interior monologue whose 
interiority crumbles in the face of unsheltered experience.
 Early in Waiting for Godot, Estragon begins to relay a dream to Vladimir, 
and Vladimir violently interrupts:
VLADAMIR. DON’T TELL ME!
ESTRAGON. Who am I to tell my private nightmares to if I can’t tell them 
to you?
VLADIMIR. Let them remain private. You know I can’t bear that.1
Vladimir does not permit Estragon to speak his subjective nightmare, 
the monologic and private crisis that constitutes the consciousness of the 
vagabond. Vladimir enforces strict decorum over what can or cannot be 
divulged in the course of a long wait. Estragon’s dream cannot be shared 
and thereby brought into consciousness without paining others and does 
not belong on stage, though as we will see shortly, Lucky does stage vaga-
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bond thought before he is similarly silenced by Vladimir and the others. 
Beckett’s prose lifts this interdiction on the utterance of the vagabond’s pri-
vate nightmare. What goes unseen (like Estragon’s sleeping in a ditch, his 
nightly beatings) and unsaid in Godot become the topic of Beckett’s prose. 
Beckett’s trilogy gives utterance to the vagabond dream, the work of the 
unsheltered dreamer who sleeps in full view. In Godot, instead of wan-
dering off the stage to be besieged by something other than dialogue, the 
silenced Estragon merely threatens to leave:
ESTRAGON. (coldly) There are times when I wonder if it wouldn’t be better 
for us to part.
VLADIMIR. You wouldn’t go far.2
Estragon cannot leave any more than he can speak his dream. These two 
prohibitions ultimately give Waiting for Godot its form. The dialogue rests 
on the ban of monologic consciousness and on the restriction on the vag-
abonds’ erratic movement. The play sublimates derelict wandering into 
yoga, Vladimir and Estragon’s exercise routine of levitations, elongations, 
and relaxations.3 Godot then sacrifices these elements of vagabond experi-
ence so as to give us the couple on stage, dialogue, waiting: in short, Beck-
ett’s theater.
Vagabond Thought
Beckett’s work is about characters decomposing and the consciousness of 
their decomposition. I call the decomposition of consciousness la pensée 
vagabonde, or vagabond thought. La pensée vagabonde means both “vaga-
bond thought” and “thought wanders.” It suggests both a kind of thought 
and the erratic movement by which it cuts a path for thinking. The two 
meanings are simultaneous and entwined: “But how can you think and 
speak at the same time, without a special gift, your thoughts wander [la 
pensée vagabonde], your words too, far apart, no that’s an exaggeration, 
apart, between them would be the place to be, where you suffer, rejoice, at 
being bereft of speech, bereft of thought, and feel nothing, hear nothing, 
know nothing, say nothing, are nothing, that would be a blessed place to 
be, where you are.”4 Underlying the idea of vagabond thought in Beckett’s 
characters is the separation of thinking from writing. These activities never 
occupy the same place and work on separate tracks. They are inherently 
apart: the one did not wander from the other. Hope for uniting the two is as 
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improbable as being deprived of either one or occupying what the narrator 
calls that “bereft” space lacking both thought and speech. Beckett’s impov-
erished characters fall short of saying what they think as well as this zero 
point of thinking and saying nothing.
 Beckett’s work conceives vagabond consciousness as nonuseful and 
beyond the procedures of rational thought. It is an expression of the vaga-
bond’s condition: disturbed by the law, the sound of something in the air, 
even his own speaking. This is Beckett’s turn from Joyce’s stream of con-
sciousness and the freedom of association in philosophical speculation. 
Lucky’s speech in act 1 of Waiting for Godot is the most noteworthy instance 
of vagabond thinking in Beckett’s work. Commanded by Pozzo to “Think, 
pig!” Lucky responds by thinking aloud. This thinking begins in exigency 
rather than choice. The thinking is performed as a spectacle. Lucky’s mono-
logue is a ramshackle collection of official-sounding decrees, public ora-
tory. Through Lucky filter the rhetorical formulae from the discourses 
of medicine, law, science, theology. It is closer to a heterologue (consist-
ing of many voices) than a monologue. From these discourses Lucky pre-
serves only the oratorical debris. He puts the “turns” of these rhetorics into 
series, arrays, contradictory enumerations: “in short in fine” and “for rea-
sons unknown in spite of the tennis the facts are there but time will tell I 
resume alas alas” “that as a result of the labors unfinished of Testew and 
Cunard it is established as hereinafter but not so fast for reasons unknown 
that as a result of the public works of Puncher and Wattmann it is estab-
lished beyond all doubt.”5 We get endlessly prefatory proclamations with-
out anything being proclaimed. The gesture of meaning thereby turns into 
nonproductive gesticulation. This is Lucky’s version of vagabond thought, 
one that lives up to its status as a performance and as an action. True to 
Vladimir’s verdict on Estragon’s private nightmare, the characters within 
earshot of Lucky’s speech all find it intolerable: the stage directions specify 
that Pozzo “suffers,” Vladimir and Estragon being to “protest,” and it ends 
with all three “throwing themselves on Lucky who struggles and shouts 
his text.”6 The mechanisms of what passes for thinking become visible (it 
is Lucky’s “display” of knowledge). Their meaning and rational purpose 
sapped, these gestures of thought recover their quality of movement: this 
is the dimension of thought as performance and not just display. The key 
phrase in Lucky’s speech is “I resume,” repeated four times in the mono-
logue and the only instances in which Lucky says “I.” “I resume” is the 
cogito of the vagabond (a kind of cogito ergo resume). This is not synonymous 
with saying “I repeat,” for vagabond thinking is more about struggle than 
doing the same (reproducing thought). Nor is it “I resume with” because 
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the resumption goes on without any accumulation to thought and almost 
against speech. The “I” of vagabond thought lurks between discontinuous 
and fragmentary statements and does little more than continually usher in 
more of them. He is the siphon, rather than the agent, of speech.
 The homeless characters of Beckett’s prose do not seek to share their 
thoughts any more than does Lucky. Instead, their thought seems forcibly 
and violently extroverted. Vagabond consciousness is always forced out 
in public because no private or domestic space is available for thinking. 
Consciousness itself is extruded and unsheltered; reality intrudes upon it 
at every step. It resembles a hobo’s sock, one that is reused by turning it 
inside out.
 Vagabond thought is extravagantly kinetic, characterized by process 
rather than knowledge. Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit refer to the “learned 
derelict” and ascribe to this consciousness a familiarity with culture 
unmoored from meaning. For Bersani and Dutoit this is freeing: “There is 
no agonized reevaluation of a tradition,” they write.7 They oppose Beckett 
to the surrealists. Whereas the surrealists “preserved terms” to which their 
revolutionary project relates, Beckett by contrast preserves nothing. His 
work “proposes something far more radical: a work cut off from all cultural 
inheritance.”8 Yet there is little of utopian or redemptive potential in this 
freedom. What matters is that the consciousness Beckett cares about is root-
less, “cut off” but not “free from” inheritance. Bersani describes Beckett’s 
approach to culture as a rummaging: “Much like the learned derelicts of his 
fiction, he evokes art and philosophy of the past as if he were rummaging 
through a junkyard, giving an amused kick now and then at some useless 
and irrelevant relic of a dead imagination.”9
 Bersani and Dutoit use the figure of the vagabond to conceptualize 
more broadly Beckett’s relation to literary history and to the relic of lan-
guage. What gesture does their “learned derelict,” and subsequently Beck-
ett’s work, undertake? “Rummaging” suggests that the vagabond relates to 
junk as if he were shopping for antiques. The “kick” of the derelict like-
wise evokes the kick a prospective buyer might give a tire on a used car 
to test its worth. These are owners’ gestures. Bersani and Dutoit helpfully 
focus on how the vagabond mediates the understanding of what Beckett’s 
work does, how it thinks about the past, and its language process. Yet it 
is also important to understand the nonproprietary nature of vagabond 
thinking. The homology drawn by Bersani and Dutoit suggests that works 
of culture have fallen into ruin and that it is the hobo who pores over this 
inheritance. They saddle the derelict with the critic’s ambition. In doing so 
they miss the nonevaluative nature of the hobo’s gesture and deep indif-
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ference to thought, either as possession, assessment, or understanding of 
the world. Vagabond thought is without a proper place and renounces pos-
session of what it says. This is the reason we pause before agreeing with 
Bersani and Dutoit’s description of Beckett’s characters as “learned dere-
licts.” Vagabond thought does not stockpile itself or abide in the thinker 
in the past tense, as if it were a valuable hoard available for display. Wal-
ter Benjamin suggests that one reason we mistrust beggars is because we 
“forget that their persistence in front of our noses is as justified as a schol-
ar’s before a difficult text. No shadow of hesitation, no slightest wish or 
deliberation in our faces escapes their notice.”10 The vagabond mirrors our 
reading process. His obstinacy is reminiscent of learning. But the beggar 
is distinguishable from the scholar because he is motivated by desperation 
and existential need rather than curiosity, dedication, or knowledge.
 What kind of thinking does not even bother to refuse reason, as if occur-
ring in a completely different order? This chapter explores this question 
by discussing la pensée vagabonde in terms of its double emergence, both 
thought itself and a path for thinking. In the spirit of la pensée vagabonde, 
I weave through seven distinct operations of vagabond thought that sup-
plant reasoning as a method for thinking for Beckett’s characters: (1) think-
ing by hearing (by murmur), (2) radiographic understanding, (3) thinking 
by force (by axiom), (4) thinking by naming or designation of things (as a 
dictionary or thesaurus), (5) thinking by obligation (the pensum), (6) think-
ing as extroversion (as terror), and (7) mythic tense: thinking in the perma-
nent present.
Thinking by Hearing: The Murmur
We were confronting, as it were, a new and infinitely delicate point in 
the texture of reality, from which something far greater than ourselves 
seemed to be appealing to us as if seeking help. at the same time 
and all through the intervening years i believed that that independent 
sound, taken from us and preserved outside us, would be unforgettable.
  —rainer maria rilke, “Primal Sound”11
Beckett’s vagabonds substitute ratio with listening. Molloy indicates that 
he hears a murmur with his head. This is different both from a sound that 
is heard either with the ear or in the head. The murmur Molloy hears is not 
perceived through usual means, nor is it simply imagined. As an uncon-
ventional organ of listening, the exact working of the head is poorly under-
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stood. It does not offer simple ways to shut itself off or to stop sound. 
Unlike the ear, the head cannot be stuffed with cotton or wax. Even the 
location of this thought is unclear: as a murmur, this thought seems to sur-
round Molloy rather than emanate from him. Molloy can neither interrupt 
this murmur nor put space between it and himself. The murmur is a kind of 
thinking that cannot be stopped or owned by the self. Can it even be heard? 
Molloy observes, “It’s not a sound like the other sounds, that you listen to, 
when you choose and can sometimes silence, by going away or stopping 
your ears, no, but it is a sound which begins to rustle in your head, without 
your knowing how, or why. It’s with your head you hear it, not your ears, 
you can’t stop it, but it stops itself, when it chooses. It makes no difference 
therefore whether I listen to it or not, I shall hear it always, no thunder can 
deliver me, until it stops.”12 The murmur that penetrates everything exists 
in a state of indeterminate proximity to the listener, and Molloy speaks as 
if it had the nearness of a radio implant. Molloy says that there is no place, 
either in silence or in deafening thunder, which is outside its sonic range. 
He therefore cannot gain perspective on, or possibly even hear, a sound 
that always persists and cannot be interrupted. A murmur does not present 
an item for listening, and is unlike the sound of a bell or a gong whose clar-
ity pierces the moment.13
 Beckett measures a life not by the sound of thought but in terms of the 
thought to which that life is a mere backdrop. Molloy charts aging as if it 
were not the development of personality by experience, reason, or under-
standing but as a transition of sound: beginning as rumor, evolving into 
murmur and rising to a scream. Commenting on an old man he sees in the 
street, Molloy observes, “He looks old and it is a sorry sight to see him soli-
tary after so many years, so many days and nights unthinkingly given to 
that rumor rising at birth and even earlier, What shall I do? What shall I 
do? now low, a murmur, now precise as the headwaiter’s And to follow? 
and often rising to a scream. And in the end, or almost, to be abroad alone, 
by unknown ways, in the gathering night, with a stick.”14 Rumor acts pre-
maturely, “rising at birth and even earlier,” and this prematurity suggests 
a moment of possibility, even if this possibility extends no further than 
boy or girl? Molloy suggests that life itself is precipitated by this rumor, 
and we are never equal to this moment of possibility (rumors being well-
known instances of stories that are impossible to both author and stop). 
He describes, moreover, the time in which the old man was unthinkingly 
given to this sonic boom after which his life has followed. Molloy formu-
lates aging as a fall from the high velocity of rumor to a waiter’s sotto voce 
murmur. In the process, the question about our possibility (“what should I 
118 •  ChaPTer 3
do?”) transforms into a choice made within the closed system of a restau-
rant menu, the future arriving as the next dish.
 The precise formulation in which Molloy describes his abandonment to 
nonrational thought makes his experience of life similar to an animal’s. The 
description of the old man as “unthinkingly given to that rumor” suggests 
we are intimately tied to noise through our ignorance. This transaction 
takes place in the passive voice: we are given to it, displaced and uprooted 
by it. Vagabond thought follows our expropriation by sound. The murmur 
enjoins Molloy to keep leave wherever he happens to be, to keep moving. 
In Malone Dies, the title character  refers to the murmur as a buzzing: “The 
noises of the world, so various in themselves and which I used to be so 
clever at distinguishing from one another, had been dinning at me for so 
long, always the same old noises, as gradually to have merged in a single 
noise, so that all I heard was one vast continuous buzzing. The volume of 
sound perceived remained no doubt the same, I had simply lost the faculty 
of decomposing it.”15 The buzzing Malone hears challenges his “faculty for 
decomposition,” both impossible to hear and impossible to avoid. Like an 
enormous doorbell it beckons and specifically addresses the listener.16
 Malone notes that he once found noise to be a source of information 
and meaning: “worlds” were knowable to him through the sounds that rep-
resented them. Noting the loss of this enlightened faculty, Malone asks us 
to imagine noise without its referential and distinguishing marks. In this 
sense the sound that Malone hears loses the world. Worldless, this sound 
becomes what Beckett calls “fundamental.” The more Molloy gives himself 
over to thinking by hearing buzzing and tries to exercise a discerning ear 
over the noise of his life, the more arthropodic his life becomes. Hearing a 
swarm of bees is the first step toward becoming a bee. The shift of his lan-
guage is unannounced and indicates a sense of measure being lost: “I could 
not help thinking that the notion of a wandering herd was better adapted 
to him than to me. But I have never thought anything but wind, the same 
that was never measured to me.”17 A disturbing and decentered restlessness 
characterizes this brief passage as much as it is its subject. “To think wind” 
is to think without measure, in such a way that retains the empty sound of 
the wind and scatters references and distinctions.18 In another context “to 
think wind” might designate a kind of transcendental exercise, and expan-
sion of self, but here it denotes a process in which thinking is given over 
to notions one cannot help thinking. “Helpless thinking” is thinking like 
an insect or animal. It means several things—involuntary thinking that is 
determined from an outside, thinking that cannot be assisted by us, think-
ing that is lost to our charitable efforts at interpretation, thinking that 
La PensÉe Vagabonde  •  119
does not help us picture the thinker: “the same that was never measured 
to me.”19 In some way thinking like an insect qualifies Molloy for one of 
Augustine’s injunctions for sainthood: to engage unthinking, only at the 
level of base existence, heroically, epically. Molloy is a modern-day Odys-
seus equipped with an antenna, unable to draw nearer to or farther away 
from his Sirens. When Malone says that the notion of the wandering herd 
was “better adapted to [Jackson] than to me,” he speaks of the process of 
metaphor blending with and becoming indistinct from an identity in the 
same way that one speaks of an insect trying to merge with its environment 
through adaptation. Here a metaphor does not inscribe an identity so much 
as it undergoes an evolutionary mimicry and becomes part of a larger cam-
ouflage. Beckett’s character conceptualizes as an insect rather than as an 
entomologist.
 By way of contrast one could consider the manner in which Franz Kafka 
formulates the drama of Gregor Samsa becoming a beetle in the heart of the 
family household, saddled with his old cares, habits, and anxieties. When 
Samsa is transformed into an insect, he had already lived like one and 
thought like one—his metamorphosis, though bizarre, is coherent, organic, 
and the natural consequence of metaphor. Being transformed causes Samsa 
no suffering. It is his family that suffers. Beckett’s characters have no fam-
ily to suffer any transformation: not only is there no one to knock on their 
door about their well-being, there is no room, no door. Beckett’s characters 
do not definitively cross the limits of the human form. Instead of becoming 
analogical, experience swarms in Beckett’s prose and is marked by the loss 
of qualities and the surge of forgotten residues of past experience. Malone 
compares his acquaintance not to a cow but to a “wandering herd,” a mul-
tiple grouping. It is a comparison that was originally applied to him: acting 
like a weather vane for metaphor, he renounces the comparison, turns it 
backward, and says it suits its maker better. The path a herd suddenly cuts 
across space, the sound of its hooves, the dust made, the forgetting of the 
immediate past: these bring us closer to understanding Molloy’s manner of 
speaking than any linguistic analysis.
 The murmur that solicits the tramps on stage in Waiting for Godot has a 
different thought function than it does for Molloy. The dialogical structure 
of the stage neutralizes the murmur’s engulfing confinement of the solitary 
Molloy. What happens when a murmur is perceived by two people instead 
of the one? What casts Molloy into the confusion of thought seems indis-
putably present on stage for Vladimir and Estragon and without the imper-
ative function it has for Molloy. The murmur is tellingly drowned out by 
the banter of Vladimir and Estragon trying to describe it:
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   Silence.
VLADIMIR. They all speak at once.
ESTRAGON. Each one to itself.
   Silence.




The back and forth between Vladimir and Estragon puts their dialogue in 
close approximation to the murmur: though they do not both “speak at 
once,” they often seem to “speak only to themselves.”
 The dialogue between the vagabonds usurps the function of the mur-
mur in Molloy. The critical success of Waiting for Godot depends in part on 
its successful sublimation of the murmur into voice. In his monologue in 
act 2, Vladimir speaks of “those cries for help still ringing in our ears.”21 
Whereas Molloy claims to have heard voices with his head, Vladimir 
reclaims the ear as a repository where sound goes to vibrate. This ringing 
takes on the quality of an ethical alarm rather than the force that decom-
poses the listener. Where sound compels Molloy into metamorphosis, the 
cry in Waiting for Godot becomes the figuration of the human: “At this 
moment in time, all mankind is us, whether we like it or not.”22 The animal 
enters only as an exemplary indifference to sound (the tiger that slinks back 
into its thicket).
 The helplessness of thought and its usurpation by the murmur appears 
in Waiting for Godot only comically, not horrifically. Molloy’s encounter with 
sound as something that thinks through him returns faintly in the dialogue 
between Vladimir and Estragon. Vladimir states, “What is terrible is to 
have thought.” Estragon replies, “Did that ever happen to us?”23 Vagabond 
thinking is something undergone, not something that we do but some-
thing that happens to us (and, as Estragon suggests, without leaving any 
traces). In Beckett’s landscape, the cogito cannot be an active verb. Thought 
is a deponent of something that happens, something that might not even 
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be happening. Estragon’s question about whether thought ever occurred to 
them is matched only by the certainty that it has ceased:
VLADIMIR. We’re in no danger of ever thinking any more.
ESTRAGON. Then what are we complaining about?24
Radiographical Understanding
he describes the radiographical quality of his observation. The copi-
able he does not see.
  —Samuel beckett, Proust 25
Vagabond thought operates on Beckett’s characters radiographically. Mol-
loy is bombarded and surrounded with noise in a manner similar to a 
radio surrounded by waves. Scraps of sound hit Molloy from indetermi-
nate locations, and the radio replaces the ratio. Molloy describes sound in 
technical terms: “Sounds unencumbered with precise meaning were regis-
tered perhaps better by me than by most. What was it then? A defect of the 
understanding perhaps, which only began to vibrate on repeated solicita-
tion, or which did vibrate, if you like, but at a lower frequency, or a higher, 
than that of ratiocination, if such a thing is conceivable, and such a thing 
is conceivable, since I conceive it.”26 Molloy speaks of a channel that is 
“lower . . . or higher” than ratiocination, then credits himself with conceiv-
ing the idea. This thinking proceeds not by means of ratiocination but by 
registration, through waves, frequencies, repetitions, solicitations, and poor 
reception. Despite a suspected and self-admitted defect in understand-
ing, Molloy is nothing like the “unreliable” narrator in the style of Emily 
Brontë or Thackeray—characters who offer a partial or biased perspective 
on the events they narrate. Molloy is rather a relayable narrator, involved in 
a wholly original quest to investigate what can be transmitted, an unbear-
able situation of listening without comprehension.
 Noises for Molloy are not subject to the doubt of the speaker: they are 
not ambiguous. To the contrary, Molloy says he hears noises with distinct 
clarity. The clarity is alarming because it is apart from meaning. He con-
tinues: “Yes, the words I heard, and heard distinctly, having quite a sen-
sitive ear, were heard for a first time, a second time, and even a third as 
pure sounds, free of all meaning, and this is probably one of the reasons 
why conversation was unspeakably painful to me. And the words I uttered 
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myself, and which must nearly always have gone with an effort of the 
intelligence, were often to me as the buzzing of an insect, And this is per-
haps one of the reasons I was so untalkative.”27 Here Molloy returns to dis-
cussing his murmur as insectlike. When Molloy claims his ear is “sensitive” 
he is referring to the precision with which it registers sound and not to an 
ability to hear nuance or overtone. He is deaf to sense. Unlike those who, 
hard of hearing, eventually “get” the message upon hearing it repeated a 
second or third time, he claims that language abandons its sense for him—
as it does for words that children repeat—with more frequent repetition. 
Molloy desists from all habits of listening that make for easy understand-
ing and that are as surely ingrained as habits of speech. Heard as “pure 
sound” rather than as traces within a differential system, language does 
not leave any deposits behind after its disappearance.
 Molloy speaks of his experience as if he were a radio, a receptive sys-
tem destitute of interpretive and calculative ability. He supplies an appa-
ratus rather than a metaphor: instead of providing an intelligible figure in 
which to encapsulate the nonsense of his acoustic world, the description 
leads through the wires and knobs of an instrument of “nonunderstand-
ing.” It leads not into an image but into the box of Molloy’s head, right 
to the working component of his radiophonic ear: a “defect of the under-
standing.” Nonsensical hearing is merely another “station” on the dial with 
rational understanding and works at a slightly different radio frequency. 
Molloy thereby places these not in opposition but in continuity with one 
another. Through this schema Molloy tries to explain how understanding 
occurs only when its defects are solicited. Understanding remains an elu-
sive experience. “It is true that in the end, by dint of patience, we made 
ourselves understood, but understood with regard to what, I ask you, and 
to what purpose.”28 Molloy’s question here is drawn from the language of 
ratiocination, inquiring into the means (understood with regard to what?) 
and ends (and to what purpose?) of understanding. We are hardpressed to 
offer an answer. The point, however, may be to rearticulate the question. 
He implores the reader to think temporarily with terms that the vagabond’s 
discourse has actively impoverished.
 Vagabond thinking cobbles together an alternative image of the under-
standing process, based on the sound, registration, and the radiophonic 
ear, rather than on reason and the extraction of sense. Molloy asks us to 
consider about the possibility of an understanding between two peo-
ple without remainder or higher purpose, and that does not secure any-
thing. Molloy asserts that an understanding transpired but without proof: 
it remains fictitious. In his quick aside to the reader, he may be asking 
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whether such a thing is conceivable. Our goal is to orient ourselves in such 
a way toward vagabond thinking, expressed here as a reaction without 
desire for enlightenment, which one is allowed to say, with Molloy, yes, it is 
conceivable, because we conceive it.
 Molloy exposes the ear as the last outpost of the Enlightenment and 
submits the rational selectivity of the ear to an acoustic catastrophe: his 
own words are not spared. Thinking by radiophonic ear rather than by 
ratio raises questions, in other words, about the very basis of a conscious-
ness steered by Enlightenment logic, questions that we perhaps do not hear 
because we reason. Painstakingly Molloy asks us to interrogate what we 
hear in the word “understanding,” graspable not by quantifying variable 
terms as by a calculator but by the reception of wave signals as by an audio 
receiver. “And to the noises of nature too, and the works of men, I reacted 
I think in my own way and without desire of enlightenment.”29 Molloy’s 
ear, exposed to the vacuous quality of language, asks what understanding 
can be communicated about a process that leaves nothing behind, where 
language does not communicate meaning. Molloy says it best: he does 
not react with the desire for something and does not exchange the sound 
of language for something to which he can then lay claim. Molloy listens 
without outcome, and in the process gives expression to the long-standing 
philosophical incompatibility of analytical enlightened thought and the 
murmur.30
Thought by Force: The Axiom
The murmur that courses through Beckett’s work is part of a general 
radioscopy of consciousness in perpetual withdrawal. Another mode 
of this withdrawal I call the “axiom.” By definition an axiom is a gener-
ally accepted or self-evident truth, such as “The whole is greater than the 
parts.” It appears in mathematical or logical arguments as a premise that 
does not require demonstration. Beckett is not interested in the truth of axi-
oms or in collecting them. He is interested in the “force” of axioms.
 In the instances when vagabond thought operates axiomatically, logic 
is not displaced by noise or sound. It is instead embedded within thought. 
A solicitation creates a moment of interruption and sudden depropriation, 
but again the initiative for understanding is missing. The axiom fills the 
void. Though a drifting character, Molloy’s thoughts are not freely adrift 
in stream-of-consciousness style. Instead his thought process is engaged at 
all times with multiple categories of necessity, principle, and conceptual 
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rule. A strange evisceration of his thought is palpable even in this simple 
passage in which Molloy is walking down an alleyway at night: “Espy-
ing a narrow alley between two high buildings I looked about me, then 
slipped into it. Little windows overlooked it, on either side, on every floor, 
facing one another. Lavatory lights I suppose. There are things from time to 
time, in spite of everything, that impose themselves on the understanding 
with the force of axioms, for unknown reasons.”31 Molloy speaks here of 
his inexplicable subjection to the axiomatic. For the straggler Molloy, even 
this negligible experience of identifying the lights in the window as “lava-
tory lights” involves susceptibility, and unusual attentiveness, to the ways 
a conclusion is imposed. Here “lavatory lights” is a conclusion reached 
involuntarily, as if it were someone else’s. This imposition of a form, the 
symmetrical arrangement of lit windows, on the understanding does not 
contradict Molloy’s earlier claim that it was always the defect of his under-
standing that reality made vibrate. This “defect” of understanding is par-
ticularly active here where an understanding has been imposed on Molloy. 
As Molloy says, he cannot grasp the premise of this understanding, and 
the axiomatic force is imposed “for unknown reasons.” Molloy reminds 
us of what needs to be forgotten before every gesture of identification: its 
premise. Forgetting this premise endows the identification with its com-
pletely natural and “of course” quality, with force. An identity, to have an 
identity, must silence its basis. Something comparable happens when a 
person is asked to explain his or her prejudices: their foundation, like that 
of Molloy’s supposition, cannot be stated.
 Molloy thinks in such a way that he grasps neither the premise of his 
“understanding” nor the motivation, the reasons for his logical certainty. 
The axiomatic nature of this architectural symmetry, what it denotes, is 
based on a kind of déjà vu (through what experience do I know these to 
be lavatory lights?) that is not his, however, to remember. The conclusive 
designation is stated in fact as a supposition (“Lavatory lights I suppose”). 
Suppositional thinking is the equivalent in logic to homelessness. The sup-
position is a mode of understanding that seems equally removed from its 
conclusion as from its occasion: the understanding it offers does not give 
us means to communicate with its premise, and since it is often made in 
the absence of all premise, its premise is something that itself must be sup-
posed. There is a homelessness that is endemic to axiomatic society, since 
its forms do not give us the means to understand how we know what we 
know. We are in short abandoned to its conclusions.
 Molloy is not dazzled by the light. Instead, his thinking becomes a 
screen that sensitively registers the larger logical operations that society 
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enforces through its individuals. The simple symmetry of small, lit win-
dows overlooking an alley initiates Molloy into a simple conclusion that 
they were lavatory lights, a knowledge he perhaps did not know he had. 
What happens when architecture and society in general impose their mean-
ings axiomatically, when their forms bear the force of axioms? It is at this 
moment that the law becomes immanent to form. The conclusions drawn 
are deduced through the individual, given an air of self-evidence. Molloy 
bears witness to the self-alienating effect of this axiomatic moment, since on 
second reflection he cannot understand wherefrom comes this “of course” 
feeling.
 Molloy’s knowledge of architecture comes at the cost of its shelter. This 
recognition of architecture is uncanny, a testament to his own abandonment 
by architecture and its interior. His knowledge of this particular aspect of 
architectural design is disarming because he is not privy to the use of this 
space in the same way as those who inhabit it. Only for the man unfamiliar 
with beds, sleeping in the alley with the newspapers and filth, can the lava-
tory law and expedience of architectural space be lifted into the realm of 
pure knowledge. For the derelict, the home can only be supposed: its inside 
is truly hypothetical.32
Lexicographic: Supposition as Thinking
A third mode of vagabond thought I call “lexicographical thinking” 
because it substitutes supposition as word association for ratio. In his essay 
“Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances,” 
Roman Jakobson distinguishes between the “syntagmatic” and “paradig-
matic” aspects of language.33 A syntagmatic disturbance is structural and 
occurs on the level of syntax and grammar. The paradigmatic disturbance 
is operational and on the level of sense or the morpheme. Beckett’s charac-
ters’ lexicographical thinking is unlike the syntagmatic thinking of the true 
aphasic where disturbance results in incomprehensibility. Nonetheless, the 
lexicographical thinking that characterizes the vagabond thought is akin to 
a syntagmatic disturbance in the sense that thinking and speaking become 
a kind of supposition by substitution of morpheme, a paradigmatic flipping 
through the dictionary.
 Supposition articulates the logical as the condition for Molloy’s vag-
abond thought. This supposition is not a condition in the sense that it 
becomes the ground for a conclusion. For Molloy supposing is not an 
activity performed once and for all, waiting in the expectation of verifica-
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tion, but rather continuously, obsessively. Molloy’s entire monologue has 
the tone of a repeatedly made and repeatedly abandoned supposition. 
The homeless condition that underlies Molloy’s surprise at his familiar-
ity—though speculative, from the view in the alley—of an interior space is 
also inflected in the torrent of words that describes the alley itself. In Mol-
loy’s description of the alley in which he is searching for a resting place, 
language moves laterally and not vertically, tirelessly picking itself up to 
resume the process. Molloy relates,
There was no way out of the alley, it was not so much an alley as a blind 
alley. At the end there were two recesses, no, that’s not the word, oppo-
site each other, littered with miscellaneous rubbish and with excrements, 
of dogs and masters, some dry and odorless, others still moist. Ah those 
papers never to be read again, perhaps never read. Here lovers must 
have lain at night and exchanged their vows. I entered one of the alcoves, 
wrong again, and leaned against the wall, my feet far from the wall, on 
the verge of slipping, but I had other props, the tips of my crutches. But a 
few minutes later I crossed the alley into the other chapel, that’s the word, 
where I felt I might feel better, and settled myself in the same hypotenusal 
posture. And at first I did actually seem to feel a little better, but little by 
little I acquired the conviction that such was not the case. A fine rain was 
falling and I took off my hat to give my skull the benefit of it, my skull all 
cracked and furrowed and on fire, on fire. . . . At last I began to think, that 
is to say listen harder.34
Far from being a figure that adopts indifference as a way to cope with 
his existence under siege, the derelict is attuned to the smallest of differ-
ences. Molloy overhears his own speaking, and consequently speaks with 
an incredible finickiness, listening for the more exact word for his experi-
ence. First he says “alley,” and then “blind alley.” “Recess” is replaced 
with “alcove” and then “chapel.” It is important not to confuse dereliction 
with inebriation: Molloy does not stumble around drunk in his speech but 
soberly seeks out the right term. The monologue transmits destitution by 
not allowing meanings to take root despite the profusion of small differ-
ences. Molloy is picky with his words, and this scrupulousness requires an 
empty hand. Being picky means never really allowing your hand to grasp 
or possess. Contrary to popular wisdom, Beckett’s beggar can indeed be a 
chooser, but only a chooser, and without laying claim to what is chosen.
 None of the words toward which his precision tends ever add up—
they do not become building blocks for anything. Molloy’s search for the 
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“proper” word for his resting place in the alley does not seem to be a search 
for deeper significance. He does not, for example, find any solace in the 
religious or ceremonial overtones of the word “chapel.” Though he places 
a chapel in an alley littered with excrement and trash, Molloy never sug-
gests this to be a profane or transgressive gesture. There is no prose that 
is bowed so low as Molloy’s. He seems oblivious to connotation, and in 
words such as “chapel” he finds the forgotten, literal designation of a hol-
lowed rather than a hallowed space. Molloy’s homelessness is conveyed by 
his ignorance of idiom, by his being out of reach of both the morality and 
popularity of certain phrases or meanings. He speaks as if he learned the 
words very long ago, prior to the idiomatic significance they later acquired. 
Molloy is a lexicographer of the alley who does not grab onto these mean-
ings but quickly lets them go. His substitutive gestures are precise but end-
less and oblivious to their rhetorical function. It could be said that Molloy 
uses an architectural dictionary in a way that is, paradoxically, nomadic, as 
if to exhaust words, run through them, sacrifice them, and abandon them. 
Closely tied to Molloy’s attentiveness to particular words is this neglect of 
the signification they have for us.
 In making thinking synonymous with listening, the final line of this 
passage above underscores the centrality of the ear in Beckett’s conception 
of homeless existence and recalls the first mode of vagabond thought men-
tioned above, the murmur. More than the face, the ear is our most open fea-
ture. This “listening harder” is not a state of repose but of restless exposure 
and susceptibility, and I have already described the ways Molloy is sub-
ject to endless injunctions, calls to order, and murmurs that compel him to 
move on. In the above passage it is possible to see the discriminating activ-
ity of Molloy’s ear.
 The sobriety with which words are employed in Molloy’s description of 
the alley is such that these words are striking without our noticing it. One 
of these is Molloy’s use of the word “excrements.” In his penchant for spe-
cific designations, Molloy has no need of the singular case of this word. His 
desire to divide and distinguish divorces him from the habit of speech that 
confers an abstract plural unity upon “excrement” (as upon “trash”). This 
is a testament to the life lived in the alley. Molloy’s speech refers to specific 
producers, and not just the idea, of excrement.
 Another word of surprising precision is Molloy’s description of his 
body posture as “hypotenusal,” which means that he is leaning like a 
hypotenuse facing the right angle formed by the ground and the wall. The 
word sounds like hypertensional, but this would only designate an ant-
onym to this posture in which Molloy—with one of his legs shortening and 
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the other stiffening—finds rest possible. Moreover, “hypotenusal,” unlike 
“hypertensional,” is not an adjective describing a psychological or “inner” 
state but rather Molloy’s posture as it functions in a larger figure, namely, 
the triangle formed by body, ground, and wall. His posture expresses less 
a habit than an axiom, less a self in repose than a segment inserted into a 
larger geometrical function, dictated by the space offered by the blind alley.
Thinking as Obligation: The Pensum
i have said that we undertake our works on the basis of several kinds 
of freedom: freedom with respect to material, with respect to size and 
shape, with respect to time; the mollusk seems deprived of all these—a 
creature that can only recite its lesson, which is hardly distinguishable 
from its very existence.
  —Paul valéry, sea shells35
Vagabond thought in Beckett’s characters is the substitution of ratio with a 
strenuous search of verbal exactitude. This thirst indicates that his charac-
ters labor under a lesson that needs to be learned. Beckett’s word for this 
unremembered lesson is a kind of cognate for the thought itself: the pen-
sum.36 This word recurs throughout the Beckett oeuvre.37 The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines “pensum” as “a charge, duty, or allotted task; a school 
task to be prepared, often imposed as punishment.”38
 The derelict is devoted to the unrecitable pensum as he is to everything 
unremembered. Beckett’s characters abandon their possessions and abjure 
the world in favor not of spiritual clarity but of the thing they cannot dis-
pense: the imperative to speak. The title character in The Unnamable admits,
Yes, I have a pensum to discharge, before I can be free, free to dribble, free 
to speak no more, listen no more, and I’ve forgotten what it is. There at last 
is a fair picture of my situation. I was given a pensum, at birth perhaps, 
as a punishment for having been born perhaps, or for no particular rea-
son, because they dislike me, and I’ve forgotten what it is. But was I ever 
told? . . . Strange notion in any case, and eminently open to suspicion, that 
of a task to be performed, before one can be at rest. Strange task, which 
consists in speaking of oneself. Strange hope, turned towards silence and 
peace. Possessed of nothing but my voice, the voice, it may seem natural, 
once the idea of obligation has been swallowed, that I should interpret it 
as an obligation to say something.39
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The pensum is described as a punishment for having been born, some-
thing he has forgotten (“but was I ever told?”). Beckett pictures this pen-
sum as an interval between Molloy and his existence, between Molloy and 
his thought. As the imagined key to his silence and as that which always 
remains to be thought, the pensum addresses the thinking subject from the 
position where he would no longer be thinking, where his response would 
be rote, a reflex of habit. This is the manner in which the pensum is signifi-
cant to Beckett’s art of poverty: it is emblematic of the way thought can be 
directed or assigned without being informed or given content. The pensum 
is the cause or the task for thinking and speaking that never reveals itself. 
The pensum is of great interest to Beckett’s depiction of the vagabond since 
it is the vagabond’s, but at the same time the vagabond cannot appropriate 
it. Were he to remember it, Molloy even specifies that he would recite it not 
in his voice but in “the voice.” Molloy frequently frames his monologue 
with reference to a duty that he has forgotten but that he must neverthe-
less perform. Interrupting his thought with pedagogical exactitude, Molloy 
says that just speaking freely cannot be equated with a freedom from the 
obligation enforced by the pensum: “And truly it little matters what I say, 
this, this or that or any other thing. Saying is inventing. Wrong, very rightly 
wrong. You invent nothing, you think you are inventing, you think you 
are escaping, and all you do is stammer out your lesson, the remnants of 
a pensum one day got by heart and long forgotten, life without tears, as it 
is wept.”40 Here the pensum appears as the force that impoverishes expres-
sion. Since it cannot be remembered, the pensum cannot be dispensed with, 
exchanged, or gotten rid of. For that very reason Molloy describes it as the 
content of his thought: it controls what he says. Even while improvising, 
Molloy claims he remains under the spell of the pensum, its “remnants.” As 
with Lacan’s understanding of the unconscious as an interval that is both 
unthinkable and ethical, Beckett’s pensum is predominantly that which 
recurs and recurs at odds with what the thinking subject thinks. It is in 
force when we think ourselves farthest from it. Here we seem to be very 
far from poverty as it is ordinarily understood. But the pensum pertains to 
loss, and a loss with which we cannot dispense and cannot overcome. It is 
the lesson that has been lost: the moment when thinking, expression, mean-
ing, and performance seem to meet in the student in front of the black-
board. The final words of the passage above describe the complete terror 
of this dispossession: “a life without tears, as it is wept.” Nothing would 
seem more natural than the equivalence, the simultaneity, of weeping and 
tears. The pensum intervenes between these moments, separating meaning 
from expression, sign from value. Something is therefore missing from this 
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image of loss, and in Molloy’s picture the subject is absent to his own sum, 
and weeps without crying. Loss and grieving are never relieved in Beckett’s 
work through emotive or sentimental signs. It is always the burden of the 
reader to discern the destitute state of his characters, as it is registered in 
their evaporated stares.
 The wandering of vagabond thought is not its identity but its tor-
ment. Molloy’s wandering monologue is a kind of response, a searching 
for response, to the educational imperative. This imperative—to remem-
ber, recite, to speak—originates in an immemorial time, and it is as if the 
demand of the schoolteacher were the first form to be imposed on the 
drifter and the last to be abandoned. Some critics regard Molloy’s increasing 
forgetfulness as a philosophical lesson, a renunciation of worldly posses-
sions, and a station on the way to pure reflection. Leo Bersani conjectures,
The poverty of Molloy’s projects and resources creates a dramatic vac-
uum in which he can develop the logic of a more radical poverty and 
thus prefigure his later incarnations in the trilogy. The crippled derelict 
is an ideal image for a philosophical apprenticeship. The trilogy carries 
the Cartesian process backwards, starting with a bodily je suis and ending 
with a pure cogito. Molloy’s infirmities give him more time for reflection. 
Unable to move and to think at the same time, Molloy can enjoy, or suf-
fer, an absolute mental concentration during the pauses between his pain-
ful movements. . . . His thought rarely “reaches” matter, and this provides 
a grotesquely comic confirmation of that autonomy of mind which Des-
cartes experienced as the strength and dignity of mind.41
This is Molloy as bildungsroman, an educational novel in which knowledge 
is hoarded in its alienation from the world, and experience is gathered up 
as a kind of capital. It makes Molloy’s resolute dereliction sound downright 
advantageous as it gives Molloy “more time for reflection.” In this sense 
Bersani misstates the nature of the task—a task as much for us as it is for 
Molloy—in the thought of the beggar.
 Bersani converts the pursuit of thought into a leisurely activity, a kind 
of hobby in which he can “develop the logic of a more radical poverty.” But 
impoverishment does not obey logic. Its expression—the imperative of the 
lesson to which the beggar is submitted—is akin to an unconscious struc-
ture, something Bersani perhaps misses in trying to understand Molloy as 
a parodic fulfillment of Cartesian philosophy. Molloy presents a more “radi-
cal” poverty than is seen in Bersani’s model. Molloy’s thinking is directed 
toward an outside in which the self is dispossessed of its presence in 
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thought. Molloy’s repeated acknowledgment that he is not where he thinks 
stands counterposed to Bersani’s claim that Molloy offers a confirmation, 
however grotesque, of “autonomy of mind.” The alienation of Molloy from 
the world does not allow him an opportunity to retreat to the irreducible 
point of the cogito.42 Rather, his alienation is truly alienated and a sign of his 
absolute dependence, his helplessness, before the demands of the outside. 
According to Bersani, poverty creates “a dramatic vacuum,” but the pathos 
of the derelict and the tenor of his thought in his dependency deserve a 
wider situation, a situation of terror from which no possessions and no self 
can serve as protection. The alienation of Molloy presents a particular inci-
dence of a situation of absolute exposure in which Molloy is turned away, not 
in a voluntary fashion toward inwardness (as is implicit in the notion of a 
“dramatic vacuum”) but in an involuntary fashion away from himself.
Thinking as Extroversion
hearing nothing, i am nevertheless prey to communications.
  —Samuel beckett, The Unnamable
Though it is a type of drifting, dereliction has nothing to do with being free. 
It means having nowhere to go, but also having nothing to retreat to. In his 
poem “Enueg” Beckett writes, “Sweating like Judas / tired of dying / tired 
of policemen / feet in marmalade.” This describes three ways in which 
Beckett’s characters are locked into contingent, external situations rather 
than internal or moral ones. The drifting beggar is not a drowned figure 
but a forever drowning figure, not a mortal figure but a permanently mor-
tal figure. The vagabond is importantly not “tired to death,” or to the point 
of respite, but rather tired of dying. He is subject to an exhaustion enforced 
by the law. Beckett does not express the mortality of his characters by say-
ing they have feet of clay. He emphasizes their impoverished and end-
lessly dying status by remarking that he trudges like a Sisyphus through 
preserves. The viscous medium through which the character moves is also 
a jumbled reference to an impoverished literary figure that precedes him. 
“Marmalade” offers a submerged reference to the derelict Marmaladov in 
Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment.43
 Jean-Luc Nancy observes that one is always abandoned to something 
as much as abandoned by something. “One always abandons to a law,” he 
writes. “The destitution of abandoned being is measured by the limitless 
severity of the law to which it finds itself exposed. . . . [Abandonment] is a 
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compulsion to appear absolutely under the law, under the law as such and 
in its totality.”44 In Nancy’s description, every day is a court date for the 
derelict, not because he appears before the court at such and such a time, 
but because his mere appearance is an appearance before the law, the law 
“as such.” The vagabond experiences the law “as such” because nothing 
mediates or tempers its exercise over him. There is no recourse for vaga-
bond thought to disappear, to remain silent, to retreat. “If only I were not 
obliged to manifest,” regrets Beckett’s Unnamable.45 The burden on the der-
elict is not composed of manifesting something particular for the law such 
as respect or desire. Rather, he remains in an intransitive relation to the 
law and is obliged to merely manifest. Molloy describes this obligation to 
manifest as a state of perpetual eviction and of having no place from which 
to withstand the provisions of the law. He is looking again for a place to 
sleep:
But already the day is over, the shadows lengthen, the walls multiply, you 
hug the walls, bowed down like a good boy, oozing with obsequiousness, 
having nothing to hide, hiding from mere terror, looking neither right nor 
left, hiding but not provocatively, ready to come out, to smile, to listen, to 
crawl, nauseating but not pestilent, less rat than toad. Then the true night, 
perilous too but sweet to him who knows it, who can open to it like the 
flower to the sun, who is himself night, day and night. . . . The night purge 
is in the hands of technicians, for the most part.46
There is a strange lack of obviousness to the poverty described in such a 
passage. Rejecting all sociological references to the phenomenon and the 
historical plight that produces begging, Beckett’s prose nevertheless con-
veys something about the experience of poverty. Small details accomplish 
this. “The walls multiply”: the city’s structure becomes opaque, self-
reproductive, active, producing a labyrinth around the life of the beggar. 
There are no houses, no interiors, no architecture per se, just their rudi-
ments—their walls—that exclude, hunt, and overwhelm Molloy. Molloy is 
imprisoned paradoxically by being locked out, and his description of this 
indicates the way in which his experience is strewn before the very ety-
mology of the mur-mur, the sound that grows between walls. Still more 
delicate and alarming, and characterizing the coup offered by Beckett’s 
prose, is Molloy’s use of “obsequiousness.” The word denotes deference to 
authority with the hope of gain or improvement of one’s position. This is a 
surprising term to describe Molloy’s life, devoted to loss and subject to per-
manent eviction. In the beggar the obsequious posture becomes permanent. 
Even objects such as the wall or a walking stick seem to extrovert Molloy 
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and turn him out of himself in a gesture of complete dependency on the 
world.47 Making no great claims for himself, Molloy asserts that he is nearer 
to the indolence and impassivity of the toad (and by implication the toady, 
i.e., the obsequious sycophant) than to the animal stereotyped for its sur-
vival techniques, the rat. For Beckett the derelict is not a survivor whose 
instincts carry him past the crisis but rather the permanent inhabitant of 
that crisis, the sensitive wound registering its demands (always ready to 
“smile, to listen, to crawl”). Molloy’s readiness is the catalyst for his meta-
morphosis, as if obsequiousness and its bent posture placed him outside 
the realm of upright creatures. Molloy’s state of mind can be summed 
up with “You never know . . . (what may happen, what may come in the 
night).” Instead of inaugurating a condition of doubt, however, this inaugu-
rates a state in which the self is readied for constant disintegration.
 Vagabond thought is consciousness ransacked by terror. The domina-
tion of this consciousness and the experience of terror increases as the tril-
ogy proceeds. In Molloy, the conditions for depropriation are embodied in 
the figure and situation of the derelict. As the trilogy evolves, the vagabond 
as subject—this most marginal of figures—is chased off and pushed out. 
In the harassed monologue of The Unnamable, for example, we encounter 
the narrator buried under thinking torn in a process of dispersion: “I only 
think, if that is the name for this vertiginous panic as of hornets smoked out 
of their nest, once a certain degree of terror has been exceeded.”48 Badiou 
remarks of this passage, “like all terror, this one is also given as an imper-
ative without concept, and it imposes an obstinacy that gives no quarter 
and allows no escape.”49 Badiou exposes the force and duress that scar the 
monologues of Beckett’s characters—an imperative to speak but without 
any concept or understanding that authorizes the imperative. Badiou goes 
on to say that Beckett enacts a gradual and literal “torture of the cogito” at 
the hands of a “terroristic imperative to sustain the unsustainable.”50 But 
here Badiou overstates the role of philosophy because the absence of con-
cept does not truly account for Malone’s terror. Beckett’s texts formulate 
a terror that exceeds philosophy not because of any limit of philosophy 
but rather because of a limit of the mind. Beckett removes the figure of the 
mind (and therefore thought), replacing it with a hive susceptible to rapid 
disinternalization. In other words, vagabond thought occurs in the level of 
the hive—or at best the brain—rather than in the mind. Forgetting that the 
basis of vagabond thought is the vagabond risks philosophizing Beckett. 
The result is that we end by speaking philosophically and generally about 
terror: “All terror,” as Badiou calls it. Taking the perspective of the beggar 
reminds us that Beckett is no more interested in all humanity than he is in 
all terror. Rather, Beckett sees and is interested in the difference between all 
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terror and what the vagabond undergoes and what ultimately constitutes 
his consciousness: daily terror.
 Life without shelter is a daily terror depicted with typical understate-
ment by Beckett, though a brutal amputation is taking place. A simple con-
trast with the beggar of Maurice Blanchot’s La Folie du jour is instructive in 
this regard. Blanchot’s story is in many ways inspired by Beckett’s novel 
and brings the themes of Molloy to explicit theoretical exposition. The nar-
rator reports, “I was beginning to sink into poverty. Slowly, it was drawing 
circles around me; the first seemed to leave me everything, the last would 
leave me only myself.”51 The passage that contrasts most strongly with 
Beckett’s approach describes the way the narrator explains his metamor-
phosis and his vulnerability in his new situation. “Even though my sight 
had hardly weakened at all, I walked through the streets like a crab, hold-
ing tightly onto the walls, and whenever I let go of them dizziness sur-
rounded my steps. I often saw the same poster on these walls; it was a 
simple poster with rather large letters: You want this too. Of course I wanted 
it, and every time I came upon these prominent words, I wanted it.”52 Blan-
chot controls the metamorphosis of his character more than does Beckett. 
Where Blanchot’s character turns to the walls for support, no laws of phys-
ics intercede to relieve the condition of Beckett’s derelict. Vertigo, curable 
in the former, consumes the life of Beckett’s character and becomes almost 
palpable in the way he says the walls multiply. Above all it is impor-
tant to notice how comprehensibly social and legible the helplessness of 
the beggar is for Blanchot. His weakness is signaled by the fact that he is 
addressed more strongly by the poster, by his inability to resist the function 
of the advertisement that informs the viewer of his wants.
 This can be called, borrowing Beckett’s phrase, a resentful indigence 
because it is replete with desire for what it cannot have. The openness of 
the narrator to the socioeconomic signifier, ces mots considérables, is the 
openness of a fully functional and employed subject. Like Kant’s idea of 
a law that both needs and commands our attention (Achtung) and respect, 
these considerable letters in the advertisement address the care and con-
sideration of Blanchot’s beggar unproblematically. The susceptibility of his 
desire and imagination to its message is in a way indistinguishable from 
anyone else’s: he occupies the same subject position of any consumer and 
occupies it more literally, as each time he sees the slogan, in Blanchot’s 
words, he wanted it. His destitute condition is there merely to provide his 
desire with melodramatic value: the beggar is both full (of desire) and 
empty (of means) before the advertisement. The advertisement’s system of 
socially sanctioned meaning therefore undergoes no distortion under the 
gaze of the dispossessed.
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 In Molloy’s description, the extroversion of the beggar is not toward a 
commodity or the letters in its advertisement, but toward the night. Molloy 
says he is open to the night the way a flower is open to the sun. “Proust,” 
Beckett observes, “assimilates the human to the vegetal. He is conscious of 
humanity as flora, never as fauna . . . and this preoccupation accompanies 
very naturally his complete indifference to moral values and human jus-
tices.”53 Molloy follows this inverted or chiasmatic natural law: his open-
ness is compared to a heliotropism that directs him toward the sounds of 
the night. Therefore, the condition of the homeless wanderer is not only 
focused around an absence—the night that holds his peril—but the neces-
sity and inevitability of this focus is graspable only by the disruption of a 
natural metaphor.
 Advertisement makes little appearance in Molloy. Its absence is consis-
tent with the law of his extroversion that follows a second-order natural 
necessity.54 Yet it is instructive to note the care with which advertisement 
does enter the story of the derelict. Molloy is telling one of his countless 
stories of sleeping in gardens and ditches, and he remarks, “But it is useless 
to dwell on this period of my life. If I go on long enough calling that my life 
I’ll end up by believing it. It’s the principle of advertising.”55 Unlike Blan-
chot’s character, Molloy is not susceptible to the lures of the advertisement 
and does not mercilessly want what it sells. Rather it is the mythic prin-
ciple of advertising—the fact that repetition will produce belief—that sus-
tains the structure of Molloy’s interior world, his conviction, and his ability 
to designate his experience as “my life.” To tell or write his life, Molloy 
must resort to exterior equipment: the slogans and reiterations of advertis-
ing become for Molloy a kind of self-training that evokes the various meth-
ods of askesis recommended by Seneca: memorization, abstinences, silence, 
listening, and, above all, the hupomnemata or account books that offered to 
the self everything that required repetition for the self to take shape.56
The Mythic Tense: Thinking in the Permanent Present
What is it defends her? even from her own. averts the intent gaze. 
incriminates the dearly won. forbids divining her. What but life ending. 
hers. The other’s. but so otherwise.
  —Samuel beckett, Ill seen, Ill said
Molloy’s touching finickiness, his preference for one low spot on the food 
chain over another, should not divert our attention from the unbearable 
source of his pathos and what Molloy himself describes as “hiding from 
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mere terror.” “Mere terror” means nothing more than terror, but also noth-
ing but terror. The minimalism of this mereness, which is a part of the pro-
cess of reduction undertaken by Beckett’s writing, suggests that between 
Molloy and the experience of terror there are no intermediaries, neither 
rights, nor personality, nor private space. In the figure of Molloy, Beckett 
asks us to think about the form life assumes when it is made the exclusive 
object of a technique. Beckett shows us how, paradoxically, the individual 
abandoned by society becomes its target. The “night purges in the hands of 
technicians,” like the constant injunctions to leave, are part of society’s war 
on poverty.
 Critics frequently point out the way in which Molloy’s interminable 
ambulations offer a challenge to the laws of Newtonian physics, an inex-
haustible careening of crutches, bikes, and legs in various states of dys-
functionality.57 Molloy does not cast himself beyond the laws of physics as 
much as he is cast out of a society that operates according to these laws. 
Molloy is put instead in a perpetual submission to the law, a perpetual 
motion machine in vacuuo: “suppliant, not a transgressor,” as a later char-
acter describes himself.58 The derelict is in a state of mobility more intense 
than the soldier’s. There is no time to think. A “No Loitering” sign hangs at 
the gates of Beckett’s novel—Molloy’s one confrontation with the law is his 
arrest for being in an “obscene state of rest.” Sitting is a posture seemingly 
relegated to a former species: “The desire to sit down came upon me from 
time to time, back upon me from a vanished world.”59 Molloy speaks of the 
Salvation Army as if it were just that, a relentless military action against the 
impoverished: “[Social workers] will pursue you to the ends of the earth, 
the vomitory in their hands. The Salvation Army is no better. Against the 
charitable gesture there is no defense, that I know of.”60
 Molloy documents the way in which being helpless has become synony-
mous with being defenseless, and of the way mere existence has become 
synonymous with mere terror. Walter Benjamin writes in one of his frag-
ments, “As long as there is a single beggar, there will still be myth.”61 Ben-
jamin’s insight is illuminated by the defenseless existence of the beggar. 
For Benjamin, a single beggar stands between myth and its disappearance. 
Here Benjamin does not seem to be asserting the popular cliché, namely, 
that the beggar is the last outpost of a culture’s ancient wisdom, its prophet 
and its storyteller. Benjamin’s comment locates the possible sources of 
myth in the routinely terrorized situation of the beggar. The placelessness 
and miserable anonymity of the beggar mimic the way the origins of myth 
are obscured and belong to a time outside history.62 Molloy himself notes 
the way in which the familiar markers of time have lost their clarity in his 
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story. Noting how he cannot distinguish between events that have hap-
pened, those that are happening, and those yet to happen, Molloy must 
“speak in a mythological present” that includes all tenses.63 Molloy’s story 
is not alerted to the passage of time. The routine of the beggar partakes, in 
fact, of the ambiguous iteration of myth. His habits are at once an expres-
sion of his idleness and a force of necessity—the need to find food and a 
place to sleep has, in a parody of the prehistoric condition, become a rou-
tine. The derelict simultaneously has no habits and has only his habits. His 
routines are the expression of how unfree it is to be out of the loop: Adorno 
compares the gestures in Beckett’s plays to the repetitive and automatic 
behavior of the prisoner in his cell.64 The enclosed unconscious space of 
habit entirely swallows the life of the derelict. Like mythic form, the der-
elict life is trapped in a state of repetition without memory. The activity of 
the beggar seems “habitual” because the beggar occupies a space that is 
both self-enclosed and unfamiliar: his activity designates a loss of self but 
without the context, the domestic interior, in which this loss is wagered in 
safety. The self-enclosed space of the beggar excludes the familiar.
 The mythic situation of the beggar becomes more palpable as we try to 
imagine the conditions of Benjamin’s statement, the concept of the “single 
beggar.” Without community, beggars are never anything but single. Yet the 
vagabond inhabits a strangely eviscerated solitude, and his singleness lays 
claim only to isolation, rather than to differentiation. In the epigraph above 
from Ill Seen, Ill Said, Beckett asks, “What defends her?” Beckett deepens 
this question as he explains it: “Averts the intent gaze. Incriminates the 
dearly won. Forbids divining her.” Molloy, too, averts the intent gaze of the 
reader and incriminates the claims that are made on him: in reading Molloy, 
confronted with the derelict existence of its character, every assertion, every 
attempt to discern the proper space of the beggar and establish his belong-
ing, comes with a receipt. Georges Bataille proposes that Molloy is closer to 
myth than to a novel. This perspective on the work begins with Bataille’s 
realization that no proper terms suitably designate our encounter with the 
vagabond. This encounter with Molloy in fact seemingly spills over into 
Bataille’s biographical encounters with street people (“I can say something 
more about him, and that is that both you and I have met him”). Bataille 
writes,
There is in this reality, the essence or residue of being, something so univer-
sal, these complete vagabonds we occasionally encounter but immediately 
lose have something so essentially indistinct about them, that we cannot 
imagine anything more anonymous. So much so that this name vagabond 
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I have just written down misrepresents them. . . . This thing we name 
through sheer impotence vagabond or wretch, which is actually unnamable 
(but then we find ourselves entangled in another word, unnamable), is no 
less mute than death. Thus we know in advance that the attempt to speak 
to this phantom haunting the streets in broad daylight is futile. Even if 
we knew something about the precise circumstances and conditions of his 
life (?) and his wretchedness, we would have made no headway: this man, 
or rather this being whose speech, sustaining him, might have made him 
human—whatever speech subsists or rather exhausts itself in him no lon-
ger sustains him, and similarly, speech no longer reaches him. Any conver-
sation we might have with him would only be a phantom, an appearance 
of conversation. It would delude us, referring us to some appearance of 
humanity, to something other than this absence of humanity heralded by 
the derelict dragging himself through the streets, who fascinates us.65
For Bataille the situation of the beggar signals the mythological dimension: 
language loses its state of possibility, its conversion value. The typography 
of Bataille’s effort to speak of the vagabond creates an obstacle course of 
italicized terms. Their profusion indicates the foreign nature of each critical 
designation for Molloy. It also indicates a perpetual need to resume or rees-
tablish emphasis, to enumerate terms to categorize this “essentially indis-
tinct” figure that seems to undo each assertion of emphasis. Molloy does 
not actively undo or subvert the critic but rather proffers a passivity and 
destitution that inspire a strange hesitancy or, to use Beckett’s terms in the 
epigraph from the beginning of this section, a sense of the incrimination of 
the dearly won. Bataille says we name the vagabond only through “linguis-
tic impotence.” In the vagabond Bataille notes that language no longer sus-
tains itself or helps him survive, but rather is weakened (il s’épuise en lui).
 No longer rejuvenated by the speaking “I,” language undergoes an 
exhaustion and emaciation in the derelict. For Bataille this situation signals 
the mythological dimension of the beggar. Language loses its state of pos-
sibility in the beggar, its conversion value: we cannot have a conversation 
with him, Bataille curiously notes, but only the appearance of one. Lan-
guage fails to perform another conversion as well: the beggar is not trans-
formed from l’être into l’homme. Bataille employs an array of figures to mark 
this demise of language at the terminal self of the beggar: il ne porte plus, 
language no longer delivers, carries, or supports the derelict from a state of 
“being” to a state of being something (l’homme). Language loses its capaci-
ties in the impoverished instant of the derelict. The beggar has a mythologi-
cal status for Bataille because he at once is both this absence of humanity 
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and signifies or heralds this absence. In the following description, Molloy 
emerges as a kind of phoenix in reverse, as ashes risen from the creature:
Doubtless the birth we should attribute to Molloy is not that of a scholarly 
composition, but rather the only one that would be suitable to the elusive 
reality I have been speaking of, that of myth—monstrous, and arising from 
the slumber of reason. There are two analogous truths that can only take 
shape in us in the form of a myth, these being death and the “absence of 
humanity” that is death’s living semblance. Such absences of reality may 
not indeed be present in the clear-cut distinctions of discourse, but we 
may be sure that neither death nor inhumanity, both non-existing, can be 
considered irrelevant to the existence that we are, of which they are the 
boundary, the backdrop, and the ultimate truth.66
Earlier I note the way in which Benjamin asks the reader to think the intrin-
sically mythological nature of the beggar in which the presence of the beg-
gar is the sine qua non of myth. This dependent relation of myth on the 
single beggar is inverted in Bataille’s picture in which the beggar is a living 
absence (“death’s living semblance”), at a mythological remove from both 
clear-cut discourse (“scholarly composition”) and from our existence as it 
is. Bataille’s approach to Molloy is both tactful (in the hesitancy it marks 
in what to name this vagabond being) and apocalyptic (in its understand-
ing of the unnamable, a living absence). The emphasis on the latter draws 
our attention away from Molloy’s self-named “mythological present.” Ben-
jamin’s comment has the effect of forcing us into that present as an eternal 
present, one without memory and without projects. Bataille paradoxically 
gives the vagabond a kind of home in the conceptual landscape. He writes, 
“The profound apathy of death, its indifference to every possible thing, is 
apparent in him, but this apathy would encounter in death itself its own 
limit.”67 The vagabond shakes hands with “death itself,” and the apathy of 
the vagabond in turn reminds us of this death limit.
 In this gesture the signifying operation of the vagabond—whose apa-
thy Bataille has described as inaccessible, immune to language, and 
impersonal—becomes rather familiar to us. Bataille draws a conclusion 
that betrays the observations (pertaining to both Molloy and personal 
experience) on which it is built. Though there is no proper name for this 
being that is “no less mute than death,” Bataille says that the beggar both 
announces this absent condition and embodies it. Bataille takes the unnam-
able and transumes it in the description of the vagabond as a kind of ghost 
or undead figure. The activity of the vagabond is described as a haunting: 
140 •  ChaPTer 3
“This horrible figure painfully swinging along on his crutches is the truth 
that afflicts us and that follows us no less faithfully than our own shad-
ows . . . the spectre that haunts the streets in open daylight.”68 A ghost no 
longer able to haunt his house, forced to walk the streets by day, a faith-
ful shadow: these figures evoke the drifting situation of the beggar at the 
same time they force us to ask whether Molloy’s dislocation precisely 
resembles a ghost’s. The ghost has a sense of belonging to a place that in 
fact exceeds the beggar’s: its dislocation is specific and imposes a particular 
debt on the living because the dead has been removed from the final “rest-
ing place.” Ghosts are restless; beggars are forbidden sleep. Molloy does 
not seek the place, once and for all, but a place. The final sentence of Mol-
loy’s monologue is “I longed to go back into the forest. Oh not a real long-
ing. Molloy could stay, where he happened to be.”69 The contingency of the 
beggar’s resting spot, of resting where he happens to be, is entirely offset 
by the comma and preceding conditionality: “Molloy could stay.” Contin-
gency is not a continuous privilege of the beggar as might be suggested if 
the sentence were written as “Molloy could stay where he happened to be.” 
This unitary statement is interrupted by the comma indicating that “where 
he happened to be” is a spot that must be sanctioned by his solicitors, the 
policemen and night watchmen or by their absence.
 The restless resumption of this contingency under law differs from 
the predicament of the undead or unburied. Consider once more the brief 
litany of Beckett’s poem “Enueg”: “Tired of dying /tired of policemen / 
feet in marmalade / perspiring profusely / heart in marmalade.” Tired of 
dying, the vagabond is subject to an exhaustion enforced by the law. The 
insuperably helpless situation of Molloy is reflected in the fact that every-
thing, even help, contributes to this dying. His situation actively blackmails 
the common sense of the social management of poverty. Of his mother 
Molloy complains, “Her charity kept me dying.”70 There is no way for 
the helpless in Beckett to break with their condition, and not even death 
is permitted to them. Help, or charity, ends by accelerating and deepening 
helplessness, so that in trying to keep the vagabond from dying, charity 
paradoxically condemns him to dying.
 Beckett writes to show us the world seen from the standpoint of the 
helpless, through eyes withdrawn into dying. There is a glimmer there that 
provides us with an understanding—to which Bataille and Benjamin ges-
ture—of the experiential structure of myth in the situation of need. The 
figure of need is separated by a gap that the ancients understood to exist 
between mortals and the immortals. But this gap in Beckett exists between 
mortals. A few lines from the monologue of Beckett’s Unnamable can give a 
sense of this:
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Et l’autre. Je lui ai prêté des yeux implorants, des offrandes pour moi, un 
besoin d’aide. Il ne me regarde pas, ne me connaît pas, ne manque de rien. 
Moi seul suis homme et tout le reste divin.
[And the other? I have assigned him eyes that implore me, offerings for 
me, need of succour. He does not look at me, does not know of me, wants 
for nothing. I alone am man and all the rest divine.]71
It is alarming to encounter the term “other” in Beckett’s prose since the 
monologues of his derelicts are not anchored in the premise of the self. In 
the transition from Beckett’s French to his English, the stance toward the 
other becomes a question. The other is both something superadded and a 
question, both an unquestionable surplus or excess (le reste) and open to a 
type of philosophical thinking (and hence the prospect of conceptual assim-
ilation). The truth of the other is in a way expressed as the gap between 
the two languages and between expressions. The sentences that follow 
therefore appear as a kind of answer to the simple question of “And the 
other?” This answer brings the questioner into a quandary of need. The 
sentences that follow are not answers but rather enumerations, open to infi-
nite incompletion. The French version emphasizes that what follows is not 
an answer but a list, soberly laid out without Beckett filling in the connec-
tion for us.
 At first, the figure states that he has lent the other (prêté) the signs of 
need: imploring eyes, a “need of succour.” These indices of need are lent to 
the other, that is to say, given over provisionally, as in a situation of crisis 
in which one lends another a blanket. The crisis here is precipitated by the 
question of the other. But lending is always an expectation of a return. It is 
in this sense that the gesture of assigning the signs of the vagabond to the 
other, this conversion of the other into a beggar, is an answer to the ques-
tion of the other. This question (“And the other?”) offers no qualifications 
by which to lead us and does not fill in any blanks for us. It is answered 
most coercively, therefore, by instituting the state of discernible need in the 
other. The self secures an answer to the monstrous question about the other 
by serving a philanthropic function, by making the ego charitable. It has 
lent to the world the pure sign of its purpose: vagabond signs signifying 
total need that nevertheless promise “offerings” (des offrandes) to that self in 
return.
 The second sentence sounds like it should undo the first, yet it does 
not hold dialogue with the first gesture and does not aim at contradic-
tion. Here the question of the other approximates the version of the other 
as posed by Beckett’s French, the other as the unintegratable surplus and 
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elusive remainder. Beckett’s character speaks of the other as one who is 
unreciprocal: the other is indifferent to and ignorant of all relation to the 
self, is blind to the self. This other does not communicate with us. These 
sentences do not form a progression, a revision, or even the basis of rec-
ognition in the character. They are juxtaposed as discontinuous moments 
within which Beckett’s character catches a glimpse of the human. The last 
sentence is delivered with the Beckettian mixture of clarity and puzzlement 
and conveys a sense that is both precise and in the process of evaporating. 
It connects the vicious circle of need and indifference, their nonexclusive 
though contradictory nature, to the permanent mortality of the speaker and 
his exclusion from the divinity.72 Need and insufficiency are the markers by 
which the self imagines itself to integrate the other; the impoverishment 
of the other emerges here as an instrument by which the self acts out its 
relation to the world before its own poverty, its own absence of relation, is 
noted. Poverty is not just in “the other,” and it is the return of the self to a 
condition of poverty that marks mortal time for Beckett’s character. Beck-
ett’s figure says that he is nothing to the one whom he imagines to have 
nothing and to be in need of him. Yet this turn is already at the heart of the 
first charitable gesture by which want is discerned in the world, since it is 
in that first estimation of the vagabond nature of the other that the self has 
unwittingly testified to the helplessness and truly involuntary aspect of the 
other, having nothing and yet offering something to us. For Beckett, to be 
“man” does not mean to join a species but to feel oneself to be the last man, 
the single beggar.
Making Less of Less
Critics widely observe that Beckett’s work, characterized by broken syntax 
and a dearth of discernible narrative structure, verges on the unreadable.2 
Much of Beckett criticism tries to deal with this problem. The best criticism 
of Beckett makes a paradox of this, taking the view that the reader’s dif-
ficulty is the point. In his essay appropriately titled “Trying to Understand 
‘Endgame,’” Adorno writes that understanding Endgame can only mean 
“understanding its unintelligibility, concretely reconstructing the meaning 
of the fact that it has no meaning.”3 According to Adorno, the most we can 
do is scrupulously take stock of all the ways Beckett frustrates our effort to 
grasp or anticipate his work. Beckett does not discourage the experience 
of unintelligibility Adorno finds constitutive of his work. He is famously 
indifferent to this effort as he is to the struggle of audiences with his drama. 
“My work is a matter of fundamental sounds (no joke intended) made as 
fully as possible, and I accept responsibility for nothing else. If people want 
to have headaches among the overtones, let them. And provide their own 
aspirin.”4
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Textual Indigence
The reader in an aeSTheTiCS of PoverTy
4
So forgive me if i relapse . . . into my dream of an art unresentful of its 
insuperable indigence and too proud for the farce of giving and receiving.
—Samuel beckett1
•  •  •  •
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 In his dialogue with Georges Duthuit, Beckett, perhaps unwittingly 
given his predilection for almost cruel statements, furnishes an enigmatic 
key to his work. Beckett says he has a vision, a “dream of an art unresentful 
of its insuperable indigence.” What does this mean? Beckett does not intend 
to impart a supreme value for humanity or that art should add to the stock-
pile of cultural monuments. Beckett dreams neither of an art replete with 
redemptive potential nor, unlike other dreamers, of striking it rich. Rather, 
Beckett dreams of an art uninterested in giving anything to the spectator, 
of a literature capable of a forthright and unapologetic expression of its 
poverty.
 Beckett’s work is guided by this dream and its surprising and discor-
dant elements. The surprise begins with the terminology itself. Beckett jux-
taposes the terms insuperable and indigence. This conflation challenges us to 
envision a state of need so needy that it cannot be redeemed, surmounted, 
or made a positive value through articulation or representation in a novel, 
a paragraph, or even a word. The ultimate node of Beckett’s dream as infor-
mative of his own creation may not be of art’s indigence (as this for Beck-
ett is perhaps constitutive of art per se) but a thing even more improbable: 
an attitude toward this condition, that his work express an equanimity, an 
unresentful disposition toward this inherent and unalienable indigence.
 The challenge to Beckett’s reader is made more difficult because his 
dream of an art unresentful of its insuperable indigence does not involve 
either reader or reading in any stated way. In fact, it is not clear that a 
reader is welcome, or even necessary. Insofar that Beckett’s dream requires 
the participation of the reader, it is less to do something than to not do 
something: not to annul, not to distort the carefully stacked poverty of 
Beckett design.
 How can readers insert themselves into so tight a loop? It is not easy 
to participate in another’s dream. The most obvious paths of response are 
blocked since most interpretations seek to make the text into a resource or 
a repository of significant traces. Reading in the spirit of Beckett’s design 
means avoiding precisely this making more of less, this cancellation of 
Beckett’s carefully designed poetics of indigence. The reader is asked to 
encounter Beckett’s dream of a work of need—needfully. In other words, 
the reader should be open to the surprising and unforeseen outcomes that 
emerge when approaching Beckett’s poverty as such without any additional 
determination or dissemination, without annulling it or transforming it.
 Beckett makes no mention of any image within this dream, only of 
art’s relation to itself. This relation is the only one remaining after Beckett 
shears world (represented object), artist (represented subject), and audience 
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from the work of art. Beckett praises Dutch painter Bram van Velde as the 
first artist “to submit wholly to the incoercible absence of relation, in the 
absence of terms or, if you like, in the presence of unavailable terms.”5 Beck-
ett’s insistence on negativity and indigence without any repeal or redemp-
tion suggests that any attempt to read his work within “the humanities” 
would annul art’s essential indigence. The problem is mirrored in the inau-
gural address that awarded Beckett the 1969 Nobel Prize in Literature. 
Beckett’s award goes to the “author who has transmuted the destitution 
of modern man into his exaltation.”6 This is precisely the misunderstand-
ing that Beckett sought to avoid and that Beckett’s dream of an insupera-
ble indigence counters so clearly. Yet this charitable negation of the poverty 
of Beckett’s art remains a temptation to all readings of his work. Like the 
Nobel Committee, commentators see Beckett as a kind of Midas figure 
equipped with a typewriter. As Steven Connor remarks, the motto “less is 
more” has become the “standard way of interpreting Beckett’s texts.”7 Con-
nor also accurately defines the problem with this approach, when he writes 
that this interpretative model is “the rate of exchange whereby criticism has 
been able to move the dwindling ‘lessness’ of his work from the red into the 
black of cultural profit.”8
 Taking Beckett at his word requires of his reader both deep familiarity 
with and also distance from the text. For Jacques Derrida, notably, distance 
to Beckett was difficult to achieve. Of why he does not write about Beck-
ett, Derrida says, “this is an author to whom I feel very close, or to whom 
I would like to feel myself close; but also too close. Precisely because of 
this proximity, it is too hard for me [to write about him], too easy and too 
hard.”9 Derrida does not feel Beckett to be at the right distance to permit 
“writing transactions.”10 He claims that this is partly a problem of language 
itself. Derrida says that he can write about foreign authors such as Joyce, 
Kafka, and Celan precisely because his own writing, in French, allows him 
to develop a language in response to the work of these authors. By con-
trast, Beckett writes in what Derrida calls a “particular French” that makes 
it difficult to reply: “How could I write in French in the wake of or ‘with’ 
someone who does operations on this language which seem to me so strong 
and so necessary, but which must remain idiomatic? How could I write, 
sign, countersign performatively texts which ‘respond’ to Beckett?”11 Beck-
ett’s “operations” on the French language remain, for Derrida, so unassail-
ably idiomatic that they paradoxically cannot be translated into Derrida’s 
French. Without this distance, his treatment of Beckett can only devolve 
into a mediated discourse, or what Derrida calls “the platitude of a sup-
posed academic metalanguage.”12 Yet Adorno, who has the advantage of 
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writing in a language other than Beckett’s French, has a problem similar to 
Derrida. Of Endgame, Adorno writes that a reading of Beckett “cannot pur-
sue the chimerical aim of expressing the play’s meaning in a form mediated 
by philosophy.”13 In the absence of a philosophical narrative about Beckett’s 
work, Adorno proposes a reading that keeps closer to the text: understand-
ing Endgame, he writes, “can mean only understanding its unintelligibility, 
concretely reconstructing the meaning of the fact that it has no meaning.”14 
Adorno proposes that the reader treat Beckett’s text with the meticulous 
attention one might give to a crime scene: the most the critic can hope for is 
recreating, step by step, the way Beckett’s language assaults meaning and 
parts company with our understanding. For both Adorno and Derrida, in 
other words, critical mediation of the Beckett text requires both nearness 
and distance, the use of a language at once familiar and unfamiliar.
 My purpose here is to avoid both the platitudes of academic language 
and the imposition of language not “vouched for by the work’s immi-
nence.”15 In their Arts of Impoverishment to which my study is indebted, Leo 
Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit observe that Beckett “has given us, by common 
consent, unforgettably original images of meaninglessness and failure, and 
reasonably literate people all over the world recognize encounters, spec-
tacles, verbal exchanges they unhesitatingly qualify as Beckettian.”16 Yet 
Beckett’s work also presents a type of impoverishment not so easily rec-
ognized, one that the reader can qualify or name only with hesitation. The 
needfulness of Beckett’s work not only renders our “reasonable literacy” 
insufficient but also requires us to rethink the reading process altogether. To 
this end, I assemble here six  key strategies for reading Beckett’s aesthetics 
of indigence, culled from Beckett’s own texts. They are conditions of pov-
erty that characterize Beckett’s poetics and that affect our encounter with 
his work. They are (1) begging the question, (2) the syntax of weakness, (3) 
writing and abandonment, (4) deliberate provisionality, (5) the hypotheti-
cal imperative, (6) worsening as narrative strategy. These six operations call 
attention to what we do differently on account of the meagerness, both slim 
yet ineradicable, offered by Beckett’s work. I introduce the topic with “A 
Poetics or an Ethics of Indigence,” a perceptively titled chapter from James 
Knowlson and John Pilling’s Frescoes of the Skull: The Later Prose and Drama 
of Samuel Beckett.
A Poetics or an Ethics of Indigence
Beckett challenges the reader to take on his poverty without annulment. 
Beckett’s poverty is a vanishing and incalculable figure, rendered as an 
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abyss (“the inverted spiral of need”) or an insurmountable height (“an 
insuperable indigence”), that seems to call for an ethical problem.17 Knowl-
son and Pilling raise this issue in converting indigence into a summary 
term for Beckett’s work. What could be more difficult to isolate, to endow 
with fetish status, or possess, they ask, than poverty? They observe, “per-
haps [indigence] is the only word that can encapsulate the obsession with 
‘need’ and ‘poverty’ that has been at the heart of Beckett’s thinking through 
such a long and distinguished career.”18 For Knowlson and Pilling, Beck-
ett’s obsessions with poverty can be brought within a functioning aes-
thetic. But because they fail to consider the ethical demands imposed by 
Beckett’s work, Knowlson and Pilling risk containing or “encapsulating” 
the very poverty Beckett sought to leave undomesticated. Ethics questions 
our implication with an ever-withdrawing figure of need. The homeless 
narrator of Beckett’s short story “The End” allegorizes the reader’s pre-
dicament when faced by this figure. He describes how his cries for assis-
tance sounded unintentionally like their opposite: “I tried to groan, Help! 
Help! But the tone that came out was that of polite conversation. My hour 
was not yet come and I could no longer groan. The last time I had cause 
to groan I had groaned as well as ever, and no heart within miles of me to 
melt.”19 Here the character cannot reckon his need to groan with his inabil-
ity to do so. His last great groan came and went unheard by anyone who 
might have offered him a sympathetic gesture. Reading Beckett in terms of 
pure aesthetics runs the risk of fastening its attention only on this tone of 
polite conversation, the formal conventions of bourgeois society. The groan 
of Beckett’s characters is both untimely and of unrecognizable form. The 
distress is not imprisoned in the form of the work.20
 This idea is not necessarily inappropriate for many works of art. In 
colloquial understanding, the artwork is a cry for help. In this view art 
becomes a displaced statement of despair (usually the artist’s). Here the cry 
is both audible and legible, and it bears the mark of a strictly psychologi-
cal or existential distress.21 But Beckett tends to work within and against 
this idiom. We need rather to ask: How do we attune ourselves to the groan 
under, or within, the tone of polite conversation? Beckett conceives of the 
artist’s helplessness as an absolute disenfranchisement of means. Asked by 
Georges Duthuit why he claims that the artist is “helpless to paint,” Beckett 
replies, “Because there is nothing to paint and nothing to paint with.”22 This 
startling proclamation deprives us of the means by which to understand the 
work of art, since for Beckett art happens in a space without objects (things 
to be painted) and without means (brushes, canvases, paint, but also hands, 
eyes, and skill). Beckett’s comment pulls art away from all the instrumental 
terms with which it has traditionally been surrounded.
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 As counterintuitive as it may be for readers who seek to understand the 
text through interpretation, Beckett seems to ask his reader for an inability 
to understand, that the readers be defeated by their attempt at understand-
ing rather than have a light go on in the mind. This makes the reader a 
participant in the poverty rather than a factor for eliminating it. In Malone 
Dies, for example, the reader encounters the title character bedridden and 
writing in his exercise book. He notes, “For I want to put down in it, for the 
last time, those I have called to my help, but ill, so that they did not under-
stand, so that they may cease with me. Now rest.”23 Is it not conceivable to 
think here that the name of the reader might be inscribed on Malone’s list of 
those who did not understand his cry for help? Can the reader be a mere 
bystander here—free to walk? Or are we not as readers inscribed within 
the novel, as in a necrology, and belonging to those who failed the call?24 
The failure of the reader to respond is not a failure of critical judgment 
or insight. Rather, it connects us to the cry in the most intimate but also 
encrypted way. We merge with the work at the point where it cannot com-
municate with us, cannot get us to respond. Malone acknowledges that his 
demand for help may not have been apprehended in the first place, since 
his cry partakes of his distress and is made “ill.”25 In other words, the call 
to action is itself afflicted, made “ill” instead of made known. Rather than 
conveying the picture or message of need, language itself is in need. But 
the error or illness of the imperative does not reduce its urgency: it only 
eliminates the reader’s ability to heed that call, to provide aid or to redeem 
a need.
 In his review of the poetry of Denis Devlin, Beckett himself formulates 
a theoretical relation between the reader and need. Contrasting art with 
“opinion” (what Beckett calls an “escape from need”), Beckett describes 
Devlin’s poems as “no more (!) than the approximately adequate and abso-
lutely non-final formulation of another kind [of need].”26 In other words, 
poetry’s “own terms” are paradoxically those that mark it as unfathomably 
dispossessed. Beckett goes on to say that “art has always been this—pure 
interrogation, rhetorical question less the rhetoric—whatever else it may 
have been obliged by the ‘social reality’ to appear, but never more freely 
so than now, when social reality . . . has severed the connection.”27 Beckett 
does not assert that artworks state these needs, but rather that they offer 
its “approximately adequate and absolutely non-final formulation.” Faced 
with a poem, a reader is not faced with a need for something. That is, the 
terms of poetry are not about need but are instead themselves needy, do 
not refer to a particular need but are in need of reference, seek out their 
reality by lacking it. As a “non-final formulation,” Devlin’s poems offer a 
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need that is unstable and itself in need of articulation. To use the expres-
sion of Beckett’s narrator, it calls ill. In “Cascando,” Beckett refers to “the 
black want splashing their faces.”28 Want, like need, is never in the expres-
sion of the face but running over it, discoloring it, evaporating from it. This 
is why for Beckett the opposite of need is not fulfillment but opinion, the 
idea hardened into a position that can be unambiguously appropriated and 
exchanged.
 Beckett’s pure interrogation of need and its place in literary articula-
tion suggests for the reader a role beyond the mere divestment of subject 
(an agency that poses the question) and object (something asked for). The 
question of art and the responsibility of the reader operated through a con-
stitutive subtraction: a rhetorical question less the rhetoric. Beckett defines 
literature in such a way that the reader approaches it primarily through 
its dispossession. There are two consequences to this neediest of states in 
which the rhetorical question has been stripped of its rhetoric. Without the 
rhetoric, a rhetorical question lacks the means of its enunciation. This ques-
tion, then, is so close to the being of the artwork that it cannot be distanced, 
or turned, in order for it to be posed: in short, it loses the material form by 
which it is recognized. This means there are questions that are not formu-
lated in Beckett’s text but posed by the text and weigh on the text through 
their absence. The title character in Beckett’s prose work The Unnamable, for 
example, makes a distinction between not formulating questions and con-
ceding their inevitability: “Decidedly it seems impossible, at this stage, 
that I should dispense with questions, as I promised myself I would. No, I 
merely swore I’d stop asking them. And perhaps before long, who knows, 
I shall light on the happy combination which will prevent them from ever 
arising again in my—let us not be over-nice—mind.”29 Beckett’s work con-
stitutes a search for an arrangement that situates or exposes a question 
rather than simply poses one. This combination is the site where questions 
insinuate themselves into the text. Beckett does not seek to formulate ques-
tions per se; he does not systematically seek the question the way a philo-
sophical treatise might. Beckett’s character expresses the hope that he will 
fall upon the desirable combination that will obstruct formulation and make 
the question-formula fail. Beckett’s work dethrones ostentatious form of the 
question in favor of making its problems ostensible.
 There is another potential implication for the reader to Beckett’s defini-
tion of art. Purified of rhetoric, the question of literature is purified of its 
rhetorical function. Rhetorical questions conventionally lend continuity to 
arguments: they do not expect a response to be given. Beckett’s definition 
of literature within these parameters requires from the reader a response. 
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Some of Beckett’s best critics have inverted Beckett’s statement and insisted 
that Beckett’s minimalism produces an autonomous artwork, art that wit-
nesses the complete disintegration of the dialogic structure of question and 
response. In his essay on Endgame, Adorno writes, for example, “Beckett 
spells out the lie implicit in the question mark: the question has become 
a rhetorical one.”30 My point here concerns the way in which Beckett does 
not offer us the sign that designates a question (the Fragezeichen, literally, 
the question mark) but withdraws that sign in a gesture of radical pov-
erty. Reading Beckett entails nothing other than the search for questions in 
need of their sign, a search for unwritten questions. Contrary to the pic-
ture offered by Adorno, there seems to be in fact considerable urgency, one 
might say emergency, in the way in which this unasked question needs the 
reader for its articulation.
 Beckett’s oeuvre of need seeks to multiply the missing questions and 
actively unask questions in order to implore the readers to realize the ques-
tion themselves. This clashes with the tendency within modern art and phi-
losophy to define themselves through their struggle to remember questions. 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari describe their project as a search for ques-
tions that do not already contain their answers. They take Henri Bergson’s 
definition of a false problem to be one rooted in the “badly stated” ques-
tion: a drive toward its proper articulation guides their thinking all the way 
up to What Is Philosophy?31 Deleuze and Guattari observe that this ques-
tion, which entitles their final work, has never been heard because it was 
always asked too abstractly and “can perhaps be posed only late in life, 
with the arrival of old age and the time for speaking concretely.”32 When 
Martin Heidegger writes that “questioning is the piety of thought,” he ref-
erences a disposition (piety) habitually associated with faith and not ques-
tioning to assert the unquestioned need of the question.33 He begins Being 
and Time by declaring that we have forgotten the Greek question of Being.34 
Heidegger furnishes us with a way, a lexicon of Greek philosophical lan-
guage, to access this question. Ultimately, Beckett sides with amnesia rather 
than with philosophical recollection. Beckett’s novels are gerontological in a 
way that surpasses the scenario furnished by Deleuze and Guattari. Instead 
of old age’s recent arrival and the opportunity to speak concretely, Beckett 
gives older age and speech frozen into a series of non sequiturs. Beckett’s 
forgetful work functions like a trap into which questions fly in from the 
outside.
 Beckett’s tactic of spurring the reader to ask questions works with the 
assumption that answering and posing of questions is not the difficult task. 
The decisive moment for Beckett comes earlier: in formulating the condi-
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tions for a question. Beckett’s disposition toward the rhetorical question 
in this sense runs contrary to established critical notions about literature. 
Beckett’s literary destitution proposes a model in which the work (and not 
the author) needs the reader. This dependency is reminiscent and possibly 
modeled on the predicament of the vagabond. Beckett’s active disposses-
sion of the question mark differentiates his work sharply from that state of 
deferral or suspension, or a state of fundamental ambiguity, that other theo-
rists regard as the defining mark of literature. Roland Barthes writes:
It is ambiguity which counts, which concerns us, which bears the histori-
cal meaning of an oeuvre which seems peremptorily to reject history. What 
is this meaning? The very opposite of a meaning, i.e., a question. What 
do things signify, what does the world signify? All literature is this ques-
tion, but we must immediately add, for this is what constitutes its spe-
cialty, literature is this question minus its answer. No literature in the world 
has ever answered the question it asked, and it is this very suspension 
which has always constituted it as literature: it is that very fragile lan-
guage which men set between the violence of the question and the silence 
of the answer.35
Whereas Beckett defines literature as a rhetorical question minus its rhet-
oric, Barthes defines literature (its “specialty”) as this question minus its 
answer. Barthes’s math sets literature aside as a space of questioning “for 
its own sake” and as the perpetual deferment of meaning and answer-
ing. Instead of meaning, literature proposes only questions (What do things 
signify? What does the world signify?). Not only is literature for Barthes an 
endless posing of questions; its ambiguity is itself posed or “set” between 
“the violence of the question and the silence of the answer.” Though its lan-
guage is unable to resolve its ambiguities and too weak to answer itself, lit-
erature for Barthes is protected by its place in a structure between violence 
and silence.
 Fragility in this picture acquires a paradoxical functionality: when 
Barthes speaks of literature’s inability to answer, it is depicted as a silence 
that is guarded (defended, something “kept” by literature) and not a situ-
ation of dumb muteness.36 For Barthes, the position and suspension of this 
fragility recuperates its powerlessness and even its value. He describes the 
language of literature as “set,” much like a diamond or a figure in a glass 
case. Barthes describes this fragile language as a kind of tender membrane 
separating question and answer. It is not to be disturbed. Beckett’s literary 
indigence takes a contrary route: it breaks with the aesthetics of suspension 
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by exercising and worsening the fragility of language and pursues a provi-
sional state in which it is unable to found itself. Beckett’s work is not set 
either for permanence (as in stone) or to accentuate its value (like a dia-
mond), but strikes a more provisional posture. Not to shelter or not to 
suspend its disability means to pursue an art of broken pieces and in a 
combination that renders the pieces less distinct.37 For Barthes, the subtrac-
tion process in literature stops at the irreducible questions it poses.38 Beck-
ett does not stop there and includes asking in the list of activities (among 
them, answering) literature fails to do.
Begging the Question
That is typical. i know no more questions and they keep on pouring 
from my mouth.
  —Samuel beckett, The Unnamable39
The expression “begging the question,” an idiomatic translation of petitio 
principii, refers to the way an argument takes for proven something that 
it ought to be proving.40 A line of reasoning that begs a question therefore 
assumes possession of what could only be acquired later, namely, through 
proof. The counterintuitive nature of the begging in this idiom makes the 
expression pertinent to our understanding of Beckett’s work. First, “beg-
ging” as it is described here is in no way a loud or imploring gesture of 
want. In fact, this want is not even uttered. The state of need must be dis-
cerned by the listener in the aberrant reasoning. Second, the idiom suggests 
that the proper response to this begging is not an answer but a question. 
Ordinarily, begging would seem synonymous with questioning as an ask-
ing for something. Yet the statement that begs a question asks nothing. Ask-
ing for nothing, however, it asks to be asked.
 The figure of speech therefore bears this insight into Beckett’s work: 
that an utterance can bear unconscious questions. What Beckett’s figure 
calls “typical” about himself holds true for Beckett’s work: that it does not 
“know” questions and yet questions come forth at each instant. These ques-
tions in the text emerge in an encounter with the other, through reading 
and in the reader, at the place where these questions are refused.
 To pose a question not only to Beckett’s text but for Beckett’s text turns 
the reader toward what the text does not know about itself and what it can-
not ask. Enoch Brater says, “The major dramatic question is not raised by 
the figures onstage in the language one of them speaks, but is developed 
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instead by the observer: it is we who must postulate a harmony between 
what we see and the ‘sad tale a last time told.’”41 Yet making sense out of 
Beckett’s work may not require us, as Brater claims, to “postulate a har-
mony” out of our experience with it. In fact, the true questions with which 
we respond to Beckett’s text may not be restorative of unity between form 
and content but may in fact be “begged” by their precise ordering: the read-
ers’ questions are a reaction to the formal coherence of Beckett’s work in 
which form and content seem forcibly reconciled. If, as Hans Robert Jauss 
claims, modernist free indirect discourse compels the reader to make evalu-
ations of the narrative data, Beckett’s hermetic style invites a wholly differ-
ent reply.42 This is quite different from Brater’s suggestion that the reader is 
to “postulate” something like a formula for the text, estranging the reader 
from the irrational silence of Beckett’s world.
 In Waiting for Godot, Beckett’s characters do not like to be asked ques-
tions. They are existential challenges and mildly disrupt the discursive sta-
tus quo on stage. In response to Estragon’s objection to the treatment of 
Lucky, Pozzo shouts: “(violently) Don’t question me!”43 And yet this objec-
tion or deflection of the question results not in its being suppressed but in 
its being enhanced—acted out. In other words, though Pozzo wants the 
question of why Lucky does not put down his bags to “go away,” it reap-
pears not by being restated but through Estragon’s charade: “(forcibly) Bags. 
(He points at Lucky.) Why? Always hold. (He sags, panting.) Never put down. 
(He opens his hands, straightens up with relief.) Why?”44 This question goes to 
the heart of the power dynamic in the play. Estragon wants to know why 
the slave never stops working, and why he displays a peculiar attachment 
to his burden. He resorts to pantomime when faced with the futility of 
more explicit questioning, making each component of his question visible 
through gesture.
 Questions do not disappear on stage. Going unheard, they emphati-
cally reappear as a performance that grabs the eye of the addressee. Pozzo 
replies to Estragon’s performance, “Ah! Why couldn’t you say so before?”45 
Yet Estragon’s need to corporealize the question offers us an inkling into 
how Beckett’s novels submerge their questions past the point of visibility 
or the silence of pantomime. This moment in Godot signals a fundamental 
bifurcation of questioning between Beckett’s novels and his theater. Beck-
ett’s stage will increasingly make questions explicit through the perform-
er’s body. In Rough for Radio II and Rough for Theater II (whose titles indicate 
both a provisional art form—the rough draft—and the roughness of force 
applied between the characters) the activity of questioning that befalls the 
reader of Beckett’s novels is aggressively staged. The questions at the heart 
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of What Where, “Did you give him the works?” “He didn’t say anything?” 
“Begged for mercy?” allow the Beckettian vectors of work, need, and physi-
cal distress to converge in the scene of interrogation.46
 We measure the impoverishment of Beckett’s work in its failure to call 
or to command the reader, yet at the same time without ceasing to invoke 
the reader. If it calls on the reader, it calls “but ill.” The reader shares 
Molloy’s difficulty in answering the call of an imperative whose voice is 
always dissipating and that seems to alert the addressee only to its impo-
tence. How does the impoverished text ask questions? In his Beckett study 
L’Oeuvre sans qualités, Bruno Clément states, “In truth, the Beckettian text is 
outside questions in the traditional sense: it does not ask any, does not ask 
any of itself any more than it leaves any out.”47 For Clément, Beckett’s work 
neither poses questions in the traditional sense nor leaves questioning off 
to the side. Beckett does not utilize the question mark with frequency. His 
writing shows “how it is” (the title of one of his novels) and our route to 
his work is through the question “How did it get this way?” How It Is as a 
title, for example, seems to cry out for its formulation as a question (How 
is it?). As Clément observes, a provocation to question lurks even within 
Beckett’s titles: Watt is recast by the reader as What? and The Unnamable as 
Why? Even Beckett’s characters seem to deflect questions with a shrug of 
the shoulders. As the narrator of “Enough” explains, “What do I know of 
a man’s destiny? I could tell you more about radishes. For them he had a 
fondness. If I saw one I would name it without hesitation.”48 The topic of 
man’s destiny, the convergence of life and questioning, is dropped in favor 
of talking about radishes. Nevertheless, the seemingly cohesive statement 
about naming radishes comes apart as it provokes us to ask: What would 
a radish be named? Are radishes as numerous as mushrooms, and with 
as many types and species? Could a radish be given a proper name? Talk-
ing about radishes is not, for Beckett, the opposite of raising questions. It 
is precisely this affirmative gesture of Beckett’s prose that forecloses ques-
tions, but in the process saddles the reader with the responsibility for ask-
ing them. This injunction to question is man’s destiny in the twenty-first 
century.
 And yet the way Beckett’s work closes out questioning is not without 
interest.49 An example of how Molloy begs questioning can be seen in the 
single encounter Molloy describes with his mother. Here he foregrounds 
how he “got into communication” with her:
The room smelled of ammonia, oh not merely of ammonia, but of ammo-
nia, ammonia. She knew it was me, by my smell. Her shrunken hairy old 
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face lit up, she was happy to smell me. She jabbered away with a rattle of 
dentures and most of the time didn’t realize what she was saying. Any-
one but myself would have been lost in this clattering gabble, which can 
only have stopped during her brief instants of unconsciousness. In any 
case I didn’t come to listen to her. I got into communication with her by 
knocking on her skull. One knock meant yes, two no, three I don’t know, 
four money, five goodbye. I was hard put to ram this code into her ruined 
and frantic understanding, but I did it, in the end. That she should confuse 
yes, no, I don’t know and goodbye, was all the same to me, I confused 
them myself. But that she should associate the four knocks with anything 
but money was something to be avoided at all costs. During the period of 
training therefore, at the same time as I administered the four knocks on 
her skull, I stuck a bank-note under her nose or in her mouth. In the inno-
cence of my heart! For she seemed to have lost, if not absolutely all notion 
of mensuration, at least the faculty of counting beyond two. It was too far 
for her, yes, the distance was too great, from one to four. By the time she 
came to the fourth knock she imagined she was only at the second, the 
first two having been erased from her memory as completely as if they 
had never been felt, though I don’t quite see how something never felt can 
be erased from the memory, and yet it is a common occurrence. She must 
have thought I was saying no to her all the time, whereas nothing was fur-
ther from my purpose.50
This is Beckett’s hermetic world, in which there is not enough air to laugh. 
Our gasps of disbelief, the painful chuckles under breath, even the way we 
imitatively hit our palms against our foreheads at the proceedings, consti-
tute attempts to decompress the text. Molloy’s description of his commu-
nicative laboratory, turning his mother’s head into a hybrid Morse code 
receiver and ATM machine, is disarmingly matter-of-fact. Its unperturbed 
and unalarmed tone requires us, however, to take up questions (and alarm) 
on our own time.
 The brutal abbreviation of Molloy’s semiotic system magnetizes our 
inquiry. Following the logic of the petitio principii, we seek the premises 
overlooked by Molloy’s assertions. Our questions interrupt the business-
as-usual mood of the passage: we want to learn the costs and profits of this 
system of “fundamental sounds.” If the smell and taste of money anchors 
its signification to four knocks, by what sensory hinge did Molloy con-
nect “yes” to one knock or “I don’t know” to three? Inherited wisdom tells 
us that money does not smell (pecuniam non olet): Does it smell enough 
to establish a syntax? Is its smell more pungent than the double-knock 
156 •  ChaPTer 4
emphasis of Molloy’s claim that her room smelled not only of ammonia but 
“ammonia, ammonia”?
 The mother’s forgetfulness becomes the agency for our questioning, a 
source for questions that the passage is unable to articulate. This forgetful-
ness calls our attention to the learning scenario described by the narrator. 
Molloy claims he was “hard put to ram this code into her ruined and frantic 
understanding, but I did it, in the end.” But what end is there to forgetting? 
By what signal or measure did he estimate that his mother understood this 
code? Is the institutor of the code merely an institutor of violence? How are 
we to discriminate between bludgeoning the other and purveying a mes-
sage to her? Amnesia challenges the Pavlovian principle that repetition pro-
duces learning and memory. Amnesia provides the frame for the questions 
with which we disturb the fait accompli of the communicative transaction.
 The questions elicited by Beckett’s scenario are also literary. To what 
extent is Beckett returning here to the episode in Marcel Proust’s Nom de 
Pays: Le Pays? In this section of La Recherche, the narrator Marcel cannot 
fall asleep in his strange new setting of Balbec. Marcel communicates with 
his grandmother, who is in the adjoining room, by knocking on the wall 
between them, signaling his distress in the moments he needs warm milk. 
Years later he is overwhelmed with an involuntary memory of these trans-
missions when he sees this wall: the wall, the former obstacle of contact, 
through time becomes an instrument that still registers and emits those 
percussive signals between him and his grandmother. In Molloy, Beckett 
sees no need to have a wall. Beckett works with reduced means and the 
knocking happens directly on the skull. Yet the closed circuit of Molloy’s 
communication invites us to ask about the supposed directness of this com-
munication. Time for Beckett does not arrive, through memory, with the 
redemptive force it displays in Proust. Forgoing memory, Beckett’s charac-
ter tries to communicate directly with forgetfulness.
 Beckett precipitates our questions most intensively around that vault 
of the unsaid, the cliché. In the passage cited above, “She was happy to 
smell me” varies only slightly from “She was happy to see me,” and con-
stitutes the new idiom for greeting in Beckett’s sensory-deprived universe. 
Another cliché that calls upon our scrutiny occurs in Malone Dies. Very open 
minded, the narrator enumerates his efforts to make friends with a broad 
array of peoples, including the institutionalized:
My relations with Jackson were of short duration. I could have put up 
with him as a friend, but unfortunately he found me disgusting, as did 
Johnson, Wilson, Nicholson and Watson, all whore-sons. I then tried, for a 
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space, to lay hold of a kindred spirit among the inferior races, red, yellow, 
chocolate, and so on. And if the plague-stricken had been less difficult of 
access I would have intruded upon them too, ogling, sidling, leering, ineff-
ing and conating, my heart palpitating. With the insane too I failed, by a 
hair’s breadth.51
In solitude, making a mental list of friends may help us affirm some con-
nection to the world. Malone undertakes a more Beckettian task: a list of 
failed friendships. He seems to make his attempts according to various tax-
onomical systems. He offers us, for example, his failure to befriend people 
with the family name ending in -son. The genre of his recollections more 
closely resembles a phonebook rather than a diary. He itemizes the races 
using two colors and a flavor. The verbs by which Malone describes his 
befriending gestures remain intransitive and prepositionless. He sidles but 
not up next to anyone, ogles without ogling someone. The words he enu-
merates display the disengagement of a thesaurus entry. He ineffs about 
how he ineffs, breathing and leaving everything unspoken around his 
friend-target. With some surprise then we find at the end of this list a mea-
surement, an estimate of how far Malone was from potential friendship. He 
says he failed with the insane “by a hair’s breadth.” What would be the 
signs of successful, rather than failed, friendship with the insane? On what 
side of the ledger would we put their smiles, or their laughter at our jokes? 
Does this “hair’s breadth” refer to an institutional isolation, the width of a 
wall that makes the insane “difficult of access”?
 In most circumstances we accept an idiom without further inquiry, for 
we know what it means without having to interrogate its form. Yet after the 
Linnean systematicity of the passage, we set about measuring and decom-
posing this expression in order to see how we can situate Malone’s effort at 
relationship. We have here the very opposite of an appropriative discourse, 
or literature that seizes everyday figures of speech in order to renovate or 
claim their meaning. Beckett’s matter-of-fact presentation sentences what 
is unsaid in the cliché to appear. Our questions are what get the cliché to 
confess.
Syntax of Weakness
“Someday somebody will find an adequate form, a syntax of weakness,” 
says Beckett in an interview with Lawrence Harvey.52 This utterance is sur-
prisingly optimistic for Beckett because weak syntax implies a form and 
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method for expressing the sine qua non of Beckett’s literary reality: move-
ment toward a minimum that verges between the adequate and inadequate 
(as in the phrase “adequate food and shelter”).53 Beckett’s own search for 
this form and syntax becomes apparent in the way he contrasts his work 
with James Joyce. He describes Joyce’s project as seeking an utmost in sig-
nifying potential: “[Joyce] was making words do the absolute maximum 
of work. There isn’t a syllable that isn’t superfluous. . . . The more Joyce 
knew, the more he could.”54 Beckett is not interested in clarifying any 
details (what Joyce knew, what Joyce’s work could do). Beckett opposes 
the direction of Joyce’s more, the addition of knowledge and the subsequent 
amplification of literary capacity. By contrast Beckett observes, “I’m work-
ing with impotence, ignorance. I don’t think impotence has been exploited 
in the past. . . . I think anyone nowadays who pays the slightest attention 
to his own experience finds it the experience of a non-knower, a non-can-er 
[somebody who cannot].”55 Beckett follows Joyce in the sense that neither 
is interested in literary realism where expression provides “adequate refer-
ence” in forging an inherent and intuitive resemblance between literature 
and the world.
 Throughout his career Beckett experiments with impoverished and bro-
ken syntax. How It Is is perhaps the best example of this. The story features 
a character on his way to Pim, who crawls face down in the mud; his only 
possessions are a sack of tinned food and a can opener.56 Like the narrator 
in The Unnamable, the subject exists in an acoustic whirlwind of voices: he 
only says, into the mud, what he hears. The novel begins:
how it was I quote before Pim with Pim after Pim how it is three parts I 
say it as I hear it
voice once without quaqua on all sides then in me when the panting stops 
tell me again finish telling me invocation
past moments old dreams back again or fresh like those that pass or things 
things always and memories I say them as I hear them murmur them in 
the mud
in me that were without when the panting stops scraps of an ancient voice 
in me not mine57
Beckett’s weakened syntax mirrors the weakened condition of his character. 
As Christopher Ricks observes, “It is not that such syntax is weak; rather, 
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that it is a ‘syntax of weakness,’ pressing on, unable to relinquish its perse-
verance and to arrive at severance.”58 Ricks suggests that the syntax cannot 
even lay claim to weakness, but emerges from the component incapacities 
to either continue or stop. The story can be discerned from its syntax. As 
the removal of grammar leaves words stranded, the character is likewise 
stranded. Pim is unreachable without a grammar. And without punctua-
tion or grammar to structure the relation between language and experi-
ence, their mutual relationship becomes forlorn. How are we as readers to 
refer to these words scattered across the page? Are they sentences or para-
graphs? Are they citations dictated to the narrator by a voice he hears?59 
The words of the text are not domesticated by the sentence that convention-
ally organizes words into meaningful units (the hierarchy of subject versus 
object or the main versus subordinate clauses). Consequently, we look at 
the words before we are able to arrange them into a pattern of meaning. 
We see the page without being cued as to how to construe its organization. 
How It Is does not look like a novel. The words are arrayed like separate 
organisms on a microscopic slide, or like the marks in a cutting board.
 Beckett’s impoverished and broken syntax makes us, as readers, into 
beggars. The nonrelation between terms on the page forces our eye to take 
a vagrant itinerant path rather than obeying a syntactic linearity. A period 
delineates the literary utterance. In the absence of this delineation our eye 
moves from left to right and from right to left, as if to plumb the orienta-
tion each phrase has toward its neighbor. The process is repeated on the 
morphological level. Here we do not move from word to word as if cross-
ing a river. In place of this transversal How It Is gives us those words as if 
they had been haphazardly dropped into a lake, offering no guidance. We 
are forced to assess each word by the ripple of water over its form, or by its 
submersion.
 The broken and impoverished syntax in How It Is is beyond appeal to 
Beckett as author because the novel reads as a work of amanuensis rather 
than authorship. Our reading process acknowledges the fact of each word’s 
inscription before its relational status: as a place in relation to a group of 
words. Beckett detaches the formal clarity of the statements from their 
revelatory or communicative function. Philosopher Stanley Cavell char-
acterizes Beckett’s writing as having a “hidden literality.” By “hidden,” 
however, he refers to the way in which it is the reader who hides what is 
exposed in Beckett’s prose. Cavell locates the language that Beckett has dis-
covered or invented not in its use in dialogue but rather “in its grammar, 
its particular way of making sense, especially the quality it has of what I 
will call hidden literality. The words strew obscurities across our path and 
160 •  ChaPTer 4
seem willfully to thwart comprehension; and then time after time we dis-
cover that their meaning has been missed only because it was so utterly 
bare—totally, therefore unnoticeably, in view.”60 “Totally, therefore unno-
ticeably, in view” describes the condition of Beckett’s vagabonds both on 
stage and in his novels (and in our world). Cavell’s comment brings to 
mind Molloy’s description of his nightly efforts at finding a place to sleep. 
He calls this “Hiding, but not provocatively.”61 Like the vagrant Molloy, 
Beckett’s text can hide only in the open. The prose of How It Is lives up to 
its title: it shows us a state of being thus. The secret of Beckett’s text is not 
something it willfully keeps but the unremitting problem it poses for us. 
The provocation of literature that claims an inner lair or fictional reserve 
(how the court system operates in Kafka’s novels, for example) is to be con-
trasted with Beckett’s “invocation,” this voice that dictates the novel.
 Because the syntax is so broken and scant we as readers have to supply 
syntactical construction in order to make any sense of the text. Taking the 
second group of words from How It Is as an example: “voice once without 
quaqua on all sides then in me when the panting stops tell me again finish 
telling me invocation.” Eager to condense the words into larger but more 
comprehensible units we might join “without” to “quaqua,” creating the 
impression that this voice is “without quaqua” or without nonsense.62 Yet 
we have to annul this conclusion because this quaqua nonsense is the voice. 
“Without” designates the locus of the voice.
 The syntax we devise for the words we read on Beckett’s page has a 
provisional quality. The text invites us to make errors and then forces us to 
rescan them. We read in a rocking motion rather than in a strictly forward 
or prospective one. This is intimately connected to the process of the text 
itself. What the narrator says is only what he hears. Conventional syntax 
runs aground on the dispossession of the voice, of language unattached to 
grammatical subjects. How would the rules of grammar arbitrate this situ-
ation in which everything is a citation? The phrase “tell me again finish 
telling me invocation” suggests, though we cannot be sure, that the voice 
tells the speaker its invocation. In Beckett’s scenario, the speaker does not 
invoke the voice as he might the wisdom of the ancients (though he calls it 
an “ancient voice”). Beckett’s novel turns this inside out: the voice invokes, 
literally lodges its voice inside the speaker. Bersani and Dutoit describe the 
situation in Beckett’s text: “He [the narrator] may be just that: not a person 
with a history, but merely a kind of stopping point for voices, an intersec-
tion of extortionary speech acts, a collecting depot for all the words whose 
source of transmission remains uncertain.”63 The figures offered by Bersani 
and Dutoit seem to cancel the poverty of Beckett’s work. Instead of becom-
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ing a stopping point for voices, Beckett’s personae transmit and disperse the 
voices they hear; instead of becoming a collecting depot for words, the nar-
rator becomes an aquilex, a semi-open and unclenched hand through whom 
language flows. Beckett’s weakened syntax presents a record or the invoice 
of this tale charting the dispossession of voice.
Abandonment
Beckett’s text is accessible to his reader through awareness of strategies of 
textual abandonment. If the typical story of an abandonment begins with 
presence or ownership and leads through misadventure to abandonment or 
loss, Beckett is its inversion. For Beckett abandonment is a premise rather 
than an outcome. Georges Bataille acknowledges this when he writes that a 
line from Dante’s Inferno, “Lasciate ogni speranza voi qu’entrate,”64 “could 
well be the epigraph for this absolutely striking book [Molloy], whose 
exclamation, uninterrupted by paragraphs, explores with such unflinch-
ing irony the extreme possibilities of indifference and misery.”65 Bataille 
suggests that shedding hope may be a precondition for reading Beckett’s 
work, an imperative we must endlessly undertake. Abandonment in Beck-
ett occurs at the very beginning of the story rather than at its end (where it 
might have functioned as a gesture of being done with it all).66 His charac-
ters enter the stage, already abandoned, and the abandonment continues as 
the story unfolds. The economy of abandonment enacts chance and dispos-
session. The alternative, the more conventional story of being abandoned, 
is for Beckett a farce. He calls this the “farce of giving and receiving.”
 Beckett’s career, in other words, goes beyond a limited view of aban-
donment defined as leaving something unfinished or unconcluded. Aban-
donment is also “to” something: abandonment to the elements, to an 
uncertain future, to chance, the orphaning of Oedipus rather than just nail-
ing him to a side of the cliff. These measures, which I argue make Beckett’s 
view of abandonment close to impoverished dereliction, commence long 
after the intention to begin has died (“I don’t know when I died”) and fin-
ish only when the formula for stopping has been given up.67
 This nonlimited view of abandonment becomes clearer if we consider 
Beckett’s pivotal short story, “From an Abandoned Work.” The narrator of 
the story seems pressed into finishing some arbitrary tale involving, in no 
particular order, his mother seen waving to him from a window, a white 
horse, his aimless wandering through thickets, his sore throat, and a man, 
Balfe, who terrified him as a youngster (“Now he is dead and I resemble 
162 •  ChaPTer 4
him”).68 Cohn’s description of the incidents as “unconcatenated” suggests 
how the story is in fact a collection of contained rather than far-reaching 
failures.69 The travails of the hero are productive of one thing: conclusive-
ness. By being able to push on without being taxed, the narrator leaves his 
condition of ever-trying intact, as if it just had not hit upon the right means, 
no matter how irrational, to express itself: “There was a time I tried to get 
relief by beating my head against something, but I gave it up.”70
 S. E. Gontarski uses the term “abandonment” to describe Beckett’s tex-
tual history rather than an operative principle to his work: “Abandoned 
in 1966, ‘Le Dépeupleur’ was also unabandoned, ‘completed’ in 1970, and 
translated as The Lost Ones in 1971.”71 Though Gontarski’s quotation marks 
around “completed” hint that even the published work both appeared and 
was abandoned, he uses the term “abandoned” as little more than a syn-
onym for “unpublished.” Abandoned works end up in the Beckett archive, 
whereas unabandoned ones end up on the shelf. Gontarski’s perspective 
overlooks the paradoxically generative function of abandonment in Beck-
ett’s writing. The character Lucky in Waiting for Godot may be so named 
because his thinking, a hymn to labors left unfinished by Testew, Cunard, 
and others, invites chance. On the surface, Gontarski seems to have it right: 
if Beckett abandons his work, does this not mean that he stops writing it? 
The abandonment of literature, the abandonment of something fictional, 
allows abandonment to seep into the process of its creation. It is not about 
abandoning something once and for all, but about persistently giving some-
thing up, giving it up to an unknown future.
 Many of the themes from Beckett’s oeuvre make an appearance in 
“From an Abandoned Work,” but only in congealed and almost dead form. 
The murmuring that envelops Molloy, for example, is reduced to a mut-
tering, “the sound of my voice all day long muttering the same old things 
I don’t listen to, not even mine it was at the end of the day, like a mar-
moset sitting on my shoulder with its bushy tail, keeping me company.”72 
Agonizingly ubiquitous in Molloy, the disembodied voice here assumes the 
same friendly proximity as a captain’s parrot, an isolated point of enuncia-
tion. Beckett allows the speaker some distant claim of ownership over this 
voice: “only a voice dreaming and droning all around, that is something, 
the voice that once was in your mouth.”73 In similar fashion, the ending of 
The Unnamable (“you must go on, I can’t go on, I’ll go on”) atrophies here 
into a question, an option: “But what’s the sense of going on with all this, 
there is none.”74 The Unnamable never inquires about the meaning or sense 
of his going on, as his speech is wrapped up in this impossibility and neces-
sity of speaking. The coercive state of dereliction in the novel is absent in 
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the short story. Going on with suggests an accompaniment and instrument 
for going on: if he does not go on with this story, the narrator implies, he 
can go on with something else. The short story appends such prepositions 
and adverbs to going on in order to cushion its horror. Elsewhere the nar-
rator says that questions come to him when he walks: “How shall I go on 
another day? and then, How did I ever go on another day?”75 This question 
separates a capacity to go on from his understanding. The narrator articu-
lates it as a daily struggle, like a man living from paycheck to paycheck. It 
is a struggle by sunlight.
 At the conclusion of the story the narrator says he just went on, “my 
body doing its best without me.”76 The separation of body and self is so 
neat that the body functions fine without him. The isolation of the cogito 
resolves itself. Yet there is no feeling here about the abandonment of one by 
the other, or of both. It must be the only instance in all of Beckett in which 
the best is achieved, rather than the worst, or the worse.
 Beckett’s abandonment of reference is frequently contrasted to the 
model of the committed artwork as defined by Sartre. In his essay “Com-
mitment,” Adorno groups Kafka’s work with Beckett’s:
The minimal promise of happiness [Beckett’s works] contain, which 
refuses to be traded for comfort, cannot be had for a price less than total 
dislocation, to the point of worldlessness. Here every commitment to the 
world must be abandoned to satisfy the ideal of the committed work of 
art. . . . This paradox, which might be charged with sophistry, can be sup-
ported without much philosophy by the simplest experience: Kafka’s 
prose and Beckett’s plays, or the truly monstrous novel The Unnameable, 
have an effect by comparison with which officially committed works look 
like pantomimes. Kafka and Beckett arouse the fear which existentialism 
merely talks about.77
In Adorno’s dialectical understanding, the autonomous work achieves 
an effect that is the project of its opposite, the committed work. Accord-
ing to this claim, Beckett’s work acquires political resonance not through 
engaged writing but through the reader’s “simple experience” of this text 
that has “abandoned every commitment to the world.” Adorno accurately 
remarks that Beckett does not enter easily into philosophical elaboration 
and that the truth of Beckett’s work is not measured by its stated project 
(about which Beckett was notoriously silent) but by our experience of his 
work. At the same time, the simplicity of Beckett’s work is not one that 
strikes the reader as a completed simplicity. And in avoiding all precon-
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ceived vehicles of sense, Beckett’s text assigns a challenging task of under-
standing to the reader.78 We can qualify Adorno’s argument that Beckett’s 
writing as “autonomous” in light of the impoverishment that characterizes 
Beckett’s writing. In the above passage Adorno insists on abandonment as 
the constructive principle of Beckett’s work. Adorno understands this more 
as a gesture of abandonment, however, and less as a condition, more as 
an operation that is performed (once and for all) than as a task. He says, 
in short, that Beckett has abandoned “every commitment to the world” 
in order to “satisfy the ideal of the committed work.” Yet Beckett’s work 
clearly raises as a question whether abandonment can be understood dia-
lectically, whether it is—in the derelict existence of his characters, for exam-
ple—something that can be substituted for or exchanged for its opposite 
(the hallmark of dialectical thinking). Adorno inscribes the gesture of aban-
donment within an economy of means: in saying that abandonment serves 
a project (in fact, the opposite project), Adorno suggests that abandonment 
is something that happens purposefully. But is it possible to ascertain the 
precise destination and outcome of what is abandoned? This recuperation 
is something that Beckett’s work systematically forecloses as part of its pur-
suit of abandonment. In Endgame this is apparent in a succinct exchange:
CLOV. Do you believe in the life to come?
HAMM. Mine was always that.79
The words of redemption persist, as in this exchange between Hamm and 
Clov, but they are used in a context in which they are useless. Hamm’s 
response suggests the way life has and has not always been displaced by 
the real life, the life to come. Even where the transcendence—the hereaf-
ter—is asserted, it does not attain credibility and flusters the reader by 
turning everyday life into a life still to happen, a life stricken by a great 
pause, a life in which nothing happens. Beckett draws us in through these 
words that seem forlorn of meaning. He draws us into a discussion that 
takes place not only between helpless characters but through the help-
less condition of language itself. It asks something impossible of us, 
namely, to conceive our present life as a life to come, and to conceive this 
present life within the terms of a transcendence that has been lost. In this 
typical Beckettian exchange, the language is preeminently closed, asser-
tive and pithy. At the same time it relies on and needs the reader to com-
plete its sense (a completion it constantly reminds us is impossible). In 
this exchange between Hamm and Clov, we are asked implicitly to assist 
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the words toward a meaning, a meaning those words deny. Beckett’s text 
does not “cry out” for help: the state of need in his language is balanced by 
that language’s indifference to the interpreter. Therefore, helpless writing 
is in a strange dependency on the reader, since it is helpless to say how it 
is that it requires our assistance. But fundamentally, Beckett’s writings do 
not, as Adorno claims, simply abjure commitment to the world. Much of 
Beckett’s writing hobbles toward a state of disability that it cannot name, 
a state that language in fact annuls: “Unable, unable, it’s easy to talk about 
being unable, whereas in reality nothing is more difficult.”80 The opposite 
of talk, chatter, and discourse, the reality of being unable rips open Beck-
ett’s fiction. In the process, Beckett’s work disables our normal questioning 
powers: it makes us sensitive to the way in which this absence of capacity 
exceeds our temptations to coerce and designate it.
 Beckett’s literature of need, its tireless effort at being without, is there-
fore not graspable as an “autonomous” entity that has sworn off every ref-
erence to the world. Quite the opposite is true, as its inabilities insert it into 
a dependent relation on the world. Franz Kafka, whose writing Adorno 
compares to Beckett’s in the above passage, describes just such neediness as 
the defining characteristic of writing: “Writing’s lack of independence from 
the world, its dependence on the maid who tends the fire, on the cat warm-
ing itself by the stove; it is even dependent on the poor old human being 
warming himself by the stove. All these are independent activities ruled 
by their own laws; only writing is helpless, does not dwell in itself, is fri-
volity and despair.”81 The situations that Kafka depicts as being situations 
of dependency—the maid tending the fire, the cat by the fire, the man by 
the stove-—are not helpless situations in the extreme and singular way that 
writing is helpless. These needs are met functionally, the way a cold man 
is dependent on the fire for warmth. By contrast, writing is without tools. 
Nothing can help writing, and because it does not follow a law of the “self” 
or subject, it cannot help itself. The absence or need implicated by writing 
is intolerable. When Kafka discerns the vagrancy of literature in claiming 
that writing “does not dwell in itself,” he means this lack that is writing’s is 
not the possession of writing, something it actively showcases and that we 
can designate as a “lack.” Writing cannot propose its own house rules by 
which to represent and dispense with its need: it goes elsewhere.82 As if to 
prolong or accentuate its helpless condition, writing ends up being depen-
dent for Kafka on relations that seem to leave it out: on the cat, the maid, 
and the “poor old human being.” Writing has no choice but to forfeit its 
security of self-enclosure.
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Hypothetical Imperatives
In his Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant contrasts the 
“categorical imperative,” the imperative declaring an action to be of itself 
objectively necessary without reference to any purpose or end, with the 
“hypothetical imperative,” which prescribes an action but only as a condi-
tion of a possible goal.83 For Kant, in other words, the categorical imper-
ative involves a good in and of itself. The hypothetical imperative, by 
contrast, is a good with a purpose—as a means to something. The categori-
cal imperative for Kant is the moral necessity and thus absolute and global. 
The hypothetical imperative is normative and lacks the absolute. Kant’s 
thinking is structured by this dyad, whereby the morally categorical or nec-
essary is opposed to the morally hypothetical or normative.
 For Beckett, morality and rules of conduct cannot be anything other 
than an impoverished form of the normative. Beckett therefore eliminates 
the categorical first half of the Kantian dyad. Unhinged from moral neces-
sity, Molloy’s hypothetical imperative assumes the urgency, the impera-
tive necessity Kant reserves for the categorical. By moving the imperative 
mood to the side of the hypothetical, Beckett simultaneously impover-
ishes it. Thus a critique of Kant’s categorical can be glimpsed: if Beckett’s 
hypothetical imperative indeed retains the force of the categorical, then it 
impoverishes grammar and even perhaps the Kantian system of moral dis-
tinction. Furthermore, Beckett’s hypothetical imperative is an imperative 
mood made poorer even than Kant’s normative nonnecessity. It is actu-
ally hypothetical—an imperative estranged from any premise, any goal. 
Kant’s figures are always endowed with necessary resources for thought, 
philosophical and aesthetic contemplation,84 but Beckett’s characters lack 
the mind, status, and full stomach to be anything other than hobos and 
desperados.
 In Beckett’s world of impoverished means, the imperative is less a 
grammatical mood than a loose signifier, liberated from obligation to mean-
ing and flapping in the wind. In the novel Molloy the character claims to 
detect in a murmur, his only companion, something other than white noise: 
“In its framing I thought I heard something new. For after the usual blar-
ney there followed this solemn warning, Perhaps it is already too late. It 
was in Latin, nimis sero, I think that’s Latin. Charming things, hypothet-
ical imperatives.”85 For Molloy, interpretation of the murmur is vital and 
faithlessness to it unthinkable. He receives the hypothetical imperative of 
the murmur like a gong signaling a lost thing, a marking of the passage of 
time more than a command. The hypothesis has swallowed the imperative, 
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yet without producing a merely undecidable world of ambiguities, a world 
in which contraries flourish. Shorn from its end, the hypothesis becomes 
strangely categorical. In the totality of its supposition, the hypothetical 
imperative becomes a parody of an activity done for its own sake.
 Theodor Adorno sums up the rationale of Beckett’s world in writing 
that “the senselessness of an action becomes the reason for doing it.”86 
Molloy refers later to his “so-called imperatives.”87 Between the French 
soi-disant and the “so-called” lies the difference between the imperative’s 
self-saying authority (its diction intrinsic to its event) and its so-called 
(by Molloy, via Kant) or supposed or rumored status. Molloy experiences 
ongoing uncertainty about what the imperative says, whom it addresses 
and in what language, and about whether an imperative has been enunci-
ated at all. This imperative follows an irrational or kettle logic.88 Molloy 
notes that only a slight shift separates what he hears from the usual “blar-
ney” or prattle of the murmur: he is addressed by the sudden “framing” of 
the murmur, which marks Molloy as the addressee without providing any 
content to the frame. The murmur deposits only a fragment of sense, an 
urgent but enigmatic marker of time: nimis sero.89 Molloy can translate the 
Latin for us but cannot offer a reference for the imperative: late for what? 
The demanding nature of this imperative is that the reference of the imper-
ative has been cut off, so that instead of being late for something, Molloy is 
late, period.
 Address without reference is the subject of endless experimentation in 
Beckett’s work. Beckett is interested in the hypothetical demand because 
the impoverished artwork communicates to the reader through need. 
The artwork may be needy because it can in fact only make hypothetical 
demands: the inability of literature to enact something or to authoritatively 
enter the practical world of action is the source of its vagrancy and poverty. 
Beckett’s work to this end reorients the conventional separation of perfor-
mative speech acts from constative or descriptive ones.90 Throughout his 
late novella Worstward Ho, Beckett employs the imperative “say”:
It stands. What? Yes. Say it stands. Had to up in the end and stand. Say 
bones. No bones but say bones. Say ground. No ground but say ground. 
So as to say pain. No mind and pain? Say yes that the bones may pain till 
no choice but stand. Somehow up and stand. Or better worse remains. Say 
remains of mind where none to permit of pain. Pain of bones till no choice 
but up and stand. Somehow up. Somehow stand. Remains of mind where 
none for the sake of pain. Here of bones. Other examples if needs must. Of 
pain. Relief from. Change of.
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All of old. Nothing else ever. But never so failed. Worse failed. With care 
never worse failed.91
 The text commands us to resuppose these elements, to say bones, say 
ground, say mind, to say everything in short that might be supposed of a 
character who stands. The imperative “say” is hypothetical because it truly 
asks us to suppose something where there are literally no grounds for sup-
posing it. The imperative transpires in the face of its impossibility. On the 
one hand, “say” enlists us to mouth the words in succession, the way the 
lips of readers sometimes mimic what the eyes see. On the other hand, the 
verb entails a wholly provisional demand, active only within the supple-
mentary space of the example (as encountered in such phrases as “say you 
are walking down the street and . . . ”).92
 The hypothetical imperative prolongs the poverty discerned by the 
text in its opening sentence. Disavowing that anything can be supposed or 
taken for granted, or as granted, around it, the text demands us to suppose 
these things. The text asks us—tentatively, yet imperatively—to concede 
something to the representation. In a way our interest in the text is sus-
tained by a sequence of charitable gestures sustaining a sentence that only 
apparently stands on its own. This “say”—directed at the reader as well as 
at the author—asks that something be given or granted that the text does 
not possess. The reader’s charity is implored by a double movement in 
Beckett’s text, a back-and-forth movement that renders the feeling that the 
text is unable to get started, cannot stand or push off from any sure ground. 
At the same time there is the feeling of there being only premise, an abyss 
of presuppositions. Presupposing is an endless task, not because anything 
can be presupposed but because nothing can be presupposed. Nothing is 
taken for granted in the simplest of predicates: it must be shown to be sup-
posed and then, once this is withdrawn, must be conceded by the imagina-
tion of the reader.
 Predication becomes a technocratic activity. Though the narrators of The 
Unnamable and How It Is both ascribe their words to a situation of dicta-
tion, Worstward Ho assumes the cadence of an office memo: “Other exam-
ples if needs must. Of pain. Relief from. Change of.” Abbreviation is not 
just the method of this text but its very subject. The imperatives to rescind, 
to undo, to correct, are executive decisions on the text itself. Every predica-
tion seems submitted to official review in order to excise all excess. Though 
it aspires to the brevity of an office memo, Beckett’s text is not merely a 
formal exercise. Such strange phrases as “Old and yet old” barely seem to 
inch forward. Yet the phrase suggests that there is a strange residue to even 
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the term “old,” as if the old had changed in the moment of its assertion, 
and this quality had to be reasserted. Did we forget that this image of “it 
stands” was “an image of old” as soon as it was described as such? This 
is the memorial function of this memo. What makes a “picture of old,” an 
“old picture,” this cliché of a thing standing, is our forgetting how it was 
made. And Beckett’s text scrupulously labors through the discrete compo-
nents of this picture (the pain, the bones, the mind) as if they were a set of 
weary joints that needed to be aligned just for the first sentence to become 
possible. The very syntax of the passage is gerontological.
 Beckett once served as James Joyce’s amanuensis, taking dictation as 
Joyce composed Finnegan’s Wake. In his biography of Joyce, Richard Ell-
man recounts the well-known but possibly fictitious moment during this 
dictation in which there is a knock at the door that goes unheard by Beck-
ett. When Joyce says, “Come in,” Beckett dutifully notes it down as part 
of the text. Beckett recollects the moment for Ellman: “Joyce thought for a 
moment, then said, ‘Let it stand.’”93 Joyce says “Stet.” Worstward Ho’s disag-
gregation of “it stands” into its missing components serves both as a reply 
to and an undoing of Joyce’s fiat, his royal permissiveness to let the error 
stand. Joyce’s nod to the error signals the mythic inclusiveness of the Joy-
cean text that absorbs the errors of its own transcription, the accidents of 
the world. Joyce proclaims “come in” to accident and absorbs it into his 
text.
 By contrast, Beckett’s text presents us with a different source of error 
and a different readerly relation to it. Worstward Ho invites us not to “come 
in” but to knock again on language in order to disperse and excise its 
excesses. Subjecting “it stands” to a withdrawal of all support, Beckett’s 
prose cuts back and forth between the poverty of the predication and the 
provision of what it needs. The supposition “say” concedes something to 
the reader and to the author himself, something that is necessary so as to 
go on. It is in this sense that I call the supposition a provisional form: the 
supposition, in the absence of a ground, does not manufacture a ground 
as much as it temporarily offers us one. It is the offering of a state of crisis, 
and to one in a state of crisis. Colloquially, “provisions” denote supplies 
meant to help endure a temporary crisis: etymologically, these are resources 
that look toward a future after the crisis and toward a time of permanence. 
In Beckett the provisional never ends. Even the provisional gestures are 
helpless: each provisional supposition in the passage I have been discuss-
ing seems exposed to a need for further supposition and further assis-
tance. A state of temporariness has become final in Beckett’s prose, as if it 
had no future to look forward to. Beckett’s work everywhere testifies to a 
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condition very different from Baudelaire’s description of the modern art-
ist as one who distills the eternal from the ephemeral: “Il s’agit de dégager 
de la mode ce qu’elle peut contenir de poétique dans l’historique , de tirer 
l’éternel du transitoire.”94 Instead of merging opposites dialectically so that 
the one (the eternal) appears in the guise of the other (the ephemeral), Beck-
ett’s provisional mode seems without alternative and without opposition, 
and yet at the same time threatened.
The Provisional
Beckett’s work can be characterized by its provisionality, its temporality of 
need. The microscopic adjustments and incisions performed on words such 
as “worse” or “less” (resembling the minutes of an office meeting) suggest 
the meticulousness of the process by which Beckett writes worstward (or by 
which he wrote Worstward Ho). Its economy (both in the sense of its mini-
malism and in the transactions it enters into with the reader) is not laissez-
faire. Returning to the passage quoted above from Worstward Ho: “It stands. 
What? Yes. Say it stands. Had to up in the end and stand. Say bones. No 
bones but say bones. Say ground. No ground but say ground. So as to say 
pain. No mind and pain? Say yes that the bones may pain till no choice but 
stand.”95
 In Beckett’s difficult prose, the reader lands with initial relief on the 
predication “It stands,” one of only a handful of complete sentences in the 
entire book. The sense of relief is quickly dispelled since it becomes clear 
that this is provisional. Beckett, whose stage direction in a play discussed 
earlier prompts “no verticals,” feels that even this brief “it stands” should 
not in fact be allowed to stand. It says too much. “It stands” implicates an 
entire anthropological and semiotic history: the two-word statement sug-
gests something standing as well as something to stand on, a ground for 
the figure. “It stands” reflects the relation of figure to ground in its most 
architectural moment: it holds a position and can become the basis of the 
narrative of assertions, even if that position is of an abstract/formal nature 
(as in the phrase “it stands to reason”). This passage proceeds neither to 
empty out nor fill in the first sentence, but rather sets “it stands” adrift and 
turns it into a shipwreck.
 The entire passage exposes the provisionality of the first assertion. The 
text proceeds to deny the existence of everything connoted in the statement 
and all the suppositions that seem necessary to it. The question “What?” 
following the first sentence of the quotation indicates a sense of surprise 
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internal to the text, as it constitutes not an accommodating question, as in 
“What stands?” but rather “What do you mean, ‘it stands’?” The text itself 
therefore seems shocked that things were progressing or were being built 
up so rapidly. It is intent on reminding us of the void that its own utterance 
cannot presume to dispel. There is a total absence of what is supposed to be 
in the predication “it stands,” and against this absence of what it asserts.
 Beckett subjects “it stands” to such thorough examination because the 
task of failure seizes upon any error (and for Beckett, all saying is mis-
saying). The text’s flaws, its lacks, its absence of bones, ground, etc., its 
needfulness, are the moments at which we are addressed by the text. Simul-
taneously transcribing, dictating, and recording, the text employs the “nar-
row writing” etymologically denoted by the term “stenography.” Worstward 
Ho narrows and reduces the space between such antinomial terms as the 
worst and the best, the less and the more. In bringing the mere nearer to the 
most in the goal of the meremost minimum, Beckett forces us to redraw the 
graphs of value and quantity around new axes.
 What lies behind Beckett’s aesthetic interest in the provisional? Written 
in 1946 while he was a volunteer for the Irish Red Cross hospital in France, 
Beckett’s radio broadcast “The Capital of the Ruins” provides insight 
into the way we are addressed by the hypothetical imperatives of Worst-
ward Ho.96 In this piece, Beckett writes about the hospital in Saint Lô, a city 
“bombed out of existence in one night.” Unexploded bombs continued to 
go off after the conclusion of the war and the hospital, which was no more 
than a group of ramshackle huts, nursed the military and civilian wounded 
from both sides. In saying that the hospital would need to be in service for 
years after the end of the war, and that its function could not be a tempo-
rary measure, Beckett writes these striking words: “‘Provisional’ is not the 
term it was, in this universe become provisional.”97
 The provisional therefore does not become “universal” for Beckett the 
way Charles Baudelaire speaks of the ephemeral being substituted for the 
eternal. For Beckett, the meaning of “provisional” is unrecoverable now 
that it is has ironically become the condition of the universe itself. The pro-
visional can no longer be grasped dialectically, in contrast to the permanent 
or the necessary, because it has become our condition and our misery. The 
antonym of provisional has died. Man’s attempt at technological mastery 
over the world has ushered in a state of his total helplessness and his per-
petual hospitalization. The observation here exacerbates the joke encoun-
tered frequently in Beckett’s work in which a pair of haphazardly patched 
pants is compared to the world.98 It is against the backdrop of the bottom-
less need of the war’s victims at the clinic that we need to understand the 
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utterly provisional form of Beckett’s literature. Beckett takes the urgency 
and frailty overheard in the word “provisional” when applied to govern-
ments or hospitals and renders it the status quo of his work. We should not 
be misled by the etymology of provisional that suggests that such a work 
might look to the future, to recovery. In Beckett’s work, there is no future 
for the provisional to look forward to. His work seeks out—with a poor 
memory—what is irreparable in the present, caught not between the provi-
sional and the permanent but between the provisional and the obsolescent.
 Beckett’s provisional retains something of a memory—not the pos-
session of the man with a memory capable of resentment, but a memory 
nevertheless. Beckett’s dialogue with Georges Duthuit, the editor-in-chief 
of the magazine transition in which Beckett publishes several translations, 
took place in 1949. It is strongly informed not only by the aesthetic debates 
raging in the circles of transition, but by Beckett’s experience as a hospital 
volunteer in 1945. Through his discussion of the artwork with Duthuit, the 
memory of his radio report runs softly but pronouncedly. The paradoxi-
cal title of Beckett’s address, “The Capital of the Ruins,” elevates the pro-
visional and proposes a formal center to disaster, the highest ruin of the 
ruins. It reminds us that the “insuperable indigence” he speaks of else-
where in his dialogue with Duthuit is perhaps best understood as another 
form of the provisional. In this radio address, Beckett sums up what passes 
in the charitable moment between volunteers (the “we”) and sufferers (the 
“they”): “What was important was not our having penicillin when they had 
none, nor the unregarding munificence of the French Ministry of Recon-
struction, but the occasional glimpse obtained, by us in them and, who 
knows, by them in us (for they are an imaginative people), of that smile 
at the human conditions as little to be extinguished by bombs as to be 
broadened by the elixirs of Burroughes and Welcome,—the smile deriding, 
among other things, the having and the not having, the giving and the tak-
ing, sickness and health.”99 The condition of the hospital is not what Beck-
ett finds enduring. It is the smile deriding everything eternal and even that 
which mocks the eternal. The last line in the citation above is reminiscent 
of his comment to Duthuit on how the impoverished artwork is “too proud 
for the farce of giving and receiving.”
 Beckett ultimately discovers the provisionality of the place and function 
of art in a temporary hospital set up in a landscape of desolation following 
the war. At first glance both Beckett’s art and the smile he glimpses belong 
to a system of meaning and associations that he is in fact critiquing. Though 
some critics read the radio address as an indication that Beckett believed 
charity to “be our salvation as we await Godot,” the above passage shows 
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that Beckett is not saying that this smile is the signpost of eternal humanity 
or the expression of an understanding.100 To a certain extent our reading of 
this radio address (and through it, of his conversations about art) needs to 
retain the nonintegrated remainder that “humanist” readings of the address 
(as of his work) would brush over. What is alarming about Beckett’s report 
from Saint Lô is the way the smile seems to have a strange inaccessibility 
and can neither be “wiped off” nor intensified into laughter. Beckett says 
this smile is not widened by charity nor reduced by suffering. In the context 
of suffering Beckett finds the death’s rictus, the smile of the skull, on the 
face of the living. There is an obtuse feeling of stasis in this smile since it is 
out of order, outside exchange, and derides among other things the “having 
and not having, sickness and health.” This smile is therefore not a reaction 
to circumstances, suggesting neither relief nor thanks, and is paradoxically 
both immune and helpless. Outside the particularities of historical circum-
stance, it merits that name given to the slight lift at the corners of the mouth 
on ancient Greek statuary: the archaic smile. This smile does not end. For 
all of its momentum toward the worst and its impulse to amputation, Beck-
ett’s work is in fact exclusively dedicated to such negligible and irreducible 
expressions. Beckett does not look for a particular expression in the face of 
the suffering or the poor (there is no face in his radio address) but rather for 
what is inaccessible, the indelible residue, in the face of catastrophe. Beck-
ett pluralizes the expression “human condition” (words not native to the 
Beckett lexicon) as if to suggest the loss of a common condition following 
this catastrophe. At the same time, this impoverished smile is on the faces 
of both doctors and patients. As a novelist and as a reporter, Beckett was 
attuned to that which could not be imparted, that impassive and truly help-
less thing on the face of helper and helped alike.
Worsening
In his last work, Worstward Ho, Beckett devises a final strategy of textual 
indigence. Despite the almost total absence of verbs in the text, Worstward 
Ho assiduously grinds out a figural and lexicographical reduction. From 
three figures called shades: a kneeling woman, an old man and a child, and 
a skull, the text systematically withdraws all recognizable and distinctive 
features. The kneeling woman undergoes this process first:
First one. First try fail better one. Something there badly not wrong. Not 
that as it is it is not bad. The no face bad. The no hands bad. The no—. 
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Enough. A pox on bad. Mere bad. Way for worse. Pending worse still. First 
worse, Mere worse. Pending worse still. Add a—. Add? Never. Bow it 
down. Be it bowed down. Deep down. Head in hat gone. More back gone. 
Greatcoat cut off higher. Nothing from pelvis down. Nothing but bowed 
back. Topless baseless hindtrunk. Dim black. On unseen knees. In the dim 
void. Better worse so. Pending worse still.101
A praying woman is a fragment or shade (no face, no hands, no—). Yet, as 
if this image was already too complete or too rich, not sufficiently impov-
erished, that image of the woman is further reduced and “defigured.” The 
text passes a verdict (“Enough.”) over the initial state of want of the figure. 
The text proceeds to scrape away any qualities we might impute to the fig-
ure. This process occurs on the figural level (the image of the woman) as 
well as on the linguistic level (the language used to describe her). It issues 
a fiat on surplus (“Add? Never.”) and removes the head in hat, every-
thing below the pelvis, and “more back.” The greatcoat is hemmed. Yet the 
reductions in the text ultimately resemble neither an amputation nor a tai-
loring but rather a deprivation of the image via language. Words such as 
“hindtrunk” bring the human carcass suddenly into view, but the impres-
sion is aesthetic, as if Beckett were operating on words, figures, values 
rather than flesh and bone.
 King Lear lurks in the background of Worstward Ho. Beckett’s “Sot-
tisier” notebook contains his notations to Shakespeare’s play, most notably 
Edgar’s lines, “Who is’t can say, I am at the worst.” And “The worst is not 
so long as one can say, This is the worst.”102 Beckett is different from Shake-
speare in the sense that Shakespeare makes language into the simultane-
ous barrier and capacity that separates us from the experience of the worst. 
According to Edgar, we are not in the worst as long as it bears speech, and 
as long as we can discourse about it. Edgar’s first observation casts doubt 
on the ability of the worst to be synonymous either with its assertion or 
with a state of being, the I am. The worst occupies a hyperbolic register for 
Edgar beyond language and existence. When we merge with the worst, pre-
sumably, it will be designated only by the absence of speech and by some 
default of our existence (our capacity to say, “I am”).
 Worstward Ho constitutes Beckett’s literary reply to the theatricality of 
Edgar’s antithesis of speech (saying) and the worst, of language as a refuge 
from the extreme conditions of misery. Beckett’s text works on the impov-
erishment of both poles: the emphasis on missaying and saying less over 
saying, and on worsening over the worst.103 It is not enough, according to 
Beckett, to say, “this is the worst.” Worstward Ho begins with the “mere 
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bad” and recedes from there. Alain Badiou observes that the void in Beck-
ett is something named rather than encountered: “Existence is the generic 
attribute of what is capable of worsening. What can worsen exists. . . . What 
exists is what lets itself be encountered. . . . Neither void nor dim designate 
something that can be encountered.”104 Beckett agrees with Edgar insofar 
as the text can only designate the worst. Though pointed in the direction of 
the worst, Beckett’s text never arrives there: this separation of the address 
from the destination of the worst is part of Beckett’s textual impoverish-
ment of the term.
 Implied by Edgar’s attention to language is a sense that “the worst” 
occupies a spectrum or escalating quantity of worseness. Beckett intro-
duces aesthetic criteria to propel poverty past this method of measurement. 
Instead of an opposition between the more and the less or the good and 
the bad (as Edgar implies), in which the no sum and degree zero become 
the apex of poverty, there is a flattening, and a shuffling back and forth 
rather than a direct linearity: “Worse less. By no stretch more. Worse for 
want of better less. Less best. No. Naught best. Best worse. No. Not best 
worse. Naught not best worse. Less best worse. No. Least. Least best worse. 
Least never to be naught. Never to naught be brought. Never by naught be 
nulled. Unnullable least. Say that best worse. With leastening words say 
least best worse. For want of worser worst.”105 The nursery-rhyme simplic-
ity of this passage hypnotizes us with its monosyllabic terms, but does not 
state its principles but works by force of them, instead enacting them. This 
plays into its point. “Worse less” sets a phonetic trap for our ear, sounding 
vaguely like worthless.
 Beckett’s texts do not seek an absence of worth but a diminishment of 
quality, a best worse. They monitor a movement toward the less and the 
worse. In Worstward Ho, experimental superlatives and comparatives col-
lide. (“Less best. No. Naught best. Best worse. No.”) There is an arraign-
ment, rather than an arrangement, of terms in which the hierarchy of 
measure is put on trial. All this incandescent coupling and decoupling of 
the worse and less calls attention to the ultimately uncontrolled dimen-
sion of the remainder. The text above makes the hairline fracture between 
“Naught best” and “Not best worse.” Worse, being in want of the worst (a 
kind of negative satiation) thereby becomes the preferable condition.
 For Badiou, Beckett’s worsening process involves stripping language 
of consequence. He asserts that Beckett’s words are there in order to have 
their implications dismissed. Worsening is “the exercise of the sovereignty 
of saying with respect to the shades. Therefore, it is both saying more about 
them and restricting what is said. This is why the operations are contradic-
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tory. Worsening is saying more about less. More words to better leasten.”106 
Badiou subverts the commonplace of Beckett criticism, that less is more 
and that saying less means more meaning. Badiou points out that Beckett 
is in fact inverting this interpretation, saying more about less. We can push 
this farther. Beckett’s work confronts its own interpretation by inserting its 
own discussion into our response. Here, less is worse, not more. The text 
thereby forecloses any strictly quantitative measurement of poverty. In this 
way Beckett’s operations are not quite “contradictory” as Badiou claims. 
Instead of a counterlogical movement (the more becoming less) Beckett 
entwines two hyperbolic systems. Beckett introduces a third element (vari-
eties on the worse) in order to create a constellation of poverty rather than 
a conceptual dyad. Badiou’s “sovereignty of saying” refers to the excep-
tions, the distinctions, the forceful separations that Beckett’s text seems to 
decree. Beckett’s text proposes a different sovereign: the concept. The text 
makes two statements against this king: “Pox on bad” and “Pox on void.”107 
If Beckett’s text enacts sovereignty, it also says down with it, let the face 
of the void be covered in acne, let us dethrone the mere bad. Beckett pith-
ily denounces the nominal authority of these terms precisely because they 
arrest poverty: “bad” because it embodies a criterion that is too preliminary, 
and “void” because it names something too ultimate. “Void” exists only 
in name, an effigy of what remains in absentia, not as textual process. The 
word would seem to represent the apex of poverty, the achievement of total 
desolation without remainder. Yet the “unmoreable unlessable unworseable 
evermost almost void” cannot be transformed, reduced further. The void 
constitutes the direction of the text, but not its step-by-step operation. Con-
ceptual designations for impoverishment are subverted here in favor of a 
literary examination of language from the standpoint of an ever-slimming 
remainder. This remainder afflicts, in the end, the void itself (it is an ever-
most almost void).
 As an era of unremitting crisis, modern history provides multiple 
instances in which the worst has come into view but not yet into language. 
The conditions of our existence have repeatedly tested our capacity for 
speech.108 We have been pushed past Edgar’s predicament in which the 
worst is seemingly yet to come.109 In his review of John Hersey’s Hiroshima, 
Georges Bataille describes the challenge issued by distress on a nuclear 
scale. He notes the injunction the sovereign individual derives in the face of 
such suffering: “The man of sovereign sensibility, face-to-face with misfor-
tune, no longer immediately exclaims, ‘At all costs let us do away with it,’ 
but first, ‘Let us live it.’ Let us lift, in the instant, a form of life to the level 
of the worst. But no one, for all that, gives up doing away with what they 
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can.”110 For Bataille, the sovereign sensibility asks not how to live accord-
ingly after Hiroshima but how to live up to Hiroshima. How can our life 
bear a form that somehow stands before and does not deflect the radiance 
of this catastrophe? Beckett, by contrast, does not suggest that we could 
ever really share the level with the worst. The “form of life” in Beckett’s 
last work is perpetually being unmade, unassumed, and unspoken on its 
way to the worst, without ever getting there. Beckett seems to be closer to 
Bataille’s description of the default of sovereign sensibility, what he calls 
the reaction of “no one,” an unending “doing away with what they can.” 
This is a good synopsis of Beckett’s subtractive attitude. For Beckett, the 
relentless drive toward the worse requires diligence—a perpetual emptying 
out of capacity, like water from a sinking boat.
 Though the texts themselves focus on the process of leastening and 
worsening, Beckett’s work is put on a level with the worst in its perfor-
mance. In prison, Sarajevo, and New Orleans, Beckett’s form of life, his 
dramatic persona, are put in balance with the surrounding devastation. 
Beckett’s work appeals to audiences in crisis situations precisely because 
the worsening process neither ends nor, like Edgar, calls attention to the 
impossibility of its expression and therefore its validity. Instead of being on 
a level with the worst, Beckett’s work levels or reduces it to a worst worse. 
Beckett’s worsening submits its forms of life to disintegration and thereby 
opens up something ineradicably inconsolable but also something deeply 
and ineradicably present.
The transition from diagnosis (critical reading) of Beckett to prognosis (see-
ing Beckett in the world) is obstructed by a persistent Beckettian agnosis, an 
indifference to ideas and knowledge. Marcel Proust compares À la Recherche 
du temps perdu to a telescope that enables readers to bring into focus the 
disparate details of a world of the past, distant in both time and space.1 
Beckett’s work, by contrast, has the reader looking into an inverted tele-
scope, where even proximate things reappear to us as alienated and dis-
tant, reduced in size and yet not for the purpose of study. Reading Beckett 
does not lead the reader to an appreciation of the world but rather to its 
depreciation and diminution. Beckett’s work teaches us to look up from his 
page with the gaze of the prospector—but in reverse gear. Reality through 
an inverted telescope appears smaller, untranscendent, and as if the whole 
world were dumped into the bottom of a well—in short, a place where 
things are condemned to wait.
 The homeless vagabonds in Waiting for Godot beg the question of how 
to stage a world down a well. Godot has been imprisoned, placed under 
the siege of Sarajevo, cast off with the jetsam in post-Katrina New Orleans. 
Under what circumstances might Godot be performed again? What theatri-
cal stages are being forged within the contemporary political landscape?2 
What new stress might be found within Godot’s monotony were the play to 
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unfold, for example, in the shadow of technological disaster, an informa-
tion meltdown, a failed prediction for the world’s end, or during a workers’ 
strike?3
 The Occupy Wall Street movement of 2011 sought to call attention to 
the iniquities of the financial system in the United States and worldwide 
that benefitted a few at the expense of the many. The insight of Occupy 
Wall Street and related squatter communities that arose in Oakland, Bos-
ton, Chicago, Cleveland, London, and other cities across the world was that 
marginal existence had left the margins and become the status quo. The 
movement’s slogan “We are the 99%” highlighted the statistical gap sepa-
rating the majority from the wealth and power of the highest and slimmest 
tier (the 1 percent) of privileged society.
 In researching this book, my goal was not to add yet another analysis to 
the heap of Beckett scholarship. I instead wanted to do something Becket-
tian, something less—to let go of analysis and see what would happen at 
the intersection of Godot’s “country road” with Wall Street. Despite its var-
iegated production history and its appeal to communities in crisis, Godot 
had never been staged with a backdrop of financial crisis. The vagabonds 
resonated allegorically with displaced inhabitants of the Lower Ninth 
Ward, with convicts, and with people under siege, yet never with the vic-
tims of a financial tsunami, the unemployed, the financially ruined, or, in 
the language of the Occupy movement, the 99 percent. So in October 2011, 
along with Jonathan Bernstein and Harold Dean James, I coproduced Wait-
ing for Godot in Zuccotti Park at the heart of the protest movement as a kind 
of “road test” for the concepts I had been developing while writing this 
book. Though not a play of protest, what might Godot become while unfold-
ing in the middle of one? Would the squatters of the Occupy movement feel 
an affinity with Didi and Gogo? What pressure might the staging of a pro-
test exert on the staging of a play?
 As in San Quentin, Gentilly, and Sarajevo, the situation in Zuccotti Park 
that beckoned the production already seemed Beckettian. Addressing the 
global movement of capital, the protest assumed an obstinately immo-
bile form, as if the bodies of the participants had nothing in common with 
the mobility and liquidity of labor, stocks, and indexes. Instead of march-
ing in the street, the protest more closely resembled an effort to live there, 
in full view and subject to the vicissitudes of weather and circumstance, 
like vagabonds. The movement de-escalated the Gandhian tactic of passive 
resistance into impassive endurance or perhaps something more closely 
resembling the prolonged inertia seen onstage in Godot. Descriptions of the 
Occupiers notably sounded like unwitting descriptions of Beckett’s stage-
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craft. Ross Douthat, for example, wrote about the “ragtag theatricality” 
of the movement.4 The parallels continued and multiplied right up to the 
night of November 15, when at 1 a.m., without warning, the police cleared 
all protesters in a very carefully planned raid under Klieg lights, arresting 
some who resisted. One eyewitness reports, “The sanitation department 
collected anything left behind and barricades were placed to limit access 
to the park.”5 The words of Molloy, Beckett’s vagabond character, come as 
close as any to a description for the end of the Zuccotti encampment: “The 
night purge is in the hands of the technicians.”6
 Occupy Wall Street was not just demonstrating against homelessness 
and the mechanisms behind it (subprime mortgages, the collapsing hous-
ing market, foreclosures), it was also demonstrating homelessness. The 
rags of the squatters were not mere show: in sharp contrast to previous 
social movements that divided across class lines,7 Occupy was permeable 
to society’s most bereft. New York City’s homeless population entered the 
ranks of the protest. Activist Rebecca Solnit observes, “One of the compli-
cating factors in the Occupy movement was that so many of the thrown-
away people of our society—the homeless, the marginal, the mentally ill, 
the addicted—came to Occupy encampments for safe sleeping space, food, 
and medical care. These economic refugees were generously taken in by the 
new civil society, having been thrown out by the old uncivil one.”8 Rather 
than “complication,” the inclusion of the homeless is a measure of the 
movement’s complexity. It was not the protest that integrated the home-
less but vice versa: the homeless introduced the protest to the day-to-day 
crisis of their existence, to sleeping on pavement, hunting for food, and the 
unrestrained intrusion of policemen. Writer Chris Hedges claims that pro-
testers received their “master class in occupation” and learned their tactics 
for survival from drifters.9 But even a writer as deeply sympathetic to the 
movement as Solnit regards the homeless less as participants and more as 
intruders. These outcasts do not seem to have place even within our politi-
cal spectrum: they live the condition others protest.
 The Occupy movement at times looked like a sit-down strike for the 
unemployed: they seemed to be striking against the conditions of un- or 
underemployment, and could do so only by enacting the vagabondage into 
which the 99 percent had been cast. To dramatize this, the movement raised 
inutility to the level of public spectacle. Zuccotti Park had neither utilitar-
ian nor symbolic value. Occupying it did not block access to the financial 
centers, and the park had none of the iconic value of spaces seized in ear-
lier protests (the president’s office at Columbia University, the ROTC head-
quarters, the monument at Wounded Knee).10 Hunkering down in the park 
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for four months was as absurd as occupying a stage for two acts, waiting 
for a character who never arrives. This has alarmed Beckett’s audiences 
since Godot’s 1953 debut. At the Brussels premiere of Waiting for Godot a 
patron yelled “Why won’t they work?” as she stormed toward the exit; 
“Because they don’t have time,” replied another.11 In these early perform-
ances the emphatic dereliction of Beckett’s figures grated on the work 
ethic of the audience. Not only were the figures on stage not doing any-
thing but the play was not doing anything—and not doing anything with 
that fact. “Nothing to be done” signals both that there is no work to do and 
that much work on the nothing remains to be done (and therefore can be 
postponed).
 Some popular objections to Beckett’s theater echo those leveled at the 
Occupiers. The question “Why won’t they work?” is testimony to a desire 
to place delinquent bodies elsewhere, to make them leave the haphazard 
collective in the park and disappear into solitary labor. Of course, the fail-
ure to disappear in this way, the growing absence and inadequacy of work, 
was what prepared the ground for the movement. But this condition does 
not spontaneously generate demands. Indeed, journalists took the move-
ment to task for what Todd Gitlin called “demandlessness,” a refusal to for-
mulate objectives that would accommodate existing political discourse and 
address the platforms of the major political parties.12 In a speech delivered 
at the park, Judith Butler observes similarly, “Saying there are no demands 
leaves your critics confused.”13 Likewise, Beckett replaces “demand” with 
“need.” His work confronts readers with an impoverished and worsen-
ing situation rather than a theme or thesis. Beckett describes the work of 
art as a confluence of two needs, “the being which is need and the neces-
sity of being in need, hell of unreason from which rises the blank scream, 
the series of pure questions, the work of art.”14 The artwork’s scream is 
blank: need is not sublimated into protest, objection, or articulation. Read-
ers instinctively want to make their job easier by making this scream into a 
demand, to make it a need for something (truth, philosophy, meaning, any-
thing). Yet the poverty of Beckett’s work maintains only a need for need: it 
cannot even imagine the quenching object.
 We had a busy week preparing for the performance at Zuccotti Park. We 
scouted the performance location, met with the improvised and fluid lead-
ership of the Occupy movement, held a casting call for professional actors, 
rehearsed, found props, scoured thrift stores for costumes, and made flyers 
and advertising material. In turning to the Salvation Army, that limbo for 
castaway items, we honored a tradition for Godot performances that began 
at the world premiere of the play at the Babylon Theater in 1953. The props 
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department at the Babylon Theater did not possess an adequate suitcase 
for the character Lucky, which, director Roger Blin specified, should be old 
and battered looking. Two days before opening night, the costume lady 
resolved this problem by asking her husband, a garbage collector for the 
city of Paris, to find such a suitcase. As in the original production, the Zuc-
cotti Godot featured abandoned objects, rather than prefabricated represen-
tations of them.
 On the day of the show we walked from our rehearsal space to Zuccotti 
Park. Our troupe, The 99% Theater Company, entered the busy streets of 
New York like actors for hire, in search of a stage (rather than an author), 
seeking to claim a performance space, rather than be delivered to one. The 
actors walked to work in both costume and character, passing out flyers for 
the performance on the way. People stared at Lucky, a man grunting with 
a suitcase, a chair, and a rope around his neck. As Pozzo swung the whip, 
shouting “Think Pig!” “Up Pig!,” passersby were confused and alarmed.
 Whatever scene we made walking down to Wall Street, upon arriving at 
Zuccotti Park the actors in their makeup and bowler hats did not stand out 
but actually blended in with the Occupy crowd. There were so many signs 
and performances of protest and mini-scenarios on view that we merely 
took a place next to everyone else. Didi carried the tree made of a few 
oversized hundred-dollar bills from a “Big Bucks” note pad for leaves and 
snapped dowels for branches. The barren money tree, which could have 
been devised for the protest rather than the play, aroused no astonishment.
 The protest and the procession of signs and homemade statuary gave a 
different nuance to the blasted tree in Godot. Instead of simply designating 
a barren wasteland, it became accusatory, less destroyed icon than icon of 
destruction, like the Styrofoam drone in the photo. In the years prior to the 
economic collapse, money seemed indeed to grow on trees: capital, even 
the promise of capital, begat more capital. Labor fell out of the picture. The 
tree that grew in Wall Street seemed therefore to represent the breakdown 
of a financial illusion.
 Each performance of Godot was countenanced by protesters’ signs. Didi 
and Gogo delivered lines such as “No use wiggling” and discussed how 
Godot had to consult his agents, his correspondents, his books, his bank 
account “before taking a decision,” while staring out into a sea of placards 
bearing phrases such as “Up against the Wall Street” and “I can’t afford 
a Politician.” Quite fittingly, our first performance of Beckett’s play took 
place beneath and out of reach of an enormous red sculpture titled Joie de 
Vivre. The performance space shifted according to the movement of the 
crowd standing around, many of them with signs.
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 Our production of Godot took place in a landscape scattered with writ-
ten imperatives, denunciations, political puns, and lines drawn from Beck-
ett’s text. Godot is both experimental and extraordinarily unperturbed, 
unagitated: it does not wince at the horror. The constellation of urgent mes-
sages that ringed our stage seemed defined by their collision with the dead-
pan expression of Beckett’s play and the elongated gesture of its emptiness. 
“It’s a Scandal!” uttered by Vladimir in shock at Lucky’s condition, is the 
only line in which the character raises his voice. Printed on a sign, this line 
hung over each movement on the stage.
 The production revealed how Wall Street is a land of capital and for cap-
ital and as such a “no-man’s-land.” The space provided not only an unin-
habitable stage for Godot but a uniquely inhospitable one as well. This was 
a protest of the Facebook era—everyone had a voice, but no one a micro-
phone. We immersed the deamplified voices of Beckett’s characters into a 
setting where the prevailing logic seemed to be that if you want to be heard, 
get louder. It was possibly the windiest Godot ever: through the cavernous 
streets, strong breezes whipped across the park and blew an array of small 
street debris at the actors and across the stage. Never have the actors in 
a Beckett play seemed so acoustically and visually dwarfed. Their anxiety 
figUre 2
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sharpened in the shadow of the colossal financial buildings surrounding 
the park, so much so that at times it seemed to tear their huddle apart.
 The classical themes of work and worklessness were overshadowed 
by the real presence of icons of capital. In this setting Pozzo cannot appear 
except as the incontestable boss, not of Brecht’s production (a rational 
capitalist) but more like one of the occasionally steamed passersby trying 
to get to work. Pozzo complains, “[Lucky] imagines that when I see how 
well he carries I’ll be tempted to keep him on in that capacity. . . . In real-
ity he carries like a pig. It’s not his job.”15 Beckett here pegs the way the 
impression of usefulness (its performance) has exceeded the value of use. 
Lucky appears as a laborer who has taken on jobs exceeding the terms of 
his contract merely to keep that job. The play also shows how Vladimir and 
Estragon undertake their unemployment like a task, a burden. Waiting for 
Godot dramatizes Sisyphean labors: each activity is ended no sooner than 
it has begun and produces an unclear outcome—not even the wry smile 
Camus attributes to the man as he trudges back down the hill is possible. 
For Beckett’s characters the smile is only a slim consolation following the 
ban on laughter, a “dreadful privation.”16 Adorno’s observation that Beck-
ett’s plays are filled with a “jargon of a universal disrespect” came out in 
Zuccotti Park in the owner-worker relation.17 Unlike on the Brecht stage, 
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there is no stable universal sense of good work as a value. The despera-
tion of two characters for the seeming lowest of occupations resonates with 
our age in which unions have suffered and a surfeit of labor makes even 
humiliating labor appealing. Didi and Gogo are not the solid proletariat, 
as designated within Brecht’s rewriting of the play, but rather are workers 
whose labor and productivity have been outsourced. Didi and Gogo and 
even Pozzo appear eager to possibly take Lucky’s place, the place of the 
slave, merely because he is actually paid, albeit in bones and other scraps of 
food.
 Other resonances emerged within the performance itself; as in New 
Orleans, certain phrases rang more determinedly in our ears. When Pozzo 
says to Vladimir and Estragon, “The road is free to all,” the actor (Cezar 
Williams) waved his arm toward Broadway, which ran next to the perfor-
mance space on the edge of the park and which was patrolled by New York 
City police repeating “Move along!” “Keep moving!” to pedestrians gather-
ing to see the performance. Cezar’s improvised gesture illuminated some-
thing about that street, and simultaneously inflected a different dimension 
of the “country road” in Beckett’s play. Indeed, throughout the perfor-
mance the words of the actors are punctuated and intermingled with the 
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words of the police. The unspoken condition for Beckett’s play, as for Wall 
Street, is that this road and that street are not free, are not available to all, 
and do not constitute a space of opportunity.
 A police presence is not an unfamiliar accompaniment to productions of 
Godot, but the requirements of the law in relation to the Occupy production 
are idiosyncratic and instructive. In the Godot in Belgrade, the cops faced 
the exit to prevent people from entering. In San Quentin and Raiford, police 
faced inward to keep prisoners from escaping the auditorium. In Zuccotti 
Park the police cut the audience in half, forcing half of it to be immobile 
and the other half mobile. A police cordon created a strange moat of human 
traffic around the inner audience. The barricades they erected prevented 
newcomers from stopping for too long to peek in either at the play or the 
happenings inside the park. Although this must have been annoying for 
some of the audience, a totally supervised space is in fact perfect for a Beck-
ett play. Guns, badges, blue uniforms, and barked orders formed the outer 
barrier of the production. Adorno calls walking in place “the fundamental 
motif of the whole of [Beckett’s] work.”18 The police enforced this futility 
of going nowhere, of being unable to stand freely and watch from the side-
walk or leave the park except at prescribed exits. (Our play unfolded not 
far from two men peddling stationary bikes that powered the electrical gen-
erators inside Zuccotti.) Like a performance in a prison yard, every move-
ment of freedom is strangely insularized. The police were perhaps more 
vital here than they were in the other performances of this book.
 The disciplinary force encircling Zuccotti Park actively transformed 
potential spectators of the production into bystanders, literally standing 
by or contiguous to the play. This mode of stand-by, even temporary, sug-
gests a mode of witnessing already enwrapped in waiting. But this wait-
ing is more impatient, less meditative, than the expectations cultivated in 
the traditional spectator. The bystander is marked by the happenstance 
event, an accident or an unannounced theatrical performance: nobody 
intends to become a bystander and one cannot purchase tickets to bystand. 
This simultaneous contingency and contiguity of the audience to the play 
enabled, however, something customarily denied to spectators: they could 
get involved. At the very first performance, before any lines had been 
uttered, an event transpired underneath the Joie de Vivre that illustrates this. 
Katie Schwarz, as Gogo, heartily struggles with her boot at the beginning of 
the play. Without a curtain to signal the start of the play, a bystander or pro-
tester walked forward to do something, to offer his help.
 Each performance of Godot in this book assaults theatrical decorum 
in its unique way, breaching the line between the play and its surround-
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ings. The dissolution of that line is never an instance of Beckett entering 
the world but testimony to how the world recognizes that it has become 
theatrical, Beckettian. At the inaugural edge of the Zuccotti Godot, at that 
moment when the actor is acting but has not spoken her lines, a man steps 
forward making an emphatic gesture of assistance. Before Katie could 
deliver the play’s ominous first line, the bystander discerned that some-
thing had to be done. By this empathic gesture the man became an actor 
not only because he had unwittingly entered the stage but because he was 
acting on this empathy, and thereby exceeding—as most of the occupiers 
sought to do—the passivity of the traditional spectator. This cleft within 
the spectator’s position also affected the protesters themselves, who were 
divided between being passive gawkers (in a protest but only there to gawk 
at it, to photograph it, looking for something to take home with them) and 
being bystanders, or subjects who intervened and risked arrest.
 Transpiring almost without notice and almost before the play began, 
this transfigurative moment took measure of what it meant to bring this 
play to the protest. Not only did the context of the Occupy movement make 
the poverty of Beckett’s play more apparent, it created the conditions under 
which someone could respond to it differently, with an offer of help rather 
than seizing it as an opportunity for catharsis. This bystander saw a state of 
need on Beckett’s stage, but not the stage. His intervention threw the stage, 
and the play, off course. In the time I spent at Occupy Wall Street, and in 
spite of the loud shouts for solidarity, the songs and chants, a drum circle, 
and weed generously shared, this marked in fact the one time I saw some-
one try to help another, another who happened to be a fictional character. 
Alas! Nothing to be done.
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Chapter 3
 1. Beckett, Waiting for Godot, 11.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Beckett, Waiting for Godot, 49. Ruby Cohn remarks on the similarity between 
Estragon’s pose and yoga positions. Noted in McMillan and Fehsenfeld, Beckett in the 
Theatre, 119.
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and as it does not during the day, when there is more vigilance, and then something 
else that is not clear, being neither the air nor what it moves, perhaps the far un-
changing noise the earth makes and which other noises cover, but not for long. . . . 
And there was another noise, that of my life become the life of this garden as it rode 
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scribes the garden in motion, riding the earth, with him as its oblivious passenger. 
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them go, one by one, let the last desert me and leave me empty, empty and silent. It’s 
they murmur my name, speak to me of me, speak of a me, let them go and speak of 
it to others, who will not believe them either, or who will believe them too. Theirs all 
these voices, like a rattling of chains in my head, rattling to me that I have a head.” 
Samuel Beckett, “Texts for Nothing,” in Complete Short Prose, 120.
 17. Beckett, Three Novels, 207.
 18. In Malone Dies, Malone reports how the organization of the journal he is keep-
ing is dictated by the wind: “But my fingers too write in other latitudes and the air 
that breathes through my pages and turns them without my knowing, when I doze 
off, so that the subject falls far from the verb and the object lands somewhere in the 
void, is not the air of this second-last abode, and a mercy it is. And perhaps on my 
hands it is the shimmer of the shadows of leaves and flowers and the brightness of a 
forgotten sun.” Ibid., 234.
 19. The character Malone will insist not only on his own absence to his thought 
but also on not even being where thinking seeks him out: “Somewhere in this turmoil 
thought struggles on, it too wide of the mark. It too seeks me, as it always has, where I 
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 20. Beckett, Waiting for Godot, 40.
 21. Ibid., 51.
 22. Ibid.
 23. Ibid., 41.
 24. Ibid.
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 30. Hegel describes the simultaneous inception of Western art and the historical 
subject in the Greeks’ turning their ears away from the murmurs of the natural world 
and toward the sound that is made by the ear itself in listening to these sounds: “Eben-
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so horchten die Griechen auf das Gemurmel der Quellen und fragten, was das zu be-
deuten habe, die Bedeutung aber ist nicht die objective Sinnigkeit der Quelle, sondern 
die subjecktive des Subjekts selbst, welches dann weiter die Najade zur Muse erhebt. 
Die Najaden oder Quellen sind der äußerliche Anfang der Musen. Doch der Musen 
unsterbliche Gesänge sind nicht das, was man hört, sondern sie sind die Produktionen 
des sinnig horchenden Geistes, der in seinem Hinauslauschen in sich selbst produ-
ziert.” Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte 
(Stuttgart: Phillip Reclam, 1961), 336. “On the same principle the Greeks listened to the 
murmuring of the fountains, and asked what might thereby be signified; but the signi-
fication which they were led to attach to it was not the objective meaning of the foun-
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Muse. The Naiads, or Fountains, are the external, objective origin of the Muses. Yet 
the immortal songs of the Muses are not that which is heard in the murmuring of the 
fountains; they are the productions of the thoughtfully listening Spirit—creative while 
observant.” G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (New York: Dover, 
1956), 235.
 31. Beckett, Three Novels, 60.
 32. In their analysis of capitalism, Deleuze and Guattari describe something simi-
lar to Beckett’s suppositional universe. They write, “Unlike previous social machines, 
the capitalist machine is incapable of providing a code that will apply to the whole of 
the social field. By substituting money for the very notion of a code, it has created an 
axiomatic of abstract quantities that keeps moving further and further in the direc-
tion of the deterritorialization of the socius.” Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti- 
Oedipus, trans. Mark Seem (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 33.
 33. See Roman Jakobson, “Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic 
Disturbance,” in Language in Literature, ed. Krystyna Pomorska and Stephen Rudy 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 95–120.
 34. Beckett, Three Novels, 60.
 35. Paul Valéry, Sea Shells, trans. Mary Oliver (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), 73. 
Adorno compares Beckett’s characters to mollusks: “Modern ontology lives off the 
unfulfilled promise of the concreteness of its abstractions, whereas in Beckett the con-
creteness of an existence that is shut up in itself like a mollusk, no longer capable of 
universality, an existence that exhausts itself in pure self-positing, is revealed to be 
identical to the abstractness that is no longer capable of experience.” “Trying to Un-
derstand ‘Endgame,’” 246.
 36. Pensum refers to a weight of wool given to female slaves to work off as a day’s 
labor in Roman times. In Beckett’s “Sottisier” notebook, he notes the following quota-
tion from Schopenhauer: “Das Leben ist ein Pensum zum Abarbeiten: in diesem Sinne 
ist defunctus ein schöner Ausdruck.” “Sottisier” notebook, 13r. (“Life is a pensum 
to work off: in this sense is defunctus an attractive expression.”) Beckett is keen on 
the “zum Abarbeiten,” materially worked off rather than “durcharbeiten” or worked 
through in the psychoanalytic sense.
 37. Beckett ends his essay on Proust by commenting on the way in which the art-
work in Proust’s work reveals life to be a pensum, a rote lesson whose meaning is 
not entirely grasped because it is so mediated by habit: the experience of the narrator 
Marcel is one that bears witness to art, “sees in the red phrase of the Septuor: . . . the 
ideal and immaterial statement of the essence of a unique beauty, a unique world, the 
invariable world and beauty of Vinteuil, expressed timidly, as a prayer, in the Sonata, 
imploringly, as an inspiration, in the Septuor, the ‘invisible reality’ that damns the life 
of the body on earth as a pensum and reveals the meaning of the word: ‘defunctus.’” 
Proust and Three Dialogues, 93. As with the word “defunctus” it seems that Beckett’s at-
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traction to the pensum is in fact its part in a dead language, a language that goes dead 
on the tongue and in which the image of our life is made.
 38. See also the definition of “pensum” in the Encyclopedia Acephalica: “Few paint-
ers produce pictures other than by way of pensums, works imposed on them by an 
alien, and often hateful, hand. How many writers harness themselves to their novel 
and voluntarily reduce themselves to the rank of plough-horses, or asses, loaded, now 
with cereals, now with relics.” George Bataille, Michel Leiris, et al., Encylopedia Ace-
phalica (London: Atlas Press, 1995), 67. Leiris, the author of this entry, bemoans the 
pensum as a strictly rote task, a function of habit. For Molloy the pensum is the first 
and the last task, the impossible task to fulfill, because it is inaccessible to memory.
 39. Beckett, Three Novels, 310.
 40. Ibid., 32.
 41. Leo Bersani, Balzac to Beckett: Center and Circumference in French Fiction (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 59.
 42. Beckett always distrusted the effort to redeem poverty and the viewing of fail-
ure as an opportunity. Praising the painter Bram van Velde, Beckett wrote, “The nu-
merous attempts made to make painting independent of its occasion have only suc-
ceeded in enlarging its repertory. I suggest that van Velde is the first whose painting 
is bereft, rid if you prefer, of occasion in every shape and form, ideal as well as material, and 
the first whose hands have not been tied by the certitude that expression is an impos-
sible act.” Three Dialogues, 121 (emphasis added).
 43. I want to thank Arkady Plotnitsky for drawing my attention to this reference.
 44. Jean-Luc Nancy, The Birth to Presence, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 44.
 45. Beckett, Three Novels, 296.
 46. Ibid., 67.
 47. In Malone Dies the title character is bedridden and relies on a walking cane to 
pull objects from around the room nearer to him. He then observes, “How great is my 
debt to sticks! So great that I almost forget the blows they have transferred to me.” 
Ibid., 185.
 48. Ibid., 350.
 49. Badiou, On Beckett, 12.
 50. Ibid.
 51. Maurice Blanchot, The Madness of the Day, trans. Lydia Davis (New York: Sta-
tion Hill, 1981), 9.
 52. Ibid.,12.
 53. Beckett, Proust and Three Dialogues, 89.
 54. Molloy does not turn toward things that appear before his eyes. The game he 
plays is one of turning away from that which is disappearing: “From things about to 
disappear I turn away in time.” Beckett, Three Novels, 12.
 55. Ibid., 53.
 56. Foucault discusses these hupomnemata in his essay titled “Self Writing.” He 
summarizes: “The hupomnemata served as memory aids. Their use as books of life, 
as guides for conduct, seems to have become a common thing for a whole cultivated 
public. One wrote down quotes in them, extracts from books, examples, and actions 
that one had witnessed or read about, reflections or reasonings that one had heard or 
that had come to mind.” Michel Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, ed. Paul Rabi-
now (New York: New Press, 1998), 209.
 57. Hugh Kenner pursues this line of thought in the chapter “The Cartesian Cen-
taur,” in Samuel Beckett: A Critical Study. A typical observation: “The Beckett bicycle 
can orchestrate all the great themes of human speculation” (126).
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 58. Beckett, Three Novels, 326.
 59. Ibid., 22.
 60. The full quote: “Let me tell you this, when social workers offer you, free, gratis, 
and for nothing, something to hinder you from swooning, which with them is an ob-
session, it is useless to recoil, they will pursue you to the ends of the earth, the vomito-
ry in their hands. The Salvation Army is no better. Against the charitable gesture there 
is no defense, that I know of.” Ibid., 24.
 61. Benjamin, Selected Writings, 2:668. Benjamin also writes in his Berlin Chroni-
cle that a wealthy child of his generation “could picture the poor, it was, without his 
knowing either name or origin, in the image of the tramp who is actually a rich man, 
though without money, since he stands—far removed from the process of production 
and the exploitation not yet abstracted from it—in the same contemplative relation to 
his destitution as the rich man to his wealth.” In Reflections, 11.
 62. In The Myth of the Birth of the Hero (New York: Vintage, 1959) Otto Rank em-
ploys the term “abandonment myth” to describe those stories (i.e., about Moses and 
Oedipus) that achieve mythical status because their figures survive an exposure to 
death at an early age, after being abandoned and “given up for dead” by their parents. 
Rank describes abandonment as a condition that cannot be overcome or diminished. 
This is relevant to the way in which Beckett’s characters are exposed. Rank observes 
that the figures of myth are exposed to not only the “natural elements” but to the mer-
ciless judgment (the “ecce homo”) and laws of peoples and divinities.
 63. Malone connects the understanding of time to the question of utility: “use” cre-
ates the idea of a future, a purpose, a goal. Accumulation and ultimate expenditure 
structure time for us. In contrast to this, Malone says he is speaking of a character who 
“could not employ [what he has accumulated], since he feels so far from the morrow. 
And perhaps there is none, no morrow any more, for one who has waited so long for it 
in vain. And perhaps he has come to that stage of his instant when to live is to wander 
the last of the living in the depths of an instant without bounds, where the light never 
changes and the wrecks look all alike.” Beckett, Three Novels, 233.
 64. Adorno, “Trying to Understand ‘Endgame,’” 268.
 65. Georges Bataille, “Molloy’s Silence,” in Modern Critical Interpretations: Samuel 
Beckett’s Molloy, Malone Dies, The Unnamable, ed. Harold Bloom (New York: Chelsea 
House, 1988), 14.
 66. Ibid., 20.
 67. Ibid., 16.
 68. Ibid., 20. “Cette horrible figure se balançant douloureusement sur ses béquilles 
est la vérité dont nous sommes malades et qui ne nous suit pas moins fidèlement que 
notre ombre nous suit . . . spectre qui hante le plein jour des rues.” Georges Bataille, 
“Le silence de Molloy,” Critique 7, no. 15 (1951), 394. 
 69. Beckett, Three Novels, 91.
 70. Ibid., 22. This sentence is not translated in the French version of Beckett’s nov-
el. Perhaps Molloy’s existence inhabits that same space of ethical impossibility as the 
current debates about assisted suicide.
 71. Beckett, L’Innommable, 22; Beckett, Three Novels, 300.
 72. See the second section of Molloy: “Gaber, Gaber, he said, life is a thing of beau-
ty, Gaber, and a joy for ever. He brought his face nearer mine. A joy for ever, he said, a 
thing of beauty, Moran, and a joy for ever. He smiled. I closed my eyes. Smiles are all 
very nice in their own way, very heartening, but at a reasonable distance. I said, Do 
you think he meant human life?” Beckett, Three Novels, 152.
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at a party about “why I write always about distress. As if it were perverse to do so! He 
wanted to know if my father had beaten me or my mother had run away from home to 
give me an unhappy childhood.” Beckett decides to leave the party as soon as possible 
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us, whether we like it or not” [Beckett, Waiting for Godot, 51]) embodies the existential 
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work.
 22. Beckett, Proust and Three Dialogues, 121.
 23. Beckett, Three Novels, 274.
 24. Beckett’s much quoted observation that van Velde is the “first to admit that to 
be an artist is to fail, as no other dare fail” is frequently taken as an exclusive descrip-
tion of the artist’s goal or task. I take “dare” and “fail” to be transitive verbs. The artist 
dares the reader; we run the risk of failing that cry “made ill.” Proust and Three Dia-
logues, 125.
 25. Such late prose works as Ill Seen, Ill Said further develop this medical diagnos-
tic of the call.
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 26. Samuel Beckett, “Intercessions of Denis Devlin,” in Disjecta, 91.
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 28. Samuel Beckett, “Cascando,” in Collected Poems in English and French (New 
York: Grove Press, 1977), 29.
 29. Beckett, Three Novels, 311. “Décidement il semble impossible, à ce stade, que je 
me passe de questions, comme je me l’étais promis. Non, je m’étais seulement juré de 
ne plus en formuler. Qui sait? Je tomberai peut-être, d’ici peu, sur l’heureux arrange-
ment qui les empêchera à tout jamais de se formuler, dans mon, ne soyons pas pédant, 
dans mon esprit.” Beckett, L’Innommable, 41.
 30. Adorno, “Trying to Understand ‘Endgame,’” 264. “Beckett jedoch entziffert 
die Luge des Fragezeichens: die Frage ist zur rhetorischen geworden.” Adorno, “Ver-
such,” 308.
 31. Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (Cambridge, MA: Zone 
Books, 1990), 17.
 32. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy? trans. Hugh Tomlinson 
and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 1.
 33. Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in The Ques-
tion Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1977), 35.
 34. “Die genannte Frage ist heute in Vergessenheit gekommen, obzwar unsere Zeit 
sich als Fortchritt anrechnet, die ‘Metaphysik’ wider zu bejahen.” Martin Heidegger, 
Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1986), 2.
 35. Roland Barthes, “The Last Word on Robbe-Grillet?” in Critical Essays, 202.
 36. The essay concludes with an observation about the way Robbe-Grillet’s char-
acters frequently point to unspecified objects: “This, they say. But what is this—this 
what? Perhaps all literature is in this anaphoric suspension which at one and the same 
time designates and keeps silent.” Ibid., 204. Barthes’s assignation of an interrogative 
function to literature and theater continues his thinking in his introduction to On Ra-
cine: “To write is to jeopardize the meaning of the world, to put an indirect question 
that the writer, by an ultimate abstention, refrains from answering. It is each of us 
who gives the answer, bringing to it his own history, his own language, his own free-
dom. . . . There is no end to answering what has been written beyond hope of an an-
swer: asserted, disputed, superseded—the meanings pass, the question remains.” Ro-
land Barthes, On Racine, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Performing Arts Journal 
Publications, 1983), ix.
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a stage scattered with debris, a brief cry, a ten-second intensification of the light ac-
companied by an “inspiration,” then “silence and hold for five seconds.” Then there 
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asks or doesn’t ask?” Paul de Man, Allegories of Reading (New Haven, CT: Yale Univer-
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often numbered. These dissipate the force of the question by trying to bring the banal 
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can be numbered among others. For example, in Malone Dies, Malone is bedridden 
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Novels, 272. Such lists truly dissipate the form of the question by, as it were, tightening 
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 50. Ibid., 18.
 51. Ibid., 218.
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Style. These seem to me to be as weak/invalid/outmoded as a Victorian bathing suit 
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Disjecta, 52.
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 58. Christopher Ricks, Beckett’s Dying Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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 81. My translation is a modification of the Muir version. Franz Kafka, Diaries, 
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unable to remain . . . ensconced and that it has to turn itself out.” De Man, Allegories of 
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uel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Oxford University 
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did not dent the kettle, (2) there was already a dent in the kettle when he received it, 
and (3) he did not borrow the kettle. See Sigmund Freud, Interpretation of Dreams, stan-
dard ed., trans. A. A. Brill (New York: Norton, 1989), 120.
 89. Kant’s categorical imperative depends on the principle, “So act that the max-
im of your action could become a universal law.” Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of 
Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 192. Beckett’s minimalism and 
subtractive aesthetic interrogate the universality of the maxim and in this way take 
aim at Kant’s ethical system. See Beckett’s paratactic translations of the maxims of Se-
bastien Chamfort.
 90. In Company, for example, Beckett writes about a murmur that a character hears 
in the second person: “A voice comes to one in the dark. Imagine. To one on his back 
in the dark. . . . Only a small part of what is said can be verified. As for example when 
he hears, You are on your back in the dark. Then he must acknowledge the truth of 
what is said. But by far the greater part of what is said cannot be verified. As for ex-
ample when he hears, You first saw the light on such and such a day.” Samuel Beckett, 
Company (New York: Grove Press, 1991), 7. This form of address has the effect of si-
multaneously describing a state of affairs that already exists and, through this descrip-
tion, of forecasting or informing a state to come.
 91. Beckett, Worstward Ho, 9. Also see the first line of The Unnamable: “Where now? 
Who now? When how? Unquestioning. I, say I. Unbelieving. Questions, hypotheses, 
call them that. Keep going, going on, call that going, call that on.” Beckett, Three Nov-
els, 291.
 92. The verb “say” is similar in this regard to the way “never” works in Beckett’s 
text: “Never to naught be brought. Never by naught be nulled.” Beckett, Worstward 
Ho, 32.
 93. Richard Ellman, James Joyce (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), 662.
 94. Charles Baudelaire, Oeuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1951), 884. “He makes 
it his business to extract from fashion whatever element it may contain of poetry with-
in history, to distil the eternal from the transitory.” Charles Baudelaire, The Painter of 
Modern Life and Other Essays, trans. Jonathan Mayne (New York: Da Capo Press, 1964), 
12.
 95. Beckett, Worstward Ho, 9.
 96. Beckett composed but did not air this broadcast.
 97. Samuel Beckett, “The Capital of the Ruins,” in Complete Short Prose, 278.
 98. The character Nagg tells this joke in Endgame, and it provides the title for Beck-
ett’s essay on aesthetics, “Le Monde et le Pantelon.” In brief, the joke tells the story 
about a man who brings his pants to a tailor and gets a different excuse as to why they 
are not ready each time he returns to the shop. His impatience at a breaking point, he 
informs the tailor that it took God only six days to make the world. “That’s right,” 
says the tailor, “but look at the world . . . and look at my TROUSERS!” See Samuel 
Beckett, Endgame, 22.
 99. Beckett, “Capital of the Ruins,” 277.
 100. My interpretation here differs sharply from Lois Gordon’s. Gordon writes 
about this passage, “Beckett exalts both the comfort to be drawn from the inward hu-
man capacity to surmount circumstances of the utmost gravity and the sustenance to 
be given and gained in moments of camaraderie.” Lois Gordon, The World of Samuel 
Beckett (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), 201.
 101. Beckett, Worstward Ho, 22.
 102. Beckett, “Sottisier” notebook, 23.3.81.
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 103. Beckett’s other inheritance from Shakespeare is the bard’s observation that 
beauty “beggars description.” The phrase is used in reference to Cleopatra: “For her 
own person, / It beggar’d all description.” Antony and Cleopatra 2.2. The Tragedy of Ant-
ony and Cleopatra, ed. Jonathan Bate (Middlesex, UK: Echo Library, 2006), 33. Shake-
speare suggests that beauty incapacitates or disemploys description, reducing it to tat-
ters as it attempts to transform appearance into language. Much of Beckett’s oeuvre is 
an exploration of what happens to this derelict and impoverished state of description 
not only in its encounter with beauty but with misery and the beggar as well.
 104. Badiou, On Beckett, 89.
 105. Beckett, Worstward Ho, 32.
 106. Badiou, On Beckett, 94.
 107. Beckett, Worstward Ho, 21, 43.
 108. Walter Benjamin articulates the soldier’s encounter with World War I in terms 
of impoverishment: “Wasn’t it noticed at the time how many people returned from the 
front in silence? Not richer but poorer in communicable experience?” Selected Writings, 
2:731.
 109. In his poem “No Worst, There Is None,” Gerard Manley Hopkins writes, “No 
worst, there is none. Pitched past pitch of grief, / More pangs will, schooled at fore-
pangs, wilder wring.” Through his disheveled grammar, Hopkins comes close to Beck-
ett’s vision of a text of the ever worsening. Through pain, Hopkins achieves a sense 
of the nontranscendent worst. Hopkins’s text takes up Beckett’s rhetorical hyperbo-
le literally: he speaks about being pitched past pitch. (The word “hyperbole” comes 
from the Greek meaning “to throw wide”). Pitched past pitch of grief means to turn the 
worse into a type of excess of movement: Hopkins’s poem struggles with pitch as a 
thing and pitch as a verb. Gerard Manley Hopkins, Poems and Prose, ed. W. H. Gardner 
(London: Penguin Books, 1985), 61.
 110. Bataille, “Concerning the Accounts Given by the Residents of Hiroshima,” 232.
Afterword
 1. For Proust’s narrator, art facilitates new vision and exerts its aftereffect within 
the spectator. When gazed upon long enough, for example, the figures within a Renoir 
leave the frame of the painting and begin to lend their qualities to people and vehicles 
seen in the street: “Women pass in the street, different from those we formerly saw, 
because they are Renoirs, those Renoirs we persistently refused to see as women. The 
carriages too, are Renoirs, and the water, and the sky.” Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost 
Time: The Guermantes Way, trans. Christopher Prendergast (New York: Penguin, 2003), 
325. Only by seeing Renoir in the world do we begin in fact to see what his paintings 
harbor. In like fashion, Proust’s novel may sensitize us to Proustian moments in our 
world, to propagate the effects of his work through our own experience.
 2. Of all the productions I’ve seen and been involved in, the setting that seems 
most fitting for Beckett’s play would be a production on the Gaza Strip.
 3. Harold Camping, an evangelist on the Family Radio Network, predicted that 
the world would end on May 21, 2011. When May 22 arrived without the righteous 
having ascended to heaven or the damned suffering fire, brimstone, and plagues on 
earth, Camping recalculated his prediction and gave the world an extended deadline 
until October 21, 2011. Between these two dates Camping suffered a stroke. Camp-
ing’s followers had turned into Beckett characters, saddled with an expectation for 
something that not only did not arrive, but did not arrive twice, in two acts. One can 
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imagine a production of Godot staged outside Camping’s radio studio, in which Didi 
and Gogo are two crestfallen apocalyptics who struggle with spirituality as a promise 
kept only at one end. The vagabonds would sweep up not after doom has arrived but 
after its prediction has failed.
 4. Ross Douthat, “The Decadent Left,” New York Times, December 4, 2011. 
 5. Quoted in Karen A. Frank and Te-Sheng Huang, “Occupying Public Space, 
2011: From Tahrir Square to Zuccotti Park,” in Beyond Zuccotti Park, ed. Ron Shiffman 
et al. (Oakland, CA: New Village Press, 2012), 8. On October 12, 2011, Michael Bloom-
berg, the mayor of New York City, came to Zuccotti Park to announce that the encamp-
ment would have to be temporarily removed in order to clean up the area. A concern 
for “sanitation” thinly concealed the politics behind the decision.
 6. Samuel Beckett, Three Novels, 67.
 7. The workers on strike in France in 1968 eventually refused to join the cause 
with protesting students.
 8. Rebecca Solnit, “Civil Society at Ground Zero,” in The Occupy Handbook, ed. Ja-
net Byrne (New York: Back Bay Books, 2012), 297.
 9. Chris Hedges, “A Master Class in Occupation,” in Byrne, Occupy Handbook, 
164–72. He writes, “The park, especially at night, is a magnet for the city’s street popu-
lation” (167).
 10. Columbia University students protesting the Vietnam War occupied the presi-
dent’s office and other Columbia administrative buildings in 1968; ROTC headquar-
ters have been occupied in Boston, New York, and Puerto Rico; the monument of 
Wounded Knee was seized in 1973 by Oglala Lakota protesting the US government’s 
failure to fulfill treaties with Native American peoples.
 11. Simpson, “First Dublin Production,” in Cohn, “Waiting for Godot,” 34.
 12. Todd Gitlin, Occupy Nation: The Roots, the Spirit, and the Promise of Occupy Wall 
Street (New York: HarperCollins, 2012), 109.
 13. Judith Butler, “Bodies in Public,” in Occupy: Scenes from Occupied America, ed. 
Astra Taylor and Keith Cessen (New York: Verso, 2011), 193.
 14. Samuel Beckett, “Les Deux Besoins,” in Disjecta, 56 (author’s translation).
 15. Beckett, Waiting for Godot, 21.
 16. Ibid., 8.
 17. Adorno, “Trying to Understand ‘Endgame,’” 264.
 18. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 39.
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